Empirical study of a venture capital relationship

Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal

Volumn 18, Issue 6, 2005, Pages 756-783

  Smith, Julia A ^a  

^a CARDIFF UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Accounting information; Risk management; Venture capital

Indexed keywords

EID: 27844529396     PISSN: 09513574     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/09513570510627702     Document Type: Article

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