The European court's political power

West European Politics

Volumn 19, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 458-487

  Alter, Karen J ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 6144223752     PISSN: 01402382     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402389608425146     Document Type: Article

References (92)

1. In general, private parties are not allowed to bring cases directly to the ECJ. Instead private parties gain access to the ECJ through national courts. The procedure works as follows. In a national court, a private party challenges a law or policy which potentially violates EC law. The national court uses the 'preliminary ruling procedure' (Art. 177, Treaty of Rome) to send a question of interpretation to the ECJ, which makes a ruling on the meaning of EC law. The national court then applies the ECJ ruling to the case. For more on EC legal procedure, see Neville Brown and F. Jacobs, The Court of Justice of the European Communities (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1989). For more on the legal and political importance of the Court's revolutionary legal doctrines of direct effect and supremacy see: T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1988); Eric Stein, 'Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution', American Jnl of Int. Law 75/1 (1981); Joseph Weiler, 'The Transformation of Europe', Yale Law Jnl 100 (1991) pp.2403-83.
2. In general, private parties are not allowed to bring cases directly to the ECJ. Instead private parties gain access to the ECJ through national courts. The procedure works as follows. In a national court, a private party challenges a law or policy which potentially violates EC law. The national court uses the 'preliminary ruling procedure' (Art. 177, Treaty of Rome) to send a question of interpretation to the ECJ, which makes a ruling on the meaning of EC law. The national court then applies the ECJ ruling to the case. For more on EC legal procedure, see Neville Brown and F. Jacobs, The Court of Justice of the European Communities (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1989). For more on the legal and political importance of the Court's revolutionary legal doctrines of direct effect and supremacy see: T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1988); Eric Stein, 'Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution', American Jnl of Int. Law 75/1 (1981); Joseph Weiler, 'The Transformation of Europe', Yale Law Jnl 100 (1991) pp.2403-83.
3. In general, private parties are not allowed to bring cases directly to the ECJ. Instead private parties gain access to the ECJ through national courts. The procedure works as follows. In a national court, a private party challenges a law or policy which potentially violates EC law. The national court uses the 'preliminary ruling procedure' (Art. 177, Treaty of Rome) to send a question of interpretation to the ECJ, which makes a ruling on the meaning of EC law. The national court then applies the ECJ ruling to the case. For more on EC legal procedure, see Neville Brown and F. Jacobs, The Court of Justice of the European Communities (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1989). For more on the legal and political importance of the Court's revolutionary legal doctrines of direct effect and supremacy see: T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1988); Eric Stein, 'Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution', American Jnl of Int. Law 75/1 (1981); Joseph Weiler, 'The Transformation of Europe', Yale Law Jnl 100 (1991) pp.2403-83.
4. In general, private parties are not allowed to bring cases directly to the ECJ. Instead private parties gain access to the ECJ through national courts. The procedure works as follows. In a national court, a private party challenges a law or policy which potentially violates EC law. The national court uses the 'preliminary ruling procedure' (Art. 177, Treaty of Rome) to send a question of interpretation to the ECJ, which makes a ruling on the meaning of EC law. The national court then applies the ECJ ruling to the case. For more on EC legal procedure, see Neville Brown and F. Jacobs, The Court of Justice of the European Communities (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1989). For more on the legal and political importance of the Court's revolutionary legal doctrines of direct effect and supremacy see: T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1988); Eric Stein, 'Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution', American Jnl of Int. Law 75/1 (1981); Joseph Weiler, 'The Transformation of Europe', Yale Law Jnl 100 (1991) pp.2403-83.
5. Hans Heinrich Rupp, 'Die Grundrecht und das Europäische Gemeinschaftsrecht', Neue Juristischen Wochenzeitschrift Heft 9 (1970) pp.353-9.
6. The ECJ based the supremacy of EC law on the 'special' nature of the EC Treaty, arguing that 'By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the member states and which their courts are bound to apply. By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the member states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves.' (Costa v. Ente Nationale per L'Energia Elettrica (ENEL) ECJ Case 6/64 (1964) ECR 583.) National judiciaries have not accepted that the EC Treaty is special in nature, or that the Treaty itself provides a legal basis for the supremacy of EC law over national law.
