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Volumn 23, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 437-448

The fragility of cooperation: A false feedback study of a sequential iterated prisoner's dilemma

Author keywords

Cooperation; Interpersonal bargaining; Prisoner's dilemma; Tit for tat

Indexed keywords


EID: 0036289760     PISSN: 01674870     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-4870(02)00095-8     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (31)

References (32)
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.