Economic consequences of constitutions: A theory and survey

Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 3-42

  Kurrild Klitgaard, Peter ^a   Berggren, Niclas ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN DENMARK   (Denmark)

^b Stockholm School of Economics   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Constitutions; Economic effects; Political institutions; Property rights

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645913061     PISSN: 11456396     EISSN: 21531552     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1145-6396.1114     Document Type: Article

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