7. Jean-François Lachaume, 'Une victoire de l'ordre juridique communautiare: l'arrêt Nicolo consacrant la supériorité des traités sur les lois postérieures'. Revue du Marché Commun (1990) pp.384-94.
8. Andrew Wilson Green, Integration by Jurisprudence (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff 1969).
9. E.g. see Lauchaume (note 4); G. Cohen-Jonathan, Observations. Cour Constitutionelle Allemande et règlements commumunitaires', Cahiers de droit Européen (1975) pp. 173-206; Jacques Dehaussy, 'La supériorité des normes internationales sur les normes internes: à propos de l'arrét du Conseil d'Etat du 20 Oct. 1989, Nicolo', Jnl du Droit Int. (1990) pp.5-33; C. Ehlermann, 'Primauté du droit communautaire mise en danger par la Cour Constitutionelle Fédérale Allemande', Revue du Marché Commun (1975) pp. 10-19; Paul Sabourin, 'Le jardin à la française du Conseil d'Etat', Recueil Dalloz Sirey (1990) pp.136-41.
10. E.g. see Lauchaume (note 4); G. Cohen-Jonathan, Observations. Cour Constitutionelle Allemande et règlements commumunitaires', Cahiers de droit Européen (1975) pp. 173-206; Jacques Dehaussy, 'La supériorité des normes internationales sur les normes internes: à propos de l'arrét du Conseil d'Etat du 20 Oct. 1989, Nicolo', Jnl du Droit Int. (1990) pp.5-33; C. Ehlermann, 'Primauté du droit communautaire mise en danger par la Cour Constitutionelle Fédérale Allemande', Revue du Marché Commun (1975) pp. 10-19; Paul Sabourin, 'Le jardin à la française du Conseil d'Etat', Recueil Dalloz Sirey (1990) pp.136-41.
11. E.g. see Lauchaume (note 4); G. Cohen-Jonathan, Observations. Cour Constitutionelle Allemande et règlements commumunitaires', Cahiers de droit Européen (1975) pp. 173-206; Jacques Dehaussy, 'La supériorité des normes internationales sur les normes internes: à propos de l'arrét du Conseil d'Etat du 20 Oct. 1989, Nicolo', Jnl du Droit Int. (1990) pp.5-33; C. Ehlermann, 'Primauté du droit communautaire mise en danger par la Cour Constitutionelle Fédérale Allemande', Revue du Marché Commun (1975) pp. 10-19; Paul Sabourin, 'Le jardin à la française du Conseil d'Etat', Recueil Dalloz Sirey (1990) pp.136-41.
12. E.g. see Lauchaume (note 4); G. Cohen-Jonathan, Observations. Cour Constitutionelle Allemande et règlements commumunitaires', Cahiers de droit Européen (1975) pp. 173-206; Jacques Dehaussy, 'La supériorité des normes internationales sur les normes internes: à propos de l'arrét du Conseil d'Etat du 20 Oct. 1989, Nicolo', Jnl du Droit Int. (1990) pp.5-33; C. Ehlermann, 'Primauté du droit communautaire mise en danger par la Cour Constitutionelle Fédérale Allemande', Revue du Marché Commun (1975) pp. 10-19; Paul Sabourin, 'Le jardin à la française du Conseil d'Etat', Recueil Dalloz Sirey (1990) pp.136-41.
13. R. Voss, 'Federal Republic of Germany National Report' in H. Schermers, C. Timmermans, A. Kellermann and W. J. Stewart (eds.) Article 177 Experience and Problems (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishing 1987) p.239-252.
14. Jeannette Vargas, Shifting the Balance of Power Between Domestic Groups: The European Court and British Equal Treatment Policy, honor's thesis for a BA degree Harvard U. (1995).
15. E.g. see: Molkerei-Zentrale Westfalen/Lippe GmbH vo Hauptzollamt Paderborn BFH reference of 27 July 1967 to the ECJ.
16. High courts are courts where the jurisdictional authority over substantive, constitutional or procedural legal interpretation is not subject to appeal. Most European legal systems have multiple high courts. E.g., in Germany, there is a federal supreme court for each substantive area of law. In France, Belgium and Italy there is a high administrative court, a high court for civil and penal systems and a high constitutional court.
