Strangulation from the sea? A PRC submarine blockade of Taiwan

International Security

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 125-160

  Glosny, Michael A ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2642565466     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/0162288041588269     Document Type: Review

References (257)

1. See Rear Adm. Michael McDevitt, U.S. Navy (ret.), "The QDR and East Asia," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (hereafter Proceedings), Vol. 128 (March 2002), pp. 87-88.
2. For assessments of the improvement in U.S.-China relations, see Thomas J. Christensen and Michael A. Glosny, "China: Sources of Stability in U.S.-China Security Relations," in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg with Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia, 2003-04: Fragility and Crisis (Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003), pp. 53-79; and David M. Lampton, "The Stealth Normalization of U.S.-China Relations," National Interest, Vol. 73 (Fall 2003), pp. 37-48. For a description of Taiwan's recent moves toward independence, see Chang Yun-ping, "Chen Drafts Timetable on Constitution," Taipei Times, November 12, 2003; and Kathrin Hille, "Taiwan Defends Plans for Referendum," Financial Times, December 10, 2003. For reports of PRC warnings and threats, see John Pomfret, "China's Military Warns Taiwan," Washington Post, December 4, 2003.
3. For assessments of the improvement in U.S.-China relations, see Thomas J. Christensen and Michael A. Glosny, "China: Sources of Stability in U.S.-China Security Relations," in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg with Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia, 2003-04: Fragility and Crisis (Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003), pp. 53-79; and David M. Lampton, "The Stealth Normalization of U.S.-China Relations," National Interest, Vol. 73 (Fall 2003), pp. 37-48. For a description of Taiwan's recent moves toward independence, see Chang Yun-ping, "Chen Drafts Timetable on Constitution," Taipei Times, November 12, 2003; and Kathrin Hille, "Taiwan Defends Plans for Referendum," Financial Times, December 10, 2003. For reports of PRC warnings and threats, see John Pomfret, "China's Military Warns Taiwan," Washington Post, December 4, 2003.
4. For assessments of the improvement in U.S.-China relations, see Thomas J. Christensen and Michael A. Glosny, "China: Sources of Stability in U.S.-China Security Relations," in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg with Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia, 2003-04: Fragility and Crisis (Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003), pp. 53-79; and David M. Lampton, "The Stealth Normalization of U.S.-China Relations," National Interest, Vol. 73 (Fall 2003), pp. 37-48. For a description of Taiwan's recent moves toward independence, see Chang Yun-ping, "Chen Drafts Timetable on Constitution," Taipei Times, November 12, 2003; and Kathrin Hille, "Taiwan Defends Plans for Referendum," Financial Times, December 10, 2003. For reports of PRC warnings and threats, see John Pomfret, "China's Military Warns Taiwan," Washington Post, December 4, 2003.
5. For assessments of the improvement in U.S.-China relations, see Thomas J. Christensen and Michael A. Glosny, "China: Sources of Stability in U.S.-China Security Relations," in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg with Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia, 2003-04: Fragility and Crisis (Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003), pp. 53-79; and David M. Lampton, "The Stealth Normalization of U.S.-China Relations," National Interest, Vol. 73 (Fall 2003), pp. 37-48. For a description of Taiwan's recent moves toward independence, see Chang Yun-ping, "Chen Drafts Timetable on Constitution," Taipei Times, November 12, 2003; and Kathrin Hille, "Taiwan Defends Plans for Referendum," Financial Times, December 10, 2003. For reports of PRC warnings and threats, see John Pomfret, "China's Military Warns Taiwan," Washington Post, December 4, 2003.
