Preemptive behavior in sequential-move tournaments with heterogeneous agents

Economics of Governance

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 245-252

  Jost, P J ^a   Krakel M ^b  

^a WHU OTTO BEISHEIM SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Preemption; Tournaments

Indexed keywords

EID: 27144522149     PISSN: 14356104     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10101-004-0088-4     Document Type: Article

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