The perils of shallow theory: Intelligence reform and the 9/11 commission

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 609-637

  Rovner, Joshua ^a   Long, Austin ^a  

^a CLARK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645557019     PISSN: 08850607     EISSN: 15210561     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/08850600500177119     Document Type: Article

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