6. For assessments of the improvement in U.S.-China relations, see Thomas J. Christensen and Michael A. Glosny, "China: Sources of Stability in U.S.-China Security Relations," in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg with Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia, 2003-04: Fragility and Crisis (Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003), pp. 53-79; and David M. Lampton, "The Stealth Normalization of U.S.-China Relations," National Interest, Vol. 73 (Fall 2003), pp. 37-48. For a description of Taiwan's recent moves toward independence, see Chang Yun-ping, "Chen Drafts Timetable on Constitution," Taipei Times, November 12, 2003; and Kathrin Hille, "Taiwan Defends Plans for Referendum," Financial Times, December 10, 2003. For reports of PRC warnings and threats, see John Pomfret, "China's Military Warns Taiwan," Washington Post, December 4, 2003.
7. See U.S. Department of Defense, 2003 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act, July 28, 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil/ pubs/20030730chinaex.pdf.
8. According to "China threat" arguments, as China's economic and military power continue to grow, the PRC will seek to dominate East Asia and displace U.S. influence and power from the region. See Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "China I: The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-31; Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Knopf, 1997); and Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2000). For arguments that China's external behavior is driven by internal insecurity, fears of invasion, concerns over legitimacy, and a history of humiliation, see Robert S. Ross and Andrew J. Nathan, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997). For a response to Bernstein and Munro, see Robert S. Ross, "China II: Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44. For an exploration of the evidence for and against the characterization of China as a revisionist power, see Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 5-56. A Chinese use of force against Taiwan, however, may be consistent with aggressive or defensive intentions.
9. According to "China threat" arguments, as China's economic and military power continue to grow, the PRC will seek to dominate East Asia and displace U.S. influence and power from the region. See Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "China I: The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-31; Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Knopf, 1997); and Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2000). For arguments that China's external behavior is driven by internal insecurity, fears of invasion, concerns over legitimacy, and a history of humiliation, see Robert S. Ross and Andrew J. Nathan, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997). For a response to Bernstein and Munro, see Robert S. Ross, "China II: Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44. For an exploration of the evidence for and against the characterization of China as a revisionist power, see Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 5-56. A Chinese use of force against Taiwan, however, may be consistent with aggressive or defensive intentions.
10. According to "China threat" arguments, as China's economic and military power continue to grow, the PRC will seek to dominate East Asia and displace U.S. influence and power from the region. See Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "China I: The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-31; Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Knopf, 1997); and Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2000). For arguments that China's external behavior is driven by internal insecurity, fears of invasion, concerns over legitimacy, and a history of humiliation, see Robert S. Ross and Andrew J. Nathan, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997). For a response to Bernstein and Munro, see Robert S. Ross, "China II: Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44. For an exploration of the evidence for and against the characterization of China as a revisionist power, see Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 5-56. A Chinese use of force against Taiwan, however, may be consistent with aggressive or defensive intentions.
11. According to "China threat" arguments, as China's economic and military power continue to grow, the PRC will seek to dominate East Asia and displace U.S. influence and power from the region. See Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "China I: The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-31; Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Knopf, 1997); and Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2000). For arguments that China's external behavior is driven by internal insecurity, fears of invasion, concerns over legitimacy, and a history of humiliation, see Robert S. Ross and Andrew J. Nathan, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997). For a response to Bernstein and Munro, see Robert S. Ross, "China II: Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44. For an exploration of the evidence for and against the characterization of China as a revisionist power, see Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 5-56. A Chinese use of force against Taiwan, however, may be consistent with aggressive or defensive intentions.
12. According to "China threat" arguments, as China's economic and military power continue to grow, the PRC will seek to dominate East Asia and displace U.S. influence and power from the region. See Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "China I: The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-31; Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Knopf, 1997); and Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2000). For arguments that China's external behavior is driven by internal insecurity, fears of invasion, concerns over legitimacy, and a history of humiliation, see Robert S. Ross and Andrew J. Nathan, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997). For a response to Bernstein and Munro, see Robert S. Ross, "China II: Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44. For an exploration of the evidence for and against the characterization of China as a revisionist power, see Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 5-56. A Chinese use of force against Taiwan, however, may be consistent with aggressive or defensive intentions.
