Constitutional courts and legislative-executive relations: The case of Ukraine

Political Science Quarterly

Volumn 119, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 143-169

  Brown, Trevor L ^a   Wise, Charles R ^b  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142660235     PISSN: 00323195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/20202308     Document Type: Review

References (101)

1. See Theodore J. Lowi, "Presidential Democracy in America: Toward the Homogenized Regime," Political Science Quarterly 109 (Special Issue 1994): 401-440; Mauro Calise, "The Italian Particarcy: Beyond President and Parliament," Political Science Quarterly 109 (Special Issue 1994): 441-480; Leon Epstein, "Changing Perception of the British System," Political Science Quarterly 109 (Special Issue 1994): 483-513.
2. See Theodore J. Lowi, "Presidential Democracy in America: Toward the Homogenized Regime," Political Science Quarterly 109 (Special Issue 1994): 401-440; Mauro Calise, "The Italian Particarcy: Beyond President and Parliament," Political Science Quarterly 109 (Special Issue 1994): 441-480; Leon Epstein, "Changing Perception of the British System," Political Science Quarterly 109 (Special Issue 1994): 483-513.
3. See Theodore J. Lowi, "Presidential Democracy in America: Toward the Homogenized Regime," Political Science Quarterly 109 (Special Issue 1994): 401-440; Mauro Calise, "The Italian Particarcy: Beyond President and Parliament," Political Science Quarterly 109 (Special Issue 1994): 441-480; Leon Epstein, "Changing Perception of the British System," Political Science Quarterly 109 (Special Issue 1994): 483-513.
4. Juan Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," Journal of Democracy 1 (Fall 1990): 51-69.
5. Donald Horowitz, "Comparing Democratic Systems," Journal of Democracy 1 (Fall 1990): 73-79.
6. Other good treatments of the basic debate over presidential and parliamentary systems include Sergio Fabbrini, "Presidents, Parliaments, & Good Government," Journal of Democracy 6 (July 1995): 128-138; Juan Linz, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 66-86; and Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 173-194.
7. Other good treatments of the basic debate over presidential and parliamentary systems include Sergio Fabbrini, "Presidents, Parliaments, & Good Government," Journal of Democracy 6 (July 1995): 128-138; Juan Linz, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 66-86; and Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 173-194.
8. Other good treatments of the basic debate over presidential and parliamentary systems include Sergio Fabbrini, "Presidents, Parliaments, & Good Government," Journal of Democracy 6 (July 1995): 128-138; Juan Linz, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 66-86; and Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 173-194.
9. Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Presidentialism and Parliamentarism in Comparative Perspective" in Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 119-136. Adam Przeworski, M. Alvarez, J. Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, "What Makes Democracies Endure?" Journal of Democracy 7 (January 1996): 39-55.
10. Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Presidentialism and Parliamentarism in Comparative Perspective" in Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 119-136. Adam Przeworski, M. Alvarez, J. Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, "What Makes Democracies Endure?" Journal of Democracy 7 (January 1996): 39-55.
11. Doh Shin, "On the Third Wave of Democratization," World Politics 47 (October 1994): 135-170.
12. Timothy Power and Mark Gasiorowski, "Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World," Comparative Political Studies 30 (April 1997): 123-155.
13. See Giovanni Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism nor Parliamentarism" in Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 106-118; Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy" in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 94-108; Paul Kubicek, "Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine," Communist & Post-Communist Studies 27 (December 1994): 423-441; Phillip Roeder, "Varieties of Post-Soviet Authoritarian Regimes," Post-Soviet Affairs 10 (January 1994): 61-101; Gerald Easter, "Preference for Presidentialism: Post-Communist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS," World Politics 49 (January 1997): 184-211.
14. See Giovanni Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism nor Parliamentarism" in Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 106-118; Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy" in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 94-108; Paul Kubicek, "Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine," Communist & Post-Communist Studies 27 (December 1994): 423-441; Phillip Roeder, "Varieties of Post-Soviet Authoritarian Regimes," Post-Soviet Affairs 10 (January 1994): 61-101; Gerald Easter, "Preference for Presidentialism: Post-Communist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS," World Politics 49 (January 1997): 184-211.
