Four simple tests of campaign contributions and trade policy preferences

Economics and Politics

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 163-187

  Beaulieu, Eugene ^a   Magee, Christopher ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

^b BUCKNELL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EXPORT; PROTECTIONISM; TRADE LIBERALIZATION; TRADE POLICY; TRADE UNION;

EID: 3142776286     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2004.00136.x     Document Type: Article

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