The similarity of states: Using S to compute dyadic interest similarity

Conflict Management and Peace Science

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 165-187

  Sweeney, Kevin ^a   Keshk, Omar M G ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Interest similarity; Interstate dyads; Preference similarity; Scompute

Indexed keywords

EID: 29744464321     PISSN: 07388942     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07388940590948583     Document Type: Article

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