15. See Giovanni Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism nor Parliamentarism" in Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 106-118; Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy" in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 94-108; Paul Kubicek, "Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine," Communist & Post-Communist Studies 27 (December 1994): 423-441; Phillip Roeder, "Varieties of Post-Soviet Authoritarian Regimes," Post-Soviet Affairs 10 (January 1994): 61-101; Gerald Easter, "Preference for Presidentialism: Post-Communist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS," World Politics 49 (January 1997): 184-211.
16. See Giovanni Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism nor Parliamentarism" in Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 106-118; Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy" in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 94-108; Paul Kubicek, "Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine," Communist & Post-Communist Studies 27 (December 1994): 423-441; Phillip Roeder, "Varieties of Post-Soviet Authoritarian Regimes," Post-Soviet Affairs 10 (January 1994): 61-101; Gerald Easter, "Preference for Presidentialism: Post-Communist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS," World Politics 49 (January 1997): 184-211.
17. See Giovanni Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism nor Parliamentarism" in Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 106-118; Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy" in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 94-108; Paul Kubicek, "Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine," Communist & Post-Communist Studies 27 (December 1994): 423-441; Phillip Roeder, "Varieties of Post-Soviet Authoritarian Regimes," Post-Soviet Affairs 10 (January 1994): 61-101; Gerald Easter, "Preference for Presidentialism: Post-Communist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS," World Politics 49 (January 1997): 184-211.
18. See Peter Ordeshook, "Institutions and Incentives," Journal of Democracy 6 (April 1995): 46-60; James McGregor, "The Presidency in East Central Europe," RFE/RL Research Report 3 (January 1994): 23-31; Matthew Shugart and John Carey, Presidents and Assemblies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 1-316); John Carey and Matthew Carey, Executive Decree Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 274-298; John Ishiyama and Matthew Velten, "Presidential Power and Democratic Development in Post-Communist Politics," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31 (September 1998): 217-233.
19. See Peter Ordeshook, "Institutions and Incentives," Journal of Democracy 6 (April 1995): 46-60; James McGregor, "The Presidency in East Central Europe," RFE/RL Research Report 3 (January 1994): 23-31; Matthew Shugart and John Carey, Presidents and Assemblies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 1-316); John Carey and Matthew Carey, Executive Decree Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 274-298; John Ishiyama and Matthew Velten, "Presidential Power and Democratic Development in Post-Communist Politics," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31 (September 1998): 217-233.
20. See Peter Ordeshook, "Institutions and Incentives," Journal of Democracy 6 (April 1995): 46-60; James McGregor, "The Presidency in East Central Europe," RFE/RL Research Report 3 (January 1994): 23-31; Matthew Shugart and John Carey, Presidents and Assemblies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 1-316); John Carey and Matthew Carey, Executive Decree Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 274-298; John Ishiyama and Matthew Velten, "Presidential Power and Democratic Development in Post-Communist Politics," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31 (September 1998): 217-233.
21. See Peter Ordeshook, "Institutions and Incentives," Journal of Democracy 6 (April 1995): 46-60; James McGregor, "The Presidency in East Central Europe," RFE/RL Research Report 3 (January 1994): 23-31; Matthew Shugart and John Carey, Presidents and Assemblies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 1-316); John Carey and Matthew Carey, Executive Decree Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 274-298; John Ishiyama and Matthew Velten, "Presidential Power and Democratic Development in Post-Communist Politics," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31 (September 1998): 217-233.
22. See Peter Ordeshook, "Institutions and Incentives," Journal of Democracy 6 (April 1995): 46-60; James McGregor, "The Presidency in East Central Europe," RFE/RL Research Report 3 (January 1994): 23-31; Matthew Shugart and John Carey, Presidents and Assemblies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 1-316); John Carey and Matthew Carey, Executive Decree Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 274-298; John Ishiyama and Matthew Velten, "Presidential Power and Democratic Development in Post-Communist Politics," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31 (September 1998): 217-233.
23. Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination," Comparative Political Studies 26 (July 1993): 198-228.
24. Scott Mainwaring, "Multipartism, Robust Federalism, and Presidentialism: The Case of Brazil" in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart, eds., Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 55-109.
25. Thomas Baylis, "Presidents vs. Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe," World Politics 48 (April 1996): 297-323.
26. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart, "Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal," Comparative Politics 29 (July 1997): 449-471; Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart, "Conclusion: Presidentialism and the party System" in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart, eds., Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 394-439.
27. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart, "Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal," Comparative Politics 29 (July 1997): 449-471; Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart, "Conclusion: Presidentialism and the party System" in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart, eds., Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 394-439.
28. Kent Eaton, "Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism in the Policy Arena," Comparative Politics 32 (April 2000): 355-376. Eaton expands the discussion of differences between the two systems beyond regime stability to include policy making and makes a similar argument about the distribution of powers. Eaton argues that the specific distribution of powers between the two branches is the key factor in determining policy outcomes rather than the choice of presidentialism or parliamentarism.
29. George Tsebelis, "Veto Players and Institutional Analysis," Governance 13 (October 2000): 441-474. See also Nicos Alivizatos, "Judges Veto Players" in Herbert Doring, ed., Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 566-591.
30. George Tsebelis, "Veto Players and Institutional Analysis," Governance 13 (October 2000): 441-474. See also Nicos Alivizatos, "Judges Veto Players" in Herbert Doring, ed., Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 566-591.
31. See Martin Shapiro, "Public Law and Judicial Politics" in Ada Finifter, ed., Political Science: The State of the Discipline (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1993), 365-381.
32. See William Kitchin, "Legal Reform and the Expansion of Judicial Power in Russia" in C. Neal Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder, eds., The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 441-459; Nico Steytler, "The Judicialization of Namibian Politics" in Tate and Vallinder, Global Expansion of Judicial Power, 485-511; C. Neal Tate, "The Philippines and Southeast Asia" in Tate and Vallinder, Global Expansion of Judicial Power, 463-484; James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, and Vanessa A. Baird, "On the Legitimacy of National High Courts," American Political Science Review 92 (June 1998): 343-358.
33. See William Kitchin, "Legal Reform and the Expansion of Judicial Power in Russia" in C. Neal Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder, eds., The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 441-459; Nico Steytler, "The Judicialization of Namibian Politics" in Tate and Vallinder, Global Expansion of Judicial Power, 485-511; C. Neal Tate, "The Philippines and Southeast Asia" in Tate and Vallinder, Global Expansion of Judicial Power, 463-484; James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, and Vanessa A. Baird, "On the Legitimacy of National High Courts," American Political Science Review 92 (June 1998): 343-358.
34. See William Kitchin, "Legal Reform and the Expansion of Judicial Power in Russia" in C. Neal Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder, eds., The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 441-459; Nico Steytler, "The Judicialization of Namibian Politics" in Tate and Vallinder, Global Expansion of Judicial Power, 485-511; C. Neal Tate, "The Philippines and Southeast Asia" in Tate and Vallinder, Global Expansion of Judicial Power, 463-484; James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, and Vanessa A. Baird, "On the Legitimacy of National High Courts," American Political Science Review 92 (June 1998): 343-358.
35. See William Kitchin, "Legal Reform and the Expansion of Judicial Power in Russia" in C. Neal Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder, eds., The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 441-459; Nico Steytler, "The Judicialization of Namibian Politics" in Tate and Vallinder, Global Expansion of Judicial Power, 485-511; C. Neal Tate, "The Philippines and Southeast Asia" in Tate and Vallinder, Global Expansion of Judicial Power, 463-484; James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, and Vanessa A. Baird, "On the Legitimacy of National High Courts," American Political Science Review 92 (June 1998): 343-358.