13. According to "China threat" arguments, as China's economic and military power continue to grow, the PRC will seek to dominate East Asia and displace U.S. influence and power from the region. See Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "China I: The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-31; Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Knopf, 1997); and Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2000). For arguments that China's external behavior is driven by internal insecurity, fears of invasion, concerns over legitimacy, and a history of humiliation, see Robert S. Ross and Andrew J. Nathan, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997). For a response to Bernstein and Munro, see Robert S. Ross, "China II: Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44. For an exploration of the evidence for and against the characterization of China as a revisionist power, see Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 5-56. A Chinese use of force against Taiwan, however, may be consistent with aggressive or defensive intentions.
14. For works on the PLA, see David Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Larry Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000); and James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000). For pessimistic analyses of the cross-strait military balance, see Bernstein and Munro, "China I"; Bernstein and Munro, The Coming Conflict with China; Gertz, The China Threat; David Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 119-133; and James Lilley and Carl Ford, "China's Military: A Second Opinion," National Interest, Vol. 57 (Fall 1999), pp. 71-77. For more optimistic assessments of the cross-strait military balance, see Bates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon, "China's Hollow Military," National Interest, Vol. 56 (Summer 1999), pp. 55-62; and Ivan Eland, "Is Chinese Military Modernization a Threat to the United States?" Policy Analysis, January 23, 2003.
15. For works on the PLA, see David Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Larry Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000); and James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000). For pessimistic analyses of the cross-strait military balance, see Bernstein and Munro, "China I"; Bernstein and Munro, The Coming Conflict with China; Gertz, The China Threat; David Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 119-133; and James Lilley and Carl Ford, "China's Military: A Second Opinion," National Interest, Vol. 57 (Fall 1999), pp. 71-77. For more optimistic assessments of the cross-strait military balance, see Bates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon, "China's Hollow Military," National Interest, Vol. 56 (Summer 1999), pp. 55-62; and Ivan Eland, "Is Chinese Military Modernization a Threat to the United States?" Policy Analysis, January 23, 2003.
16. For works on the PLA, see David Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Larry Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000); and James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000). For pessimistic analyses of the cross-strait military balance, see Bernstein and Munro, "China I"; Bernstein and Munro, The Coming Conflict with China; Gertz, The China Threat; David Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 119-133; and James Lilley and Carl Ford, "China's Military: A Second Opinion," National Interest, Vol. 57 (Fall 1999), pp. 71-77. For more optimistic assessments of the cross-strait military balance, see Bates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon, "China's Hollow Military," National Interest, Vol. 56 (Summer 1999), pp. 55-62; and Ivan Eland, "Is Chinese Military Modernization a Threat to the United States?" Policy Analysis, January 23, 2003.
17. For works on the PLA, see David Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Larry Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000); and James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000). For pessimistic analyses of the cross-strait military balance, see Bernstein and Munro, "China I"; Bernstein and Munro, The Coming Conflict with China; Gertz, The China Threat; David Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 119-133; and James Lilley and Carl Ford, "China's Military: A Second Opinion," National Interest, Vol. 57 (Fall 1999), pp. 71-77. For more optimistic assessments of the cross-strait military balance, see Bates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon, "China's Hollow Military," National Interest, Vol. 56 (Summer 1999), pp. 55-62; and Ivan Eland, "Is Chinese Military Modernization a Threat to the United States?" Policy Analysis, January 23, 2003.
18. For works on the PLA, see David Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Larry Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000); and James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000). For pessimistic analyses of the cross-strait military balance, see Bernstein and Munro, "China I"; Bernstein and Munro, The Coming Conflict with China; Gertz, The China Threat; David Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 119-133; and James Lilley and Carl Ford, "China's Military: A Second Opinion," National Interest, Vol. 57 (Fall 1999), pp. 71-77. For more optimistic assessments of the cross-strait military balance, see Bates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon, "China's Hollow Military," National Interest, Vol. 56 (Summer 1999), pp. 55-62; and Ivan Eland, "Is Chinese Military Modernization a Threat to the United States?" Policy Analysis, January 23, 2003.
