Political bargaining in a federation: Buchanan meets Coase

European Economic Review

Volumn 48, Issue 5, 2004, Pages 983-999

  Gradstein, Mark ^a,b,c  

^a BEN GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV   (Israel)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c CESIFO   (Germany)

Author keywords

Federation; Secession

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; FEDERAL SYSTEM; POLITICAL INTEGRATION; SECESSIONISM; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 3242658376     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2003.12.006     Document Type: Article

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