36. See Herman Schwartz, "The New East European Constitutional Courts," Michigan Journal of International Law 13 (Summer 1992): 741-785; Alec Stone, "Abstract Constitutional Review and Policy Making in Western Europe" in Donald W. Jackson and C. Neal Tate, eds., Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy (London: Greenwood Press, 1992), 41-57; Donald P. Kommers, "The Federal Constitutional Court in the German Political System," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 470-491; Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone, "The Constitutional Politics of Europe," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 397-420; Susan Sterett, "Judicial Review in Britain," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 421-442; Mary L. Volcansek, "Political Power and Judicial Review in Italy," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 492-509; Sarah Wright Sheive, "Central and Eastern Europe Constitutional Courts and the Antimajoritarian Objection to Judicial Review," Law and Policy in International Business 26 (Summer 1995): 1201-1233; Cheryl Thomas, "The Attempt to Institute Judicial Review in the Former USSR" in Tate and Vallinder, Global Expansion of Judicial Power, 421-440.
37. See Herman Schwartz, "The New East European Constitutional Courts," Michigan Journal of International Law 13 (Summer 1992): 741-785; Alec Stone, "Abstract Constitutional Review and Policy Making in Western Europe" in Donald W. Jackson and C. Neal Tate, eds., Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy (London: Greenwood Press, 1992), 41-57; Donald P. Kommers, "The Federal Constitutional Court in the German Political System," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 470-491; Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone, "The Constitutional Politics of Europe," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 397-420; Susan Sterett, "Judicial Review in Britain," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 421-442; Mary L. Volcansek, "Political Power and Judicial Review in Italy," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 492-509; Sarah Wright Sheive, "Central and Eastern Europe Constitutional Courts and the Antimajoritarian Objection to Judicial Review," Law and Policy in International Business 26 (Summer 1995): 1201-1233; Cheryl Thomas, "The Attempt to Institute Judicial Review in the Former USSR" in Tate and Vallinder, Global Expansion of Judicial Power, 421-440.
38. See Herman Schwartz, "The New East European Constitutional Courts," Michigan Journal of International Law 13 (Summer 1992): 741-785; Alec Stone, "Abstract Constitutional Review and Policy Making in Western Europe" in Donald W. Jackson and C. Neal Tate, eds., Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy (London: Greenwood Press, 1992), 41-57; Donald P. Kommers, "The Federal Constitutional Court in the German Political System," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 470-491; Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone, "The Constitutional Politics of Europe," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 397-420; Susan Sterett, "Judicial Review in Britain," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 421-442; Mary L. Volcansek, "Political Power and Judicial Review in Italy," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 492-509; Sarah Wright Sheive, "Central and Eastern Europe Constitutional Courts and the Antimajoritarian Objection to Judicial Review," Law and Policy in International Business 26 (Summer 1995): 1201-1233; Cheryl Thomas, "The Attempt to Institute Judicial Review in the Former USSR" in Tate and Vallinder, Global Expansion of Judicial Power, 421-440.
39. See Herman Schwartz, "The New East European Constitutional Courts," Michigan Journal of International Law 13 (Summer 1992): 741-785; Alec Stone, "Abstract Constitutional Review and Policy Making in Western Europe" in Donald W. Jackson and C. Neal Tate, eds., Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy (London: Greenwood Press, 1992), 41-57; Donald P. Kommers, "The Federal Constitutional Court in the German Political System," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 470-491; Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone, "The Constitutional Politics of Europe," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 397-420; Susan Sterett, "Judicial Review in Britain," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 421-442; Mary L. Volcansek, "Political Power and Judicial Review in Italy," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 492-509; Sarah Wright Sheive, "Central and Eastern Europe Constitutional Courts and the Antimajoritarian Objection to Judicial Review," Law and Policy in International Business 26 (Summer 1995): 1201-1233; Cheryl Thomas, "The Attempt to Institute Judicial Review in the Former USSR" in Tate and Vallinder, Global Expansion of Judicial Power, 421-440.