19. For works on the PLA, see David Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Larry Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000); and James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000). For pessimistic analyses of the cross-strait military balance, see Bernstein and Munro, "China I"; Bernstein and Munro, The Coming Conflict with China; Gertz, The China Threat; David Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 119-133; and James Lilley and Carl Ford, "China's Military: A Second Opinion," National Interest, Vol. 57 (Fall 1999), pp. 71-77. For more optimistic assessments of the cross-strait military balance, see Bates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon, "China's Hollow Military," National Interest, Vol. 56 (Summer 1999), pp. 55-62; and Ivan Eland, "Is Chinese Military Modernization a Threat to the United States?" Policy Analysis, January 23, 2003.
20. For works on the PLA, see David Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Larry Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000); and James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000). For pessimistic analyses of the cross-strait military balance, see Bernstein and Munro, "China I"; Bernstein and Munro, The Coming Conflict with China; Gertz, The China Threat; David Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 119-133; and James Lilley and Carl Ford, "China's Military: A Second Opinion," National Interest, Vol. 57 (Fall 1999), pp. 71-77. For more optimistic assessments of the cross-strait military balance, see Bates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon, "China's Hollow Military," National Interest, Vol. 56 (Summer 1999), pp. 55-62; and Ivan Eland, "Is Chinese Military Modernization a Threat to the United States?" Policy Analysis, January 23, 2003.
21. For works on the PLA, see David Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Larry Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000); and James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000). For pessimistic analyses of the cross-strait military balance, see Bernstein and Munro, "China I"; Bernstein and Munro, The Coming Conflict with China; Gertz, The China Threat; David Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 119-133; and James Lilley and Carl Ford, "China's Military: A Second Opinion," National Interest, Vol. 57 (Fall 1999), pp. 71-77. For more optimistic assessments of the cross-strait military balance, see Bates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon, "China's Hollow Military," National Interest, Vol. 56 (Summer 1999), pp. 55-62; and Ivan Eland, "Is Chinese Military Modernization a Threat to the United States?" Policy Analysis, January 23, 2003.
22. For works on the PLA, see David Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Larry Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000); and James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000). For pessimistic analyses of the cross-strait military balance, see Bernstein and Munro, "China I"; Bernstein and Munro, The Coming Conflict with China; Gertz, The China Threat; David Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 119-133; and James Lilley and Carl Ford, "China's Military: A Second Opinion," National Interest, Vol. 57 (Fall 1999), pp. 71-77. For more optimistic assessments of the cross-strait military balance, see Bates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon, "China's Hollow Military," National Interest, Vol. 56 (Summer 1999), pp. 55-62; and Ivan Eland, "Is Chinese Military Modernization a Threat to the United States?" Policy Analysis, January 23, 2003.
23. For works on the PLA, see David Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Larry Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000); and James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000). For pessimistic analyses of the cross-strait military balance, see Bernstein and Munro, "China I"; Bernstein and Munro, The Coming Conflict with China; Gertz, The China Threat; David Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 119-133; and James Lilley and Carl Ford, "China's Military: A Second Opinion," National Interest, Vol. 57 (Fall 1999), pp. 71-77. For more optimistic assessments of the cross-strait military balance, see Bates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon, "China's Hollow Military," National Interest, Vol. 56 (Summer 1999), pp. 55-62; and Ivan Eland, "Is Chinese Military Modernization a Threat to the United States?" Policy Analysis, January 23, 2003.
24. See Michael O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), especially p. 53; and David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, and Barry A. Wilson, Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000), especially p. xii.
25. See Michael O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), especially p. 53; and David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, and Barry A. Wilson, Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000), especially p. xii.
26. For work on coercion, see Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966); Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military Power?" International Security, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Spring 1980), pp. 3-35; and Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). Following Pape, p. 4, my use of the term "coercion" is similar to Schelling's concept of compellence. Therefore, coercion is the use of force to get another actor to change its behavior.
