Learning from intelligence failures

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 435-450

  Hedley, John Hollister ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84865742630     PISSN: 08850607     EISSN: 15210561     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/08850600590945416     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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2. Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962).
3. Woodrow J. Kuhns, “Intelligence Failures”; Michael Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3, September 1977, pp. 461-502;
4. Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 1, October 1978
5. Christopher Brady, “Intelligence Failures: Plus ca Change…,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 4, No. 8, October 1993, p. 86.
6. Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War and Decision,” op. cit., p. 54.
7. Donald P. Steury, ed., Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950-1983 (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1996).
8. Harold P. Ford, Estimative Intelligence: The Purposes and Problems of National Intelligence Estimating, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993).
9. Sherman Kent, “A Crucial Estimate Relived,”, Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 35, No. 4, Winter 1991, p. 67-69
10. Peter Clement, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” in Fifty Years of Informing Policy, p. 92.
11. Emile A. Nakhleh, “The June 1967 and October 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars,” in Fifty Years of Informing Policy, p. 206.
12. Emile A. Nakhleh, Fifty Years of Informing Policy, pp. 205-207.
13. Richard Shryock, “The Intelligence Community Post-Mortem Program, 1973-1975,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 21, No. 3, Fall 1997, pp. 15-22.
14. John Hollister Hedley, “The DI: A History of Service,” in Fifty Years of Informing Policy, pp. 14-15.
15. Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC, Brassey’s, 2002), pp. 59-60.
16. Douglas J. MacEachin, Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Intelligence Community’s Record, 2002, p. 46.
17. Willis C. Armstrong, William Leonhart, William J. McCaffrey, and Herbert C. Rothenberg, “The Hazards of Single-Outcome Forecasting,” in H. Bradford Westerfield, ed., Inside CIA’s Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency’s Internal Journal, 1955-1992 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 238
18. Willis C. Armstrong, William Leonhart, William J. McCaffrey, and Herbert C. Rothenberg, “The Hazards of Single-Outcome Forecasting,” in H. Bradford Westerfield, ed., Inside CIA’s Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency’s Internal Journal, 1955-1992 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995)., pp. 238-239.
19. Willis C. Armstrong, William Leonhart, William J. McCaffrey, and Herbert C. Rothenberg, “The Hazards of Single-Outcome Forecasting,” in H. Bradford Westerfield, ed., Inside CIA’s Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency’s Internal Journal, 1955-1992 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), pp 241-243.
20. Benjamin B. Fischer, ed., At Cold War's End: U.S. Intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1989-1991 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1999).
21. Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett, eds., Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2003).
22. Douglas MacEachin, Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, p. 46
23. Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1999).
24. Stephen Marrin, “CIA’s Kent School: Improving Training for New Analysts,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 16, No. 4, Winter 2003-2004, pp. 609-637.
25. John Hollister Hedley, Fifty Years of Informing Policy, pp. 15-16.
26. John Hollister Hedley, “Myths About Intelligence,” The Washington Post, 28 November 2003, p. 41.
27. John Hollister Hedley, Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 35, No. 4, op. cit., p. 65