Agents that acquire negotiation strategies using a game theoretic learning theory

International Journal of Intelligent Systems

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 5-39

  Nawa, Norberte Eiji ^a  

^a ADVANCED TELECOMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH INSTITUTE INTERNATIONAL   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; LEARNING ALGORITHMS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

COMPUTATIONAL AGENTS; EXPERIENCE-WEIGHTED ATTRACTION THEORY; NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES;

INTELLIGENT AGENTS;

EID: 33645275497     PISSN: 08848173     EISSN: 1098111X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/int.20119     Document Type: Article

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