Design of efficient generation markets

Proceedings of the IEEE

Volumn 93, Issue 11, 2005, Pages 1998-2012

  Baldick, Ross ^a,d   Helman, Udi ^b   Hobbs, Benjamin F ^c,d,e,f,g   O'Neill, Richard P ^b  

^a The University of Texas at Austin   (United States)

^b FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION   (United States)

^c The Johns Hopkins University   (United States)

^d IEEE   (United States)

^e IEEE ^*  (United States)

^f California ISO Market Surveillance Committee   (United States)

^g Policy Studies Unit   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Ancillary services; Auctions; Capacity; Generation markets; Market design; Market power; Power system economics

Indexed keywords

ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS; LAWS AND LEGISLATION; MARKETING;

ANCILLARY SERVICES; AUCTIONS; CAPACITY; GENERATION MARKETS; MARKET DESIGN; MARKET POWER; POWER SYSTEM ECONOMICS;

PRODUCT DESIGN;

EID: 27744574432     PISSN: 00189219     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/JPROC.2005.857484     Document Type: Conference Paper

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