FURTHER EVIDENCE ON INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE VALUE

Advances in Financial Economics

Volumn 11, Issue , 2005, Pages 167-207

  Jennings, William W ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645864940     PISSN: 15693732     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1569-3732(04)11008-6     Document Type: Review

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