On the stability of best reply and gradient systems with applications to imperfectly competitive models

Economics Letters

Volumn 51, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 59-65

  Corchon, Luis C ^a   Mas Colell, Andreu ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Best reply; Chaos; Gradient; Stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030306104     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(95)00752-0     Document Type: Article

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