Bringing courts back in: Normdurchsetzung im GATT, in der WTO und der EG

Swiss Political Science Review

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 49-80

  Zangl, Bernhard ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2942659288     PISSN: 14247755     EISSN: 16626370     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/j.1662-6370.2001.tb00315.x     Document Type: Article

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