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Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 217-237

Bargaining with imperfect commitment

(1) Kambe, Shinsuke a

a GAKUSHUIN UNIVERSITY (Japan)

Author keywords

Unique equilibrium; war of attrition

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001474162 PISSN: 08998256 EISSN: None Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0700 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (68)

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