17. Gerard Bebr, 'The Rambling Ghost of "Cohn-Bendit": Acte Clair and the Court of Justice', Common Market Law Reviews 20 (1983) pp.439-72.
18. Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, 'Europe Before the Court', Int. Organization 47/1 (1993) pp.41-76; Robert Kovar, Observations', La Semaine Juridique - Juris Classeur Périodique II. Jurisprudence (1979) p. 19158; Imelda Maher 'The Common Law Courts as Community Courts' paper presented at 2nd ECSA World Conference May 1994 and Weiler, 1991. For a review of the alternative explanations of national court participation in legal integration, see Karen Alter, 'Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration' European U. Institute working paper 95/27 (1995). Jonathan Golub also reviews limitations in dominant approaches to explaining national court participation in legal integration (see his, 'The Politics of Judicial Discretion: Rethinking the Interaction between National Courts and the European Court of Justice', West European Politics 19/2 (April 1996) pp.360-85.
19. Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, 'Europe Before the Court', Int. Organization 47/1 (1993) pp.41-76; Robert Kovar, Observations', La Semaine Juridique - Juris Classeur Périodique II. Jurisprudence (1979) p. 19158; Imelda Maher 'The Common Law Courts as Community Courts' paper presented at 2nd ECSA World Conference May 1994 and Weiler, 1991. For a review of the alternative explanations of national court participation in legal integration, see Karen Alter, 'Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration' European U. Institute working paper 95/27 (1995). Jonathan Golub also reviews limitations in dominant approaches to explaining national court participation in legal integration (see his, 'The Politics of Judicial Discretion: Rethinking the Interaction between National Courts and the European Court of Justice', West European Politics 19/2 (April 1996) pp.360-85.
20. Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, 'Europe Before the Court', Int. Organization 47/1 (1993) pp.41-76; Robert Kovar, Observations', La Semaine Juridique - Juris Classeur Périodique II. Jurisprudence (1979) p. 19158; Imelda Maher 'The Common Law Courts as Community Courts' paper presented at 2nd ECSA World Conference May 1994 and Weiler, 1991. For a review of the alternative explanations of national court participation in legal integration, see Karen Alter, 'Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration' European U. Institute working paper 95/27 (1995). Jonathan Golub also reviews limitations in dominant approaches to explaining national court participation in legal integration (see his, 'The Politics of Judicial Discretion: Rethinking the Interaction between National Courts and the European Court of Justice', West European Politics 19/2 (April 1996) pp.360-85.
21. Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, 'Europe Before the Court', Int. Organization 47/1 (1993) pp.41-76; Robert Kovar, Observations', La Semaine Juridique - Juris Classeur Périodique II. Jurisprudence (1979) p. 19158; Imelda Maher 'The Common Law Courts as Community Courts' paper presented at 2nd ECSA World Conference May 1994 and Weiler, 1991. For a review of the alternative explanations of national court participation in legal integration, see Karen Alter, 'Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration' European U. Institute working paper 95/27 (1995). Jonathan Golub also reviews limitations in dominant approaches to explaining national court participation in legal integration (see his, 'The Politics of Judicial Discretion: Rethinking the Interaction between National Courts and the European Court of Justice', West European Politics 19/2 (April 1996) pp.360-85.
22. Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, 'Europe Before the Court', Int. Organization 47/1 (1993) pp.41-76; Robert Kovar, Observations', La Semaine Juridique - Juris Classeur Périodique II. Jurisprudence (1979) p. 19158; Imelda Maher 'The Common Law Courts as Community Courts' paper presented at 2nd ECSA World Conference May 1994 and Weiler, 1991. For a review of the alternative explanations of national court participation in legal integration, see Karen Alter, 'Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration' European U. Institute working paper 95/27 (1995). Jonathan Golub also reviews limitations in dominant approaches to explaining national court participation in legal integration (see his, 'The Politics of Judicial Discretion: Rethinking the Interaction between National Courts and the European Court of Justice', West European Politics 19/2 (April 1996) pp.360-85.