40. See Herman Schwartz, "The New East European Constitutional Courts," Michigan Journal of International Law 13 (Summer 1992): 741-785; Alec Stone, "Abstract Constitutional Review and Policy Making in Western Europe" in Donald W. Jackson and C. Neal Tate, eds., Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy (London: Greenwood Press, 1992), 41-57; Donald P. Kommers, "The Federal Constitutional Court in the German Political System," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 470-491; Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone, "The Constitutional Politics of Europe," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 397-420; Susan Sterett, "Judicial Review in Britain," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 421-442; Mary L. Volcansek, "Political Power and Judicial Review in Italy," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 492-509; Sarah Wright Sheive, "Central and Eastern Europe Constitutional Courts and the Antimajoritarian Objection to Judicial Review," Law and Policy in International Business 26 (Summer 1995): 1201-1233; Cheryl Thomas, "The Attempt to Institute Judicial Review in the Former USSR" in Tate and Vallinder, Global Expansion of Judicial Power, 421-440.
41. See Herman Schwartz, "The New East European Constitutional Courts," Michigan Journal of International Law 13 (Summer 1992): 741-785; Alec Stone, "Abstract Constitutional Review and Policy Making in Western Europe" in Donald W. Jackson and C. Neal Tate, eds., Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy (London: Greenwood Press, 1992), 41-57; Donald P. Kommers, "The Federal Constitutional Court in the German Political System," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 470-491; Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone, "The Constitutional Politics of Europe," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 397-420; Susan Sterett, "Judicial Review in Britain," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 421-442; Mary L. Volcansek, "Political Power and Judicial Review in Italy," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 492-509; Sarah Wright Sheive, "Central and Eastern Europe Constitutional Courts and the Antimajoritarian Objection to Judicial Review," Law and Policy in International Business 26 (Summer 1995): 1201-1233; Cheryl Thomas, "The Attempt to Institute Judicial Review in the Former USSR" in Tate and Vallinder, Global Expansion of Judicial Power, 421-440.
42. See Herman Schwartz, "The New East European Constitutional Courts," Michigan Journal of International Law 13 (Summer 1992): 741-785; Alec Stone, "Abstract Constitutional Review and Policy Making in Western Europe" in Donald W. Jackson and C. Neal Tate, eds., Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy (London: Greenwood Press, 1992), 41-57; Donald P. Kommers, "The Federal Constitutional Court in the German Political System," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 470-491; Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone, "The Constitutional Politics of Europe," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 397-420; Susan Sterett, "Judicial Review in Britain," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 421-442; Mary L. Volcansek, "Political Power and Judicial Review in Italy," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 492-509; Sarah Wright Sheive, "Central and Eastern Europe Constitutional Courts and the Antimajoritarian Objection to Judicial Review," Law and Policy in International Business 26 (Summer 1995): 1201-1233; Cheryl Thomas, "The Attempt to Institute Judicial Review in the Former USSR" in Tate and Vallinder, Global Expansion of Judicial Power, 421-440.
43. See Herman Schwartz, "The New East European Constitutional Courts," Michigan Journal of International Law 13 (Summer 1992): 741-785; Alec Stone, "Abstract Constitutional Review and Policy Making in Western Europe" in Donald W. Jackson and C. Neal Tate, eds., Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy (London: Greenwood Press, 1992), 41-57; Donald P. Kommers, "The Federal Constitutional Court in the German Political System," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 470-491; Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone, "The Constitutional Politics of Europe," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 397-420; Susan Sterett, "Judicial Review in Britain," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 421-442; Mary L. Volcansek, "Political Power and Judicial Review in Italy," Comparative Political Studies 26 (January 1994): 492-509; Sarah Wright Sheive, "Central and Eastern Europe Constitutional Courts and the Antimajoritarian Objection to Judicial Review," Law and Policy in International Business 26 (Summer 1995): 1201-1233; Cheryl Thomas, "The Attempt to Institute Judicial Review in the Former USSR" in Tate and Vallinder, Global Expansion of Judicial Power, 421-440.