27. For work on coercion, see Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966); Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military Power?" International Security, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Spring 1980), pp. 3-35; and Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). Following Pape, p. 4, my use of the term "coercion" is similar to Schelling's concept of compellence. Therefore, coercion is the use of force to get another actor to change its behavior.
28. For work on coercion, see Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966); Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military Power?" International Security, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Spring 1980), pp. 3-35; and Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). Following Pape, p. 4, my use of the term "coercion" is similar to Schelling's concept of compellence. Therefore, coercion is the use of force to get another actor to change its behavior.
29. See U.S. Department of Defense, 2003 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, For a discussion of some of the strategies that the Chinese are considering, see Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges to U.S. Security Policy," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 5-40.
30. See U.S. Department of Defense, 2003 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, For a discussion of some of the strategies that the Chinese are considering, see Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges to U.S. Security Policy," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 5-40.
31. For work on PLA missiles, see Mark A. Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999).
32. The two are obviously not mutually exclusive. Moreover, the discussion later in this article about whether Taiwan would stand firm or capitulate would also be important in trying to judge the success of any coercive use of missiles.
33. See Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, eds., Zhanyi Xue [The science of campaigns] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2000), pp. 320-324, 407-421; Li Mingliang, Fengsuo yu Fan Fengsuo Zuozhan [Blockade and antiblockade warfare] (Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 2001); and Hu Wenlong, chief ed., Lianhe Fengsuo Zuozhan Yanjiu [Research on joint blockade operations] (Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 1999).
34. See Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, eds., Zhanyi Xue [The science of campaigns] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2000), pp. 320-324, 407-421; Li Mingliang, Fengsuo yu Fan Fengsuo Zuozhan [Blockade and antiblockade warfare] (Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 2001); and Hu Wenlong, chief ed., Lianhe Fengsuo Zuozhan Yanjiu [Research on joint blockade operations] (Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 1999).
35. See Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, eds., Zhanyi Xue [The science of campaigns] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2000), pp. 320-324, 407-421; Li Mingliang, Fengsuo yu Fan Fengsuo Zuozhan [Blockade and antiblockade warfare] (Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 2001); and Hu Wenlong, chief ed., Lianhe Fengsuo Zuozhan Yanjiu [Research on joint blockade operations] (Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 1999).
36. See U.S. Department of Defense, 2003 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China; Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001); Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, "Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force," International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 161-196; Kenneth W. Allen, PLA Navy Building at the Start of a New Century, report from the Second Conference on the PLA Navy, June 28-29, 2001 (Alexandria, Va.: CNA, 2001); Michael McDevitt, "Where Is China's Navy Headed?" Proceedings, Vol. 127 (May 2001), pp. 58-61; and John Pomfret, "China to Buy 8 More Russian Submarines," Washington Post, June 25, 2002.
37. See U.S. Department of Defense, 2003 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China; Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001); Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, "Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force," International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 161-196; Kenneth W. Allen, PLA Navy Building at the Start of a New Century, report from the Second Conference on the PLA Navy, June 28-29, 2001 (Alexandria, Va.: CNA, 2001); Michael McDevitt, "Where Is China's Navy Headed?" Proceedings, Vol. 127 (May 2001), pp. 58-61; and John Pomfret, "China to Buy 8 More Russian Submarines," Washington Post, June 25, 2002.
38. See U.S. Department of Defense, 2003 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China; Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001); Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, "Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force," International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 161-196; Kenneth W. Allen, PLA Navy Building at the Start of a New Century, report from the Second Conference on the PLA Navy, June 28-29, 2001 (Alexandria, Va.: CNA, 2001); Michael McDevitt, "Where Is China's Navy Headed?" Proceedings, Vol. 127 (May 2001), pp. 58-61; and John Pomfret, "China to Buy 8 More Russian Submarines," Washington Post, June 25, 2002.
39. See U.S. Department of Defense, 2003 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China; Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001); Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, "Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force," International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 161-196; Kenneth W. Allen, PLA Navy Building at the Start of a New Century, report from the Second Conference on the PLA Navy, June 28-29, 2001 (Alexandria, Va.: CNA, 2001); Michael McDevitt, "Where Is China's Navy Headed?" Proceedings, Vol. 127 (May 2001), pp. 58-61; and John Pomfret, "China to Buy 8 More Russian Submarines," Washington Post, June 25, 2002.