23. Vargas (note 8) p.65-72.
24. In European civil law systems legal doctrine and legal periodicals play a more important role in the legal process than in the United States. As a case-book on comparative legal traditions put it: 'The bar tends ... to rely on the editors of the privately published legal journals who select and print what they consider to be the important cases. Typically each case is followed by an annotation written by an expert ... Though not a formal source of law, the weight of scholarly authority, known in civil law terminology as "the doctrine", is everywhere taken into account by legislators and judges when they frame, interpret or apply law.' (Mary Ann Glendon, Michael Wallace Gordon and Christopher Osakwe, Comparative Legal Traditions (St Paul, MN: West Publishing 1985).
25. George Bermann, Roger Goebel, William Davey and Eleanor Fox, Cases and Materials on European Community Law (ibid. 1993).; Costa c. E.n.e.l. & Soc. Edisonvolta Italian Constitutional Court decision of 7 March 1964 Judgment No. 14, Foro Italiano 87 I 465.
26. George Bermann, Roger Goebel, William Davey and Eleanor Fox, Cases and Materials on European Community Law (ibid. 1993).; Costa c. E.n.e.l. & Soc. Edisonvolta Italian Constitutional Court decision of 7 March 1964 Judgment No. 14, Foro Italiano 87 I 465.
27. For example, in the Turnover Tax Struggle, the Federal Tax Court used narrow legal interpretations to stop the lower courts from sending references to the ECJ or interpreting the compatibility of national turnover equalisation taxes with EC law. Alfons Lütticke GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Saarlouis BFH decision of 15 Jan. 1969 case 57/65.
28. E.g. Minister of Interior v. Daniel Cohn-Bendit Conseil d'Etat decision of 22 Dec. 1978, Common Market Law Reports [hereafter CMLR] (1980) pp.545-62; BFH decision of 16 July 1981, ibid. 1982 I 527-31.
29. E.g. Minister of Interior v. Daniel Cohn-Bendit Conseil d'Etat decision of 22 Dec. 1978, Common Market Law Reports [hereafter CMLR] (1980) pp.545-62; BFH decision of 16 July 1981, ibid. 1982 I 527-31.
30. To name but two examples, lower finance courts in Germany ignored the Federal Finance Court's decision on the direct effect of directives, and make references to the ECJ to challenge the Federal Tax Court's jurisprudence, (FG Munster decision of 24 May 1984 , EFG 1985 310; FG Niedersächsen decision of 9 Feb. 1984, EFG 1984 pp.527-8; FG Hessen decision of 24 April 1985) and British industrial appeals tribunals ignored the Employment Appeals Tribunal's judgment on pregnancy dismissals and relied on EC law instead (Varga, note 8)
31. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA (II) ECJ case 106/77 (1978) ECR 629.
32. Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt München case 9/74 ECR 773 (1974), CMLR 158 423; Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v. Grogan case C-159/90, CMLR 1991 3 849.
33. Ronny Abraham, Droit international, droit communautaire et droit français (Paris: Hachette 1989).
34. Legal scholars have argued that mounting conflicts over legal interpretation among German ordinary courts will provoke the German Constitutional Court to enter into the legal debate, if only to resolve the legal issue.
35. Despite its name, the Commissariat du Gouvernement is not a representative of the government. He/she is a member of the Conseil d'Etat who offers a reasoned opinion to the Conseil to consider. Since Conseil d'Etat decisions are short and cryptic, the argument of the Commissariat is often printed along with the Conseil's decision, and used to help interpret the legal basis for Conseil judgments. Raoul Georges Nicolo and another Conseil d'Etat decision of 20 Oct. 1989 M. Frydman, Commissaire du Gouvernement. CMLR 1990, Vol. 1, p. 173-91.
36. Lord Denning, 'Introduction to article "The European Court of Justice: Judges or Policy Makers?"', (The Bruges Group Publication, Suite 102 Whitehall Court, Westminster, London SW1A 2EL, 1990).
