64% Majority rule in Ducal Venice: Voting for the Doge

Public Choice

Volumn 97, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 709-723

  Coggins, Jay S ^a   Perali, C Federico ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^b Ist di Economia e Politica Agraria   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032278751     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004947715017     Document Type: Article

References (17)

1. Arrow, K. (1963). Social choice and individual values. Second edition. New Haven: Yale University Press.
2. Black, D. (1948). The elasticity of committee decisions with an altering size of majority. Econometrica 16: 262-272.
3. Caplin, A. and Nalebuff, B. (1988). On 64%-majority rule. Econometrica 56: 787-814.
4. Caplin, A. and Nalebuff, B. (1991). Aggregation and social choice: A mean voter theorem. Econometrica 59: 1-23.
5. Cessi, R. (1968). Storia della Repubblica di Venezia. Second edition. Milan: Casa Editrice Giuseppe Principato.
6. Condorcet, M. de (1976). Essay on the application of mathematics to the theory of decision making. In K. Baker (Ed.), Condorcet: Selected writings. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
7. Da Mosto, A. (1960). I Dogi di Venezia nella vita Pubblica e Privata. Milan: Aldo Martello Editore.
8. Guicciardini, F. (1973). Democracy of the Venetians. In G. Maranini (Ed.), La Repubblica. Florence: Vallecchi Editore.
9. Hazlitt, W.C. (1900). The Venetian Republic: Its rise, its growth, and its fall, Vol. I. London: Adam and Charles Black.
10. Kramer, G.H. (1973). On a class of equilibrium conditions for majority rule. Econometrica 41: 285-297.
11. Lane, F.C. (1973). Venice: A Maritime Republic. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
12. Lines, M. (1986). Approval voting and strategy analysis: A Venetian example. Theory and Decision 20: 155-172.
13. Maranini, G. (1931). [Reprinted 1994]. La Costituzione di Venezia, Vol. II. Florence: La Nuova Italia Editrice.
14. McKelvey, R.D. (1979). General conditions for global intransitivities in formal voting models. Econometrica 47: 1085-1112.
15. Muir, E. (1981). Civil ritual in Renaissance Venice. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
16. Norwich, J.J. (1982). [First Vintage Books edition, 1989]. A history of Venice. New York: Knopf.
17. Plott, C. (1967). A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under majority rule. American Economic Review 57: 787-806.