Team incentives under relative performance evaluation

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 187-206

  Ishida, Junichiro ^a  

^a OSAKA UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645116547     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: 15309134     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00097.x     Document Type: Article

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