37. Maurice Lagrange, 'Note sur arret Semoules', Recueil Dalloz-Sirey 15 (1968) pp.286-9.
38. High courts learned that they could influence ECJ jurisprudence by threatening to find EC law and ECJ jurisprudence inapplicable, while clearly indicating to the ECJ which areas of legal expansion and interpretation they would object to. These threats clearly work; for example, in light of national court non-compliance and reticence, the ECJ did not expand the reach of its doctrine on the direct effect of directives (P.E. Morris and P. W. David, 'Directives, Direct Effect and the European Court: The Triumph of Pragmatism', Business Law Review (April, May 1987) pp.85-8 and 116-8, 35-6.) In light of the German Constitutional Court's criticism of the basic rights protections in EC law, the ECJ has developed a doctrine on basic rights protection (Federico Mancini and David Keeling, 'From CILFIT to ERT: The Constitutional Challenge facing the European Court', Yearbook of European Law 11/1991 (1992) pp.1-13). Recently the German Constitutional Court sent the message that it will reject future expansions of EC law if such expansions amount to a rewriting of the EC Treaties, and called on the German government and the ECJ to better protect the subsidiarity rights of member states and regions. We can already see the effect of this threat as the ECJ makes greater pains to recognise member-state rights and limit the reach of EC law (Brunner and others v. The European Union Treaty B VerfG decision of 13 Oct. 1993 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2 BvR 2159/92, CMLR pp.57-108).
39. High courts learned that they could influence ECJ jurisprudence by threatening to find EC law and ECJ jurisprudence inapplicable, while clearly indicating to the ECJ which areas of legal expansion and interpretation they would object to. These threats clearly work; for example, in light of national court non-compliance and reticence, the ECJ did not expand the reach of its doctrine on the direct effect of directives (P.E. Morris and P. W. David, 'Directives, Direct Effect and the European Court: The Triumph of Pragmatism', Business Law Review (April, May 1987) pp.85-8 and 116-8, 35-6.) In light of the German Constitutional Court's criticism of the basic rights protections in EC law, the ECJ has developed a doctrine on basic rights protection (Federico Mancini and David Keeling, 'From CILFIT to ERT: The Constitutional Challenge facing the European Court', Yearbook of European Law 11/1991 (1992) pp.1-13). Recently the German Constitutional Court sent the message that it will reject future expansions of EC law if such expansions amount to a rewriting of the EC Treaties, and called on the German government and the ECJ to better protect the subsidiarity rights of member states and regions. We can already see the effect of this threat as the ECJ makes greater pains to recognise member-state rights and limit the reach of EC law (Brunner and others v. The European Union Treaty B VerfG decision of 13 Oct. 1993 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2 BvR 2159/92, CMLR pp.57-108).
40. High courts learned that they could influence ECJ jurisprudence by threatening to find EC law and ECJ jurisprudence inapplicable, while clearly indicating to the ECJ which areas of legal expansion and interpretation they would object to. These threats clearly work; for example, in light of national court non-compliance and reticence, the ECJ did not expand the reach of its doctrine on the direct effect of directives (P.E. Morris and P. W. David, 'Directives, Direct Effect and the European Court: The Triumph of Pragmatism', Business Law Review (April, May 1987) pp.85-8 and 116-8, 35-6.) In light of the German Constitutional Court's criticism of the basic rights protections in EC law, the ECJ has developed a doctrine on basic rights protection (Federico Mancini and David Keeling, 'From CILFIT to ERT: The Constitutional Challenge facing the European Court', Yearbook of European Law 11/1991 (1992) pp.1-13). Recently the German Constitutional Court sent the message that it will reject future expansions of EC law if such expansions amount to a rewriting of the EC Treaties, and called on the German government and the ECJ to better protect the subsidiarity rights of member states and regions. We can already see the effect of this threat as the ECJ makes greater pains to recognise member-state rights and limit the reach of EC law (Brunner and others v. The European Union Treaty B VerfG decision of 13 Oct. 1993 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2 BvR 2159/92, CMLR pp.57-108).
41. Paul Pierson and Stephan Leibfried, 'Semi-Sovereign Welfare States: Social Policy in a Multi-Tiered Europe' in ibid, (eds.) Fragmented Social Policy: The European Union's Social Dimension in Comparative Perspective (Washington DC: Brookings 1995).
42. 'Between 1789 and 1860 the courts of seven States denied the constitutional right of the United States Supreme Court to decide cases on writs of error to State courts - Virginia, Ohio, Georgia, Kentucky, South Carolina, California and Wisconsin. The Legislatures of all these states adopted resolutions or statues against this power of the Supreme Court. Bills were introduced in Congress on at least ten occasions to deprive the Court of its jurisdiction -in 1821, 1822, 1824, 1831, 1846, 1867, 1868, 1871, 1872, and 1882.' (Warren, 'Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States - A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act', American Law Review 47 (1913) pp.161. Cited in Hart and Wechsler Federal Courts and the Federal System, 3rd ed. (University Casebook Series, NY: Foundation Press 1988) p.516.
