Managerial pay and firm performance - Danish evidence

Scandinavian Journal of Management

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 269-286

  Eriksson, Tor ^a   Lausten, Mette ^a  

^a AARHUS SCHOOL OF BUSINESS   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Firm performance; Managerial pay

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034259973     PISSN: 09565221     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0956-5221(99)00026-3     Document Type: Article

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