Vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 717-743

  Choi, Jay Pil ^a   Yi, Sang Seung ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034553038     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2696356     Document Type: Article

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