43. 'Between 1789 and 1860 the courts of seven States denied the constitutional right of the United States Supreme Court to decide cases on writs of error to State courts - Virginia, Ohio, Georgia, Kentucky, South Carolina, California and Wisconsin. The Legislatures of all these states adopted resolutions or statues against this power of the Supreme Court. Bills were introduced in Congress on at least ten occasions to deprive the Court of its jurisdiction -in 1821, 1822, 1824, 1831, 1846, 1867, 1868, 1871, 1872, and 1882.' (Warren, 'Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States - A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act', American Law Review 47 (1913) pp.161. Cited in Hart and Wechsler Federal Courts and the Federal System, 3rd ed. (University Casebook Series, NY: Foundation Press 1988) p.516.
44. Ernst Haas The Uniting of Europe (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford UP 1958); A.H. Robertson European Institutions - Cooperation: Integration: Unification (NY: Praeger 1966).
45. Ernst Haas The Uniting of Europe (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford UP 1958); A.H. Robertson European Institutions - Cooperation: Integration: Unification (NY: Praeger 1966).
46. Based on interviews with national representatives from Luxembourg, France and Germany who negotiated the articles of the Treaty of Rome relating to the ECJ. For more on the original intent of the EC legal system, see Karen J. Alter, The Making of a Rule of Law: The European Court and the National Judiciaries, Dept. of Political Science, MIT (1996).
47. The preliminary ruling system, which allows national courts to send cases to the ECJ, was a creation of the Coal and Steel Community. It was designed to allow national courts to challenge the validity of EC law or of High Authority decisions. The preliminary ruling procedure was extended in the Treaty of Rome to include questions of legal interpretation (Pierre Pescatore, 'Les Travaux du "Groupe Juridique" Dans la négociation des Traités de Rome', Studia Diplomalica (Chronique de Politique Etrangère) 34/1-4 (1981) pp. 159-78.) While the reasoning for the change in the preliminary ruling procedure is not entirely clear, negotiators of the Treaty acknowledge that they had not imagined that national courts would use the preliminary ruling system to challenge the compatibility of national law with EC law.
48. Indeed, many of the ECJ's landmark cases were brought through the preliminary ruling system after the Commission had refused to pursue the issue. To cite but three famous examples, the Lütticke decision regarding taxes which served as disguised tariffs, the Cassis de Dijon decision which promoted the concept of mutual recognition of regulatory and production standards in other member states, and the Defrenne decision regarding equal pay for equal work, all made it to the ECJ after the Commission refused to pursue the issue.
49. Denning (note 24).
50. Marbury v. Madison US Supreme Court 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), p. 904 and ECJ's Costa decision (note 15) I am indebted to Anne-Marie Slaughter for this insight.
51. C.J. Mann, The Function of Judicial Decision in European Economic Integration (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1972).
52. Gert Meier, 'Der Streit un die Umsatzausgleich Steuer aus integrations politischer Sicht', Recht der Internationales Wirtschaft 3/1994.
53. Indeed, in 1964 and 1968 Italian and French high courts refused any role enforcing EC law over subsequent national law. Italian Constitutional Court's Costa decision (note 15); Syndicat Général de Fabricants de Semoules de France Conseil d'Etat Commissaire du Gouvernement 1 March 1968 , Common Market Law Reports 1970 Vol.9 208.
54. Federico Mancini and David Keeling, 'Democracy and the European Court of Justice', Modern Law Review 57/2 (1994) pp.175-90; and Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijoff 1994) p.423-65.
55. Federico Mancini and David Keeling, 'Democracy and the European Court of Justice', Modern Law Review 57/2 (1994) pp.175-90; and Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijoff 1994) p.423-65.
56. Ibid. Rasmussen (note 38) p.354.
57. Deidre Curtin and Kamiel Morelmans, 'Application and Enforcement of Community Law by Member States: Actors in Search of a Third Generation Script' in D. Curtin and T. Heukels (eds.) Institutional Dynamics of European Integration (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijoff 1994) p.423-65.