44. C. Neal Tate and Stacia L. Haynie, " Authoritarianism and the Functions of Courts: A Time Series Analysis of the Philippine Supreme Court, 1961-1987," Law & Society Review 27 (Summer 1993): 707-739; Christopher Larkins, "Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis," American Journal of Comparative Law 44 (Fall 1996): 605-626; Christopher Larkins, "The Judiciary and Delegative Democracy in Argentina," Comparative Politics 30 (July 1998): 423-442.
45. C. Neal Tate and Stacia L. Haynie, " Authoritarianism and the Functions of Courts: A Time Series Analysis of the Philippine Supreme Court, 1961-1987," Law & Society Review 27 (Summer 1993): 707-739; Christopher Larkins, "Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis," American Journal of Comparative Law 44 (Fall 1996): 605-626; Christopher Larkins, "The Judiciary and Delegative Democracy in Argentina," Comparative Politics 30 (July 1998): 423-442.
46. C. Neal Tate and Stacia L. Haynie, " Authoritarianism and the Functions of Courts: A Time Series Analysis of the Philippine Supreme Court, 1961-1987," Law & Society Review 27 (Summer 1993): 707-739; Christopher Larkins, "Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis," American Journal of Comparative Law 44 (Fall 1996): 605-626; Christopher Larkins, "The Judiciary and Delegative Democracy in Argentina," Comparative Politics 30 (July 1998): 423-442.
47. Georg Vanberg, "Establishing Judicial Independence in West Germany: The Impact of Opinion Leadership and the Separation of Powers," Comparative Politics 32 (April 2000): 333-353.
48. Again, Eaton, "Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism," makes a similar argument about legislative-executive arrangements and policy making, 355-376.
49. Charles R. Wise and Trevor L. Brown, "The Separation of Powers in Ukraine," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 32 (March 1999): 23-44.
50. Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies, 131-166.
51. Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy," 22-24; Mainwaring and Shugart, "Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy," 465-467; and Mainwaring and Shugart, Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, 405-416.
52. Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy," 22-24; Mainwaring and Shugart, "Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy," 465-467; and Mainwaring and Shugart, Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, 405-416.
53. Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy," 22-24; Mainwaring and Shugart, "Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy," 465-467; and Mainwaring and Shugart, Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, 405-416.
54. Vanberg, "Establishing Judicial Independence in West Germany," 334-341.
55. Daniel P. Franklin and Michael J. Baun, Political Culture and Constitutionalism: A Comparative Approach (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 219-232.
56. Vanberg, "Establishing Judicial Independence in West Germany," 334.
57. See C. Neal Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder, "Judicialization and the Future of Politics and Policy" in Tate and Vallinder, Global Expansion of Judicial Power, 517-528; Sheive, "Central and Eastern Europe," 1201-1202.
58. See C. Neal Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder, "Judicialization and the Future of Politics and Policy" in Tate and Vallinder, Global Expansion of Judicial Power, 517-528; Sheive, "Central and Eastern Europe," 1201-1202.
59. Kommers, "Federal Constitutional Court," 479-482.
60. See Sheive, "Central and Eastern Europe," 1201-1202; Thomas, "Attempt to Institute Judicial Review," 421-425; William Kitchin, "Establishing and Exercising Judicial Review in the Soviet Union: The Beginnings" in Jackson and Tate, Comparative Judicial Review, 59-74; and most recently, Herman Schwartz, The Struggle for Justice in Post-Communist Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 1-348.
61. See Sheive, "Central and Eastern Europe," 1201-1202; Thomas, "Attempt to Institute Judicial Review," 421-425; William Kitchin, "Establishing and Exercising Judicial Review in the Soviet Union: The Beginnings" in Jackson and Tate, Comparative Judicial Review, 59-74; and most recently, Herman Schwartz, The Struggle for Justice in Post-Communist Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 1-348.
