Distribution and politics: A brief history and prospect

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 25, Issue 2-3, 2005, Pages 507-525

  Roemer, John E ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 29244441184     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-005-0016-8     Document Type: Conference Paper

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