58. Rasmussen (note 38) p.289; Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union', Int. Organization 49/1 (1995) pp.171-81; Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast 'Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Constructing the EC's Internal Market' in J. Goldstein and R. Keohane (eds.) Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1993) p. 173-206.
59. Rasmussen (note 38) p.289; Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union', Int. Organization 49/1 (1995) pp.171-81; Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast 'Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Constructing the EC's Internal Market' in J. Goldstein and R. Keohane (eds.) Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1993) p. 173-206.
60. Rasmussen (note 38) p.289; Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union', Int. Organization 49/1 (1995) pp.171-81; Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast 'Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Constructing the EC's Internal Market' in J. Goldstein and R. Keohane (eds.) Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1993) p. 173-206.
61. Ibid. Garrett (1993, note 41).
62. Such as making ECJ decisions carry punitive sanctions, as was done in 1989.
63. Garrett (1995, note 41).
64. Brian A. Marks, A model of Judicial Influence on Congressional Policy Mating: Grove City College v. Bell (1984) Diss. in political science, U. of Washington (1989).
65. Joseph Weiler, 'The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism', Yearbook of European Law 1(1981) pp.257-306.
66. Stein (note 1).
67. Based on an interview with a member of the German negotiating team who put forward the proposal at the Maastricht negotiations for the Treaty on a European Union.
68. Donald Macrae, 'Institution and Decision-Making Changes' in D. O'Keefe and P. Twomey (eds.) Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (London: Chancellery Law Publishing 1994) pp. 171-87.
69. Mancini and Keeling (note 38).
70. 7 July 1966 (IIIB.4-V 8534- 1/66), republished in der Betrieb (1966) p.1160.
71. Rasmussen (note 38) p.352.
72. Guy Isaac, 'A propos de 1' "amendement Aurillac": Vers une obligation pour les juges d'appliquer les lois contraires aux traités?', Gazette du Palais II (1980) pp. Doctrine: 583-5.
73. Hervé Bribosia, 'Direct Applicability and the Primacy of European Community Law in the Belgium Legal Order' European U. Institute working paper 95/24 (1995).
74. Marie-France Buffet-Tchakaloff, La France devant la cour de justice des communautés européennes (Aix-en-Provence: Presses universitaires d'Aix-Marseilles 1984).
75. Based on interviews with French legal scholars and current and former members of the Cour de Cassation and the Conseil d'Etat, May, June and July 1994.
76. Meir (note 36) pp.75-7.
77. Burley and Mattli (note 12).
78. For examples of how the French executive worked to circumvent the parliament see Rasmussen (note 38, at pp.352-3) and Buffet-Tchakaloff (note 55 at pp.336 and 341). In interviews, members of the German economics ministry also acknowledged working to circumvent German high court challenges to the ECJ authority, because the high court challenges were creating problems with the Commission and undermining German influence in EC negotiations.
79. Fritz Scharpf, 'The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration', Public Administration 66 (Autumn 1988) pp.239-78.
80. E.g. in 1968 President De Gaulle demanded a revision of the Treaty addressing the jurisdiction and powers of the Court (Rasmussen note 38, p.351). but failed to get a political sanction against the ECJ. In 1971 efforts to expand the ECJ's preliminary ruling jurisdiction to some new international conventions were blocked. The issue was resolved through a compromise agreement: a small enumerated list of national high courts as to be allowed to send references regarding the conventions to the ECJ. In 1978 new conventions regarding fraud against the Community and criminal activities of EC officials were shelved because some member states would not even accept the compromise agreement of 1971 with respect to the new conventions (based on interviews at the German ministry of justice and the legal services of the Council, Oct. and Nov. 1995). In 1980 French political leaders again called on other member states to act to limit the power and jurisdiction of the ECJ saying 'we must do something about the Court and its illegal decisions' (Ibid. p.354), but he failed to get enough consensus to act. In 1989 and 1991 member states refused to expand ECJ authority over justice and home affairs, and in 1995 the ratification of three conventions regarding customs information systems, fraud and criminal jurisdiction and Europol were being blocked because of disagreement over extending ECJ authority (specifically pertaining to Art. 177 EEC, the preliminary ruling system) to the conventions (based on interviews with government legal advisors to the Netherlands, Britain and Germany Nov. 1995). In 1991 politicians also killed a Commission proposal to inscribe a role for national courts into the EC Treaty (Deidre Curtin and Kamiel Morelmans 'Application and Enforcement of Community Law by Member States: Actors in Search of a Third Generation Script' in D. Curtin and T. Heukels (eds.) Institutional Dynamics of European Integration (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijoff 1994) pp.423-65.)