62. See Sheive, "Central and Eastern Europe," 1201-1202; Thomas, "Attempt to Institute Judicial Review," 421-425; William Kitchin, "Establishing and Exercising Judicial Review in the Soviet Union: The Beginnings" in Jackson and Tate, Comparative Judicial Review, 59-74; and most recently, Herman Schwartz, The Struggle for Justice in Post-Communist Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 1-348.
63. See Sheive, "Central and Eastern Europe," 1201-1202; Thomas, "Attempt to Institute Judicial Review," 421-425; William Kitchin, "Establishing and Exercising Judicial Review in the Soviet Union: The Beginnings" in Jackson and Tate, Comparative Judicial Review, 59-74; and most recently, Herman Schwartz, The Struggle for Justice in Post-Communist Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 1-348.
64. Martin Shapiro, "Courts" in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol. 5: Governmental Institutions and Processes (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 321-365.
65. Tate and Haynie, "Authoritarianism and the Functions of Courts," 713-717. Tate and Haynie analyze the Philippine Supreme Court's conflict resolution function in terms of civil suits between conflicting parties, whether they are individuals, groups, or organizations.
66. Robert Sharlet, "The Russian Constitutional Court: The First Term," Post-Soviet Affairs 9 (January 1993): 1-39.
67. The decree was published in Rossiiskaya gazeta, 9 October 1993.
68. Gordon B. Smith, Reforming the Russian Legal System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1-325.
69. Ibid., 275-283.
70. Larkins, "Judiciary and Delegative Democracy," 436-437. Larkins argues that in 1989, Argentine President Carlos Menem succeeded in inducing independent-minded justices to retire and appointed more authoritarian-minded justices to the court. In this way, the court became a mechanism for legitimizing Menem's power grab, although in the end, the court's legitimacy and the rule of law were tarnished.
71. Robert Dahl, "Decision Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy Maker," Journal of Public Law 6 (1957): 279-305. In an analysis of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, Dahl highlights the political tightrope the Court must walk in order to maintain its position among the other two branches.
72. The American Bar Association's Division for Public Education has produced a concise summary of the research on judicial independence, both in the United States and comparatively, in Judicial Independence: Essays, Bibliography, and Discussion Guide (1999).
73. Owen Fiss, "The Right Degree of Independence" in Irwin P. Stotzky, ed., Transition to Democracy in Latin America. The Role of the Judiciary (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 55-72.
74. Larkins, "Judicial Independence and Democratization," 605-626.
75. Donald Jackson, "Judicial Independence in Cross-National Perspective," Judicial Independence: Essays, Bibliography, and Discussion Guide (Washington, DC: American Bar Association, 1999), 8-12.
76. Ibid., 9.
77. Stone, "Abstract Constitutional Review," 42-46.
78. Ibid., 42-46.
79. Florin Vasilescu, "The Role and Competences of the Constitutional Court," in The Role of the Constitutional Court in the Consolidation of the Rule of Law (Council of Europe, 1994), 33-45; Victor Dan Zlatescu, "Organization, Operation and Practice of the Constitutional Court" in Role of the Constitutional Court, 56-69.
80. Florin Vasilescu, "The Role and Competences of the Constitutional Court," in The Role of the Constitutional Court in the Consolidation of the Rule of Law (Council of Europe, 1994), 33-45; Victor Dan Zlatescu, "Organization, Operation and Practice of the Constitutional Court" in Role of the Constitutional Court, 56-69.
81. Csaba Varga, "Transformation to Rule of Law from No-Law: Societal Contexture of the Democratic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe," Connecticut Journal of International Law 8 (Spring 1993): 487-504.
82. Robert Sharlet, "Variables of Legal Transformation in the Newly Independent States," Rule of Law Consortium Newsletter 10 (Winter 1997): 16-18.
83. Smith, Reforming the Russian Legal System, 275-283.
84. See Wise and Brown, "The Separation of Powers in Ukraine," for a detailed discussion of why Ukraine delayed so long in passing a constitution.
