"Our customers are our enemies" The lysine cartel of 1992-1995

Review of Industrial Organization

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 5-21

  Connor, J M ^a  

^a PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Antitrust law; Archer Daniels Midland; Cartel; Citric acid; Deparment of Justice; Lysine; Overcharge

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; PRICE DYNAMICS;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 0035116472     PISSN: 0889938X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1026513927396     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. Characteristics of collusive firms
2. The global lysine price-fixing conspiracy of 1992-1995
3. Archer Daniels Midland: Price-fixer to the world
4. Lysine production, trade, and the effects of international price fixing
5. Are export Cartels efficiency-enhancing or monopoly-promoting?
6. Identifying contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade
7. When are cartels stable contract?
8. Cartels
9. Former Archer Daniels Midland executives are found guilty of price fixing
10. The use of economic analysis in establishing market collusion
11. Market structure and price collusion: An empirical analysis
12. An empirical survey of price fixing conspiracies
13. The great school milk conspiracies of the 1980s
14. Does collusion pay ...does antitrust work?
15. DOJ goal: Assistance abroad
16. An econometric study of price-fixing, market structure, and performance in British industry in the early 1950s
17. An evaluation of the cost to U.S. animal feeds manufacturers of an alleged price-fixing conspiracy by Lysine Manufacturers, 1992-1995
18. Declaration of Lawrence J. White