81. Appointments to the ECJ are for renewable six year terms, which in theory allow politicians significant influence over appointees. But because ECJ decisions are issued unanimously, national judges have significant protection from wrathful politicians. In addition, the appointment process to the ECJ and to national high courts is very complex, involving party politics, legislative politics and other issues, so that EC legal positions are seldom the most salient political issue influencing judicial appointments. Beginning in the early 1980s, however, there was evidence that politicians had started using the appointment process more attentively with the goal of moderating ECJ activism.
82. Federico Mancini, 'Language, Culture and Politics in the Life of the European Court of Justice', speech delivered at American Law Schools Assoc., New Orleans, 6 Jan. 1995.
83. Institutional politics also create barriers to member states opening the issue of ECJ authority. While in theory member states can call an inter-governmental conference at any time (even within a Council meeting), politicians know that opening complex issues such as the authority of Community institutions is politically risky because the agenda could get out of control, and member states might try to open difficult bargains and extract favours in exchange for supporting the country that called the inter-governmental conference.
84. 'Government to demand curbs on European Court' FT 2/2/95 p.9.
85. The German Constitutional Court delayed issuing its early decisions on EC law and waited for consensus to gel; members of the Conseil d'Etat also made it clear that they were waiting for a political directive on what to do with EC law supremacy. (Gérard Druesne, 'La primauté du droit communautaire sur le droit interne - L'arrét de la Cour de Cassation du 24 Mai 1975', Revue de Marché Commun (1975) pp.378-90 and Mann, note 35).
86. Ibid. p.429.
87. M. Moe, 'The Politics of Structural Choice: Towards a Theory of Public Bureaucracy' in O. E. Williamson (ed.) Organizational Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond (Oxford: OUP 1990) pp. 116-53 cited in Paul Pierson, The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Perspective', Comparative Political Studies (1996).
88. M. Moe, 'The Politics of Structural Choice: Towards a Theory of Public Bureaucracy' in O. E. Williamson (ed.) Organizational Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond (Oxford: OUP 1990) pp. 116-53 cited in Paul Pierson, The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Perspective', Comparative Political Studies (1996).
89. For more on the European Court's resources, see Burley and Mattli (note 12) and Weiler (note 1).
90. By invoking EC law and the ECJ, domestic interests could transform the domestic politics of certain issue areas, actually shifting the domestic balance of power between groups and the government to obtain outcomes unattainable through domestic politics or the national legal process alone. For a discussion of when and how this works, see Karen Alter and Jeannette Vargas 'Shifting the Domestic Balance of Power in Europe: European Law and UK Social Policy', paper presented at Tenth Annual Conference of Europeanists, 14-16 March 1996.
91. By 1991 national courts had referred 2,324 cases to the ECJ, as compared to 868 cases raised by the Commission during the same time. Most of the Commission's cases were brought in the 1980s. The exponential increase in Commission cases can be explained by the increasing authority of the EO combined with the completion of the single market. Most of the infringement cases raised by the Commission in the 1980s dealt with the timely and correct implementation of directives passed to help complete the common market. The more authoritative nature of EO decisions (especially in light of the its doctrine on the direct effect of directives) made using the infringement procedure to challenge the late or incorrect implementation of directives a successful strategy. 1960-69 1970-80 1981-94 Total 1960-94 Cases brought to ECJ by Commission 27 98 920 1,045 Cases brought to ECJ national courts 75 666 2,152 2,893
92. Robert Lecourt, 'Quel Eut été le Droit des Communautés sans les arrêt de 1963 et 1964?' in Mélanges en Hommage à Jean Boulouis: L'Europe et le Droit (Paris: Edition Dalloz 1991) p.349-61 and Stein (note 1).