40. See U.S. Department of Defense, 2003 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China; Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001); Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, "Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force," International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 161-196; Kenneth W. Allen, PLA Navy Building at the Start of a New Century, report from the Second Conference on the PLA Navy, June 28-29, 2001 (Alexandria, Va.: CNA, 2001); Michael McDevitt, "Where Is China's Navy Headed?" Proceedings, Vol. 127 (May 2001), pp. 58-61; and John Pomfret, "China to Buy 8 More Russian Submarines," Washington Post, June 25, 2002.
41. See U.S. Department of Defense, 2003 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China; Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001); Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, "Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force," International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 161-196; Kenneth W. Allen, PLA Navy Building at the Start of a New Century, report from the Second Conference on the PLA Navy, June 28-29, 2001 (Alexandria, Va.: CNA, 2001); Michael McDevitt, "Where Is China's Navy Headed?" Proceedings, Vol. 127 (May 2001), pp. 58-61; and John Pomfret, "China to Buy 8 More Russian Submarines," Washington Post, June 25, 2002.
42. For statements expressing concern over a potential blockade, see U.S. Department of Defense, 2003 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China; U.S. Department of Defense, "The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait," February 1999, especially pp. 14-16; Michael O'Hanlon, Budget Options for the Bush Administration (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2001), p. 225; and Chris Cockel, "Peace in Taiwan Strait Not a Given, Says U.S. Official," China Post, April 5, 2002.
43. For statements expressing concern over a potential blockade, see U.S. Department of Defense, 2003 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China; U.S. Department of Defense, "The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait," February 1999, especially pp. 14-16; Michael O'Hanlon, Budget Options for the Bush Administration (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2001), p. 225; and Chris Cockel, "Peace in Taiwan Strait Not a Given, Says U.S. Official," China Post, April 5, 2002.
44. For statements expressing concern over a potential blockade, see U.S. Department of Defense, 2003 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China; U.S. Department of Defense, "The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait," February 1999, especially pp. 14-16; Michael O'Hanlon, Budget Options for the Bush Administration (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2001), p. 225; and Chris Cockel, "Peace in Taiwan Strait Not a Given, Says U.S. Official," China Post, April 5, 2002.
45. For statements expressing concern over a potential blockade, see U.S. Department of Defense, 2003 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China; U.S. Department of Defense, "The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait," February 1999, especially pp. 14-16; Michael O'Hanlon, Budget Options for the Bush Administration (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2001), p. 225; and Chris Cockel, "Peace in Taiwan Strait Not a Given, Says U.S. Official," China Post, April 5, 2002.
46. Analysts are only at the nascent stages of understanding PLA doctrine and organization at the operational level. Although the PLA may run a blockade differently at the tactical or operational level than this article describes, this analysis is a best attempt to evaluate how successful a blockade might be. See the conference papers "The PLA Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs," RAND-CNA, December 5-8, 2002.
47. For analysis of likely conditions under which the PRC might decide to use force, see Steven M. Goldstein, "The Taiwan Strait: A Continuing Status Quo of Deadlock," Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 1 (April 2002), pp. 85-94; and Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up." For an argument that cross-strait relations should remain stable, see Robert S. Ross, "Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.- China Relations," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Fall 2002), pp. 48-85.
48. For analysis of likely conditions under which the PRC might decide to use force, see Steven M. Goldstein, "The Taiwan Strait: A Continuing Status Quo of Deadlock," Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 1 (April 2002), pp. 85-94; and Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up." For an argument that cross-strait relations should remain stable, see Robert S. Ross, "Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.- China Relations," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Fall 2002), pp. 48-85.
49. For an analysis assuming a three-month duration, see Paul H.B. Godwin, "The Use of Military Force