Turkish accession to the European Union: Challenges and opportunities

World Affairs

Volumn 168, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 67-78

  Kubicek, Paul ^a,b,c  

^a OAKLAND UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b KOÇ UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

^c BOGAZICI UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; TRADE AGREEMENT;

EURASIA; EUROPE; EUROPEAN UNION; TURKEY;

EID: 30744460130     PISSN: 00438200     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3200/WAFS.168.2.67-78     Document Type: Article

References (95)

1. With a population of approximately 70 million people, Turkey is almost twice as large as Poland, the largest state to join the EU in 2004. If current trends hold, Turkey would become the largest country in the EU within a generation.
2. In 2004, the GDP per capita (purchasing power parity) was $6,700, a quarter of the EU's average and far less than the states admitted in 2004 (for example, Slovenia $19,000; Slovakia $13,300; Poland $11,100; and Latvia, $10,200). Even Romania, at $7,000 per person, fares better than Turkey. Data from CIA's World Factbook online at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ fields/2004.html (accessed Jan. 25, 2005).
3. The EU reports that 35.4 percent of employment is in agriculture in Turkey compared with 19 percent in Poland, which had the largest agricultural sector of the ten states that joined in 2004. For data, see Commission of the European Communities, 2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession (Brussels, October 9, 2002), 156, http:// europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/tu_en.pdf.
4. Aremand Lepartmentier and Laurent Zecchini, "Pour on contre l'adhesion de la Turquie a l'Union europeenne," Le Monde, November 8, 2002.
5. William Pfaff, "What's Left of the Union?" New York Review of Books 52, no. 12 (July 14, 2005): 26-29.
6. All three have expressed interest in joining the EU at some point in the future. Although at present, the door to membership for all three is not open, it would be harder to maintain that position once Turkey is let into the union.
7. For the failure of the Muslim world, particularly the Ottomans, to engage with Europe and import liberal ideas, see Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002).
8. critical discussion of Turkish history can also be found in Erik Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004).
9. Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979).
10. J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question (Oxford: Clarendon, 1919), 3.
11. Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gokalp, ed. and trans. Niyazi Berkes (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1959), 276. Gokalp was careful, however, to make a distinction between civilization, which was universal in scope, and culture, which was defined locally.
12. Paul Gentizon, quoted in Paul Dumont, "The Origins of Kemalist Ideology," in Ataturk and the Modernization of Turkey, ed. Jacob Landau, 26 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984).
13. Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1997), 322.
14. Turkey formally adopted multiparty democracy in 1950, although this would be periodically interrupted by military coups. For NATO's willingness to look askance at democratic shortcomings among its members, see Dan Reiter, "Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy," International Security 25, no. 1 (2001): 41-67.
15. Ana Lundgren, "Prioritisations in the Enlargement Process: Are Some Candidates More 'European' than Others," in Enlargement in Perspective, ARENA Report no. 2, ed. Helene Sjursen, 151-74 (Oslo: Centre for Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation-State, 2005).
16. The Copenhagen Criteria cover political, economic, and legal issues. Most relevant for discussions on Turkey have been the political criteria, that candidate countries achieve "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities." The Turkish response to the rejection, "Europe, Go to Hell," is found in Tufan Terence, "Canin Cehenneme Avrupa," Hurryet, December 13, 1997.
17. Slovakia was pointedly declared ineligible for membership, but this helped spur movement for reform in the country, resulting in the ouster of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's government in 1998.
18. See, for example, Amnesty International, Turkey: No Security Without Human Rights (New York: Amnesty International, 1996);
19. U.S. Congress Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, The Continued Use of Torture in Turkey (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997);
20. Human Rights Watch, Turkey: Violations of Free Expression in Turkey (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999);
21. and U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Turkey (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001). Monthly updates are available from the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey at http://www.tihv.org.tr/.
22. M. Hakan Yavuz, "Turkey's Fault Lines and the Crisis of Kemalism," Current History, January 2000, 34.
23. Paul Kinzler, "Brussels Meeting Dims Turkey's Bid to Join EU," New York Times, March 11, 1997.
24. Nathan Ertzlan, "EU Excludes Turkey from Enlargement Plans," Turkish Daily News, December 14, 1997.
25. "Press Scanner," Turkish Daily News, December 12, 1997.
