Bayesian learning in negotiation

International Journal of Human Computer Studies

Volumn 48, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 125-141

  Zeng, Dajun ^a   Sycara, Katia ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SOFTWARE; DECISION MAKING; HUMAN COMPUTER INTERACTION; INTERACTIVE COMPUTER SYSTEMS; LEARNING SYSTEMS;

AUTONOMOUS INTERACTING SOFTWARE AGENTS; BAYESIAN LEARNING; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; SEQUENTIAL NEGOTIATION MODEL;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 0031679752     PISSN: 10715819     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/ijhc.1997.0164     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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