The politics of European federalism

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 279-294

  Bednar, Jenna ^a   Ferejohn, John ^a   Garrett, Geoffrey ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030240824     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0144-8188(96)00020-8     Document Type: Article

References (32)

1. 1. This is the term used by international relations scholars to describe international institutions "above" the nation state. See for example, Stephen Krasner (Ed.), 1983, International Regimes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
2. 2. See for example, Robert Cooter and Josef Drexl, 1994, "The logic of power in the emerging European constitution: Game theory and the division of powers," International Review of Law and Economics. 14:307-326; Geoffrey Garrett, 1995, "From the Luxembourg compromise to codecision: Decision making in the European Union," Electoral Studies, 14:289-308; Bernard Steunenberg, Chistian Koboldt, and Dieter Schmidtchen, 1995, "Policymaking, Comitology, and the Balance of Power in the European Union," IRLE, 16:329-344; George Tsebelis, 1994, "The power of the European parliament as a conditional agenda setter," American Political Science Review, 88:128-142.
3. 2. See for example, Robert Cooter and Josef Drexl, 1994, "The logic of power in the emerging European constitution: Game theory and the division of powers," International Review of Law and Economics. 14:307-326; Geoffrey Garrett, 1995, "From the Luxembourg compromise to codecision: Decision making in the European Union," Electoral Studies, 14:289-308; Bernard Steunenberg, Chistian Koboldt, and Dieter Schmidtchen, 1995, "Policymaking, Comitology, and the Balance of Power in the European Union," IRLE, 16:329-344; George Tsebelis, 1994, "The power of the European parliament as a conditional agenda setter," American Political Science Review, 88:128-142.
4. 2. See for example, Robert Cooter and Josef Drexl, 1994, "The logic of power in the emerging European constitution: Game theory and the division of powers," International Review of Law and Economics. 14:307-326; Geoffrey Garrett, 1995, "From the Luxembourg compromise to codecision: Decision making in the European Union," Electoral Studies, 14:289-308; Bernard Steunenberg, Chistian Koboldt, and Dieter Schmidtchen, 1995, "Policymaking, Comitology, and the Balance of Power in the European Union," IRLE, 16:329-344; George Tsebelis, 1994, "The power of the European parliament as a conditional agenda setter," American Political Science Review, 88:128-142.
5. 2. See for example, Robert Cooter and Josef Drexl, 1994, "The logic of power in the emerging European constitution: Game theory and the division of powers," International Review of Law and Economics. 14:307-326; Geoffrey Garrett, 1995, "From the Luxembourg compromise to codecision: Decision making in the European Union," Electoral Studies, 14:289-308; Bernard Steunenberg, Chistian Koboldt, and Dieter Schmidtchen, 1995, "Policymaking, Comitology, and the Balance of Power in the European Union," IRLE, 16:329-344; George Tsebelis, 1994, "The power of the European parliament as a conditional agenda setter," American Political Science Review, 88:128-142.
6. 3. William Riker, 1964, Federalism: Origin, Operation and Significance, Boston: Little Brown. For an economic analysis of federalism in Europe, see Robert Inman and Daniel Rubinfeld, 1992, "Fiscal Federalism in Europe," European Economic Review 26:654-660.
7. 3. William Riker, 1964, Federalism: Origin, Operation and Significance, Boston: Little Brown. For an economic analysis of federalism in Europe, see Robert Inman and Daniel Rubinfeld, 1992, "Fiscal Federalism in Europe," European Economic Review 26:654-660.
8. 4. See, for example, Geoffrey Garrett, 1996, "The Transition to Economic and Monetary Union," Forthcoming in Barry Eichengreen and Jerry Frieden (Eds.) The Political Economy of Economic and Monetary Union, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
9. 5. Jenna Bednar, William Eskridge, and John Ferejohn, "A Political Theory of Federalism," forthcoming in Constitutions and Constitutionalism, John Ferejohn, Jack Rakove, and Jonathan Riley (Eds.).
10. 6. Joseph Weiler, 1991, "The Transformation of Europe," Yale Law Journal, 100:2403-2483.
11. 7. Geoffrey Garrett, 1992, "International Cooperation and Institutional Choice," International Organization 46:533-560; Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast, 1993, "Ideas, interests and institutions," in Judith Goldstern and Robert Keohane (Eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
12. 7. Geoffrey Garrett, 1992, "International Cooperation and Institutional Choice," International Organization 46:533-560; Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast, 1993, "Ideas, interests and institutions," in Judith Goldstern and Robert Keohane (Eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
13. 8. Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, 1991, "Institutional change in Europe in the 1980s," in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (Eds.), The New European Community, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
14. 9. The material in this section is drawn from Jenna Bednar, 1995, "The Federal Problem." unpublished manuscript; Bednar, Eskridge, and Ferejohn (1996); Jenna Bednar and William Eskridge, "Steadying the court's 'Unsteady path': A theory of judicial enforcement of federalism," Southern California Law Review 68(6): 1447-1491"; William Eskridge and John Ferejohn, 1994, "The elastic commerce clause: A political theory of American federalism," Vanderbilt Law Review, 47:1355-1400.
15. 9. The material in this section is drawn from Jenna Bednar, 1995, "The Federal Problem." unpublished manuscript; Bednar, Eskridge, and Ferejohn (1996); Jenna Bednar and William Eskridge, "Steadying the court's 'Unsteady path': A theory of judicial enforcement of federalism," Southern California Law Review 68(6): 1447-1491"; William Eskridge and John Ferejohn, 1994, "The elastic commerce clause: A political theory of American federalism," Vanderbilt Law Review, 47:1355-1400.
16. 9. The material in this section is drawn from Jenna Bednar, 1995, "The Federal Problem." unpublished manuscript; Bednar, Eskridge, and Ferejohn (1996); Jenna Bednar and William Eskridge, "Steadying the court's 'Unsteady path': A theory of judicial enforcement of federalism," Southern California Law Review 68(6): 1447-1491"; William Eskridge and John Ferejohn, 1994, "The elastic commerce clause: A political theory of American federalism," Vanderbilt Law Review, 47:1355-1400.
17. 10. Barry Weingast, 1995, "The economic role of political institutions: Federalism, markets, and economics development," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization; Barry Weingast, "Institutions and Political Commitment: A New Political Economy of the American Civil War Era" Douglass North and Barry Weingast, 1989, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England," Journal of Economic History, 49:803-832.
18. 10. Barry Weingast, 1995, "The economic role of political institutions: Federalism, markets, and economics development," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization; Barry Weingast, "Institutions and Political Commitment: A New Political Economy of the American Civil War Era" Douglass North and Barry Weingast, 1989, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England," Journal of Economic History, 49:803-832.
19. 10. Barry Weingast, 1995, "The economic role of political institutions: Federalism, markets, and economics development," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization; Barry Weingast, "Institutions and Political Commitment: A New Political Economy of the American Civil War Era" Douglass North and Barry Weingast, 1989, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England," Journal of Economic History, 49:803-832.
20. 11. John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan, 1990. "Congressional influence on the bureaucracy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 6:1-20.
21. 12. In Europe, this assumption is embodied in the subsidiarity principle.
22. 13. Garrett (1995).
23. 14. The current qualified majority required is 62 out of 87 votes. Governments are allocated votes in the Council in loose approximation to their countries' populations, although the voting weights are biased in favor of smaller countries. Today, these weights are: France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, 10; Spain, 8; Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, and Portugal, 5; Sweden and Austria, 4; Denmark, Finland, and Ireland, 3; Luxembourg, 2.
24. 15. Thus, we do not analyze the path to the creation of a monetary union in Europe that was laid out at Maastricht.
25. 16. Dale Smith and Jürgen Wanke, 1993, "Completing the European Single Market," American Journal of Political Science 37:529-554.
26. 17. We did not include data for the countries that joined the EU after 1973 in order to balance the sample years between those before and after the signing of the Single European Act. It was not possible to include data for the years since 1992.
27. 18. The item asking attitudes toward European unification was not asked in 1976 or 1977. Not surprisingly, the two items are highly correlated. However, their marginal distributions are quite different. 84% of all respondents with opinions on the matter favored efforts to unify western Europe, whereas only 68% percent approved of their nation's membership in the EC.
28. 19. See Jeffrey Dubin and Douglas Rivers, 1996, "Truly robust standard errors for pooled time series cross section models," unpublished manuscript.
29. 20. Richard Eichenberg and Russell Dalton, 1993, "Europeans and the European Community," International Organization 47:507-534.
30. 21. We measured governmental support by aggregating responses to the Eurobarometer question asking which party they would support if there was an election, according to which parties were in government at the time.
31. 22. At this point, it is worth remembering that our analysis does not speak to the effects of the EMU agreement on the core and the periphery. For an analysis of this issue, see Garrett, (1996).
32. 23. see Bednar, Eskridge, and Ferejohn, op cit.