26. For an argument that the requirements of Copenhagen and political conditionality are not so clearly defined or self-evident, see Heather Grabbe, "European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire," International Political Science Review 23, no. 3 (2002): 249-68.
27. Lundgren, "Prioritisations in the Enlargement Process," 2005.
28. For text of this decision, see http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/ pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm (accessed February 1, 2005).
29. Turks argued both that the EU applied double standards, overlooking Eastern European shortcomings while focusing solely on Turkey's faults, and that, as Eastern Europeans had been on the wrong side of the cold war and had less democratic experience than Turks, the postcommunist countries had illegitimately "cut" in the membership queue.
30. For discussion of these cases, see Paul Kubicek, ed., The European Union and Democratization (London: Routledge, 2003);
31. and Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel, "Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey," Journal of Common Market Studies 41, no. 4 (2003): 495-517.
32. Gamze Avci, "Turkey's EU Politics: What Justifies Reform?" in Enlargement in Perspective, ARENA Report no. 2, ed. Helene Sjursen, 141.
33. For a fuller discussion of many aspects of reform in Turkey, see Ali Carkoglu and Barry Rubin, eds., Turkey and the European Union (London: Frank Cass);
34. and David Phillips, "Turkey's Dreams of Accession," Foreign Affairs 83, no. 5 (September/October 2004): 86-97.
35. For the Acquis Communitaire, see above, n. 22.
36. Ziya Onis, "Diverse but Converging Paths to EU Membership: Poland and Turkey in Comparative Perspective," East European Politics and Societies 18, no. 3 (2004): 481-512.
37. Paul Kubicek, "The Earthquake, Civil Society, and Democratization in Turkey: An Assessment with a View toward Eastern Europe," Political Studies 50, no. 4 (September 2002): 759-76;
38. and Ziya Onis and Umut Turem, "Entrepreneurs, Democracy, and Citizenship in Turkey," Comparative Politics 35, no. 4 (2002): 439-56.
39. "Juncker: I Changed My Mind over Turkey," Turkish Daily News, December 10, 2004.
40. R. T. Erdogan, "Why the EU Needs Turkey," speech at Oxford University, May 28, 2004, http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/areastudies/lectures/ Erdogan.pdf.
41. "Turkish Rights Reforms Fall Short," Turkish Probe, August 29, 2004.
42. Giles Merritt, "Turkey's Generals May Be the Real Obstacle," International Herald Tribune, September 18, 2004. Notably, a proposal to ensure civilian control over the budget will take effect in 2005.
43. See Ziya Onis, "Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era," in Turkey and the European Union, ed. Carkoglu and Rubin, 15.
44. Cuneyt Ulsever, "What Kind of Country Do We Want?" Turkish Daily News, July 18, 2000.
45. Frank Schimmelfennig, "Introduction: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and Eastern Europe States - Conceptual and Theoretical Issues," in Norms and Nannies, ed. Ronald Linden, 1-29 (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).
46. "Adultery Clouds Real Progress," Turkish Daily News, September 27, 2004.
47. Onis, "Diverse but Converging Paths," 512.
48. Quoted in Robert Kagan, "Embraceable EU," Washington Post, December 5, 2004.
49. Statement by Blair on March 24, 2004, http://www.eubusiness.com/afp/ 040324201934.zs7tbbvc (accessed January 26, 2005).
50. Most of these - over 2 million - live in Germany. Turks originally came to Europe in the 1950s and 1960s as "Gastarbeiter" (guest workers), but many have chosen to stay and raise families in EU countries.
51. Elaine Sciolino, "European Charter Architect Faults Chirac for Its Rejection," New York Times, June 15, 2005.
52. Quoted in John Rossant and Rose Brady, "Turkey's EU Bid: Resistance Is on the Rise," Business Week, February 9, 2004, 57.
53. Helene Sjursen, "Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy," Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 3 (2002): 491-513.
54. This is expanded on in the Citizenship and Democratic Legitimacy in Europe (CIDEL) project, "Justifying Enlargement," coordinated by ARENA (Centre for Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation-State), http://www.arena.uio.no/cidel (accessed Febraury 12, 2005).
55. Jurgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998),
56. "Why Europe Needs a Constitution," New Left Review, no. 11 (2001): 5-26.
57. Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," International Organization 55, no. 1 (2001): 47-80;
58. and Jose I. Torreblanca, The Reuniting of Europe: Promises, Negotiations and Compromises (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001).
59. The most enthusiastic backer of Turkish membership in the EU is the United States, which is a mixed blessing for Ankara.
60. Ziya Onis, "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative-Historical Perspective," Journal of European Integration History 7, no. 1 (2001): 105-19;
61. and Meltem Muftuler-Bac, "The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics," East European Quarterly 34, no. 2 (June 2000): 159-79. Although this obviously has a cultural tinge, one can make this point with respect to the smooth functioning of the EU institutions.
62. Poll commissioned by TNS Gallup (Denmark) and reported in "Turks Ready to Move," Christian Science Monitor, December 16, 2004.
63. "Turkey's Francophiles Wounded by French EU Doubts," Turkish Daily News, September 12, 2004.
64. "Dutch Commissioner Again Warns on Turkish EU Bid," Turkish Daily News, September 8, 2004.
65. Aremand Lepartmentier and Laurent Zecchini, "Pour ou contre," Le Monde, 2002.
66. "In 1683 Turkey Was the Invader; in 2004 Much of Europe Still Sees It That Way," Guardian, September 22, 2004.
67. "German Conservatives Warn Schroder on Turkey," Turkish Daily News, December 6, 2004.
68. Such is the view of 49 percent of Turks, according to a survey of 3,060 citizens in May-June 2002. The survey was commissioned by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV);
69. see http://www.tesev.org/.
70. Faruk Sen, "The Way Europe Sees Turkey and Turkey Sees Europe," Zaman (Istanbul), June 10, 2003. Slovenia, at 56 percent approval, ranked the highest. Respondents in Luxemburg (12 percent), Austria (14 percent), Denmark (16 percent) and Germany (18 percent) were least enthusiastic about Turkish membership. Those polled in Mediterranean countries (Spaniards [48 percent], Portuguese [45 percent], and Italians [41 percent]) were the most supportive, and Greek support was at 28 percent. More recent surveys from June 2004 in France show 61 percent disapproval of Turkish membership;
71. see Robert Wieladd, "Misconceptions Surround EU's Membership Bid," Turkish Daily News, September 6, 2004. In Austria, a September 2004 Gallup poll found 76 percent opposed;
72. see "Austria Seeks Open Option for Turkey," Turkish Daily News, December 1, 2004.
73. Lauren McLaren and Meltem Muftuler-Bac, "Unenthusiastic 'Yes' to Hungary; Resounding 'No' to Turkey: Individual, Contextual, and Historical Explanations of Citizen Attitudes to Enlargement," Journal of Common Market Studies, forthcoming. In 2000, 31 percent of EU citizens surveyed favored enlargement to Turkey; 49 percent were opposed, which was the highest level of opposition for any candidate country (44 percent were opposed to Romania, which was in second place).
74. Peter Ford, "Wariness over Turkey's EU Bid," Christian Science Monitor, October 6, 2004.
75. "The Door Creaks Open," Economist, November 17, 2001, 47.
76. Erdogan, "Why the EU Needs Turkey," speech at Oxford University, May 28, 2004.
77. Introductory remarks for Prime Minister Erdogan at Oxford University, May 28, 2004, http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/areastudies/ SEESP-newsletter2004.pdf.
78. Suzannah Verney, "Creating the Democratic Tradition of European Integration," in Enlargement and the Finality of the European Union, ARENA Report no. 7, ed. Helene Sjursen, 98 (Oslo: Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation-State, 2002). This relates to what Schimmelfennig in "Community Trap" (2001), calls "rhetorical entrapment"
79. See note 47.
80. Tom Happold, "Straw: Turkey is EU 'Acid Test,'" Guardian, March 23, 2004.
81. Timothy Garton Ash, "A Bridge Too Far?" Guardian, November 14, 2002.
82. H. Tarik Oguzlu, "How to Interpret Turkey's Accession Process with the European Union? A Clash of Discourses," Perceptions 7, no. 4 (December 2002-February 2003): 51-83.
83. Faruk Sen, "The Neglected Aspect of Turkish Accession," Turkish Probe, August 29, 2004. It is worth noting that some, in particular the French, may see Turkey as too pro-American and, thus, its inclusion would work against France's own designs to construct a strong European foreign policy that would be independent of the wishes of Washington.
84. Erdogan, "Why the EU Needs Turkey," speech at Oxford University, May 28, 2004.
85. Report of several European leaders, including former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, former French Prime Minister Michel Rocard, and former Spanish Foreign Minister Marcelina Oreja, in Robert Wielaad, "Misconceptions Surround Turkey's EU Membership," Turkish Daily News, September 8, 2004.
86. Zaman, May 15, 2003. One might retort, of course, that the Islamic role in much of European history was that of invader, so invocations of history may not be wholly convincing to many Europeans.
87. For more on this notion as applied in earlier expansions, see Schimmelfenning, "Community Trap," 2001.
88. For example of particularly harsh rhetoric, in which Erdogan is called a "jihadist thug" and in which one writer asks, "what communion hath light with darkness," see http://www.jihadwatch.org/ dhimmiwatch/archives/014275.php (accessed January 28, 2005).
89. Jesper Bejer, "The Decision on Turkish EU Accession in December 2002: The Logic of Anarchy, Collection Action Problems, and Rhetorical Action," Observatory of European Foreign Policy, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, working paper 57, March 2004.
90. "Turkiye buyuk sorun" [Turkey is a big problem], Radikal (Istanbul), July 5, 2004.
91. In October 2004, Chirac proposed amending the French Constitution so that voters would have a say over future EU expansion. He was quick to assure people, however, that this was not directed at Turkey. See http:// www.eubusiness.com/afp/041001014432.5r/tzusl (accessed January 26, 2005).
92. For text on the conclusions of the December 2004 European Council meeting, see http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ 83201.pdf (accessed February 2, 2005).
93. Developments in Ukraine at the end of 2004 open up the question of another expansion to a large country, but one could imagine that the EU will, on historical-cultural grounds, balk (or at least have great difficulty) in incorporating a post-Soviet state, lest this encourage a slew of applications from others. Croatia is already in the membership queue, and Macedonia has applied for membership.
94. Thierry de Montbrial, "Debating the Borders of Europe," International Herald Tribune, May 21, 2004.
95. Ash, "A Bridge Too Far," 2002.