The viability of cooperation based on interpersonal commitment

JASSS

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 159-181

  Back, István ^a   Flache, Andreas ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Agent Based Simulation; Evolution; Fairness; Help Exchange; Interpersonal Commitment; Reciprocity

Indexed keywords

EID: 32044431661     PISSN: 14607425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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