85. Ukraine is still in the process of establishing a civil code.
86. Schwartz, "New East European Constitutional Courts," 770-775.
87. Tate and Vallinder, "Judicialization and the Future of Politics and Policy," 515-528.
88. Wise and Brown, "Separation of Powers in Ukraine," 28-42.
89. In the analysis for this section, we have benefited from access to multiple data sources in researching the development of Ukraine's constitutional court. Primary sources include Ukraine's 1996 constitution (English version available at http://www.rada.kiev.ua/const/conengl.htm), The Regulations of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (translated by the American Bar Association, summer 1997), and select cases of the constitutional court (a subsequent footnote references the specific cases analyzed). Much of our research is also based on interviews with Ukraine's first citizen plaintiff of the constitutional court, Oleksandr Barabash (15 November 1997), the final appointment to the bench of the constitutional court, Mykola Korniyenko (16 June 1997 and 18 November 1997), and the President's Representative to the Constitutional Court, Vladimir Nosov (29 July 1998). All interviews were conducted either by a native Ukrainian speaker or with the translation of a native Ukrainian speaker.
90. Visnyk of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine 1 (Kiev, Ukraine: Publication Department of the Constitutional Court, 1997), 2-37.
91. Justice Mykola Kornienko, interview with Trevor L. Brown and Charles R. Wise, 16 June 1997.
92. Stephen White, Graeme Gill, and Darrell Slider, The Politics of Transition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 212-273.
93. Charles R. Wise and Volodymyr Pigenko, "The Separation of Powers Puzzle in Ukraine: Sorting Out Responsibilities and Relationships between President, Parliament, and Prime Minister" in Taras Kuzio, Robert Kravchuck, and Paul D'Anieri, eds., State and Institution Building in Ukraine (London: Macmillan, 1999), 25-55.
94. This analysis was based on a review of the fourteen separation of powers cases heard by the court since its inception in 1997. Because of constraints on space, the full analysis of these cases is not included in this article. All cases and the authors' analysis of the cases are available upon request from the authors. The following cases of Ukraine's Constitutional Court were analyzed: #N 03/29-97; #01/1909-97; #01/34-97; #03/690-97; #1-26/98; #1-15/98; #01/1501-97; #03/2444-97 1-988; #01-19/98; #01-29/98; #01-18/99; #01-19/99; #N 1-91/2000; #N 1-21/2000; and #N 1-27/2000. These cases were translated by Natalia Rijova, a native Ukrainian speaker and former employee of the Parliamentary Development Project.
95. Case #01/1909-97 heard on 11 July 1997 and Case #01/34-97 heard on 23 December 1997.
96. As originally structured, the Accounting Chamber performed functions similar to the General Accounting Office (GAO) in the United States.
97. Case # 03/690-97 heard on 24 December 1997.
98. Case #N 1-27/2000 heard on 27 March 2000.
99. The survey of national deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of the Fourteenth Convocation was conducted in Ukraine from 15 January 1999 to 15 April 1999. The survey consisted of over forty-three questions and 150 survey items. Three hundred three deputies participated in the survey, and twenty-one deputies participated in a pretest of the survey the first week of February. The survey consisted of both open-ended and closed-ended questions. The Parliamentary Development Project developed the survey instrument and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) carried out the interviews. The sample for the survey was drawn from the complete list of Verkhovna Rada deputies from the Fourteenth Convocation. Out of the entire membership of 444 deputies, 303 deputies participated in the survey and twenty-one in the pretest. A sample of this size is sufficiently reliable to generalize to the entire population of deputies with ±1.5% of sampling error.
100. We categorized factions along the following ideological spectrum. The left bloc is composed of the Communist party of Ukraine, the Progressive Socialist party, and the Socialist party. The center-left bloc is composed of the Peasant party, the Hromada party, and the Green party. The center-right bloc is composed of the Social Democratic party, the People's Democratic party, the Fatherland party, and the Rebirth of Regions party. The right bloc is composed of two factions of the Rukh party and the Reforms and Order party. Finally, the independent bloc is composed of deputies with no faction affiliation.
101. Vladimir Nosov, interview with Trevor L. Brown and Charles R. Wise, 29 July 1998.