Decision rules for the academy awards versus those for elections

Interfaces

Volumn 34, Issue 3, 2004, Pages

  Gehrlein, William V ^a   Kher, Hemant V ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE   (United States)

Author keywords

Games: group decisions; Voting: committees

Indexed keywords

EID: 3042777266     PISSN: 00922102     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/inte.1040.0072     Document Type: Article

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