Financial networks: Contagion, commitment, and private sector bailouts

Journal of Finance

Volumn 60, Issue 6, 2005, Pages 2925-2953

  Leitner, Yaron ^a  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 28244495119     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00821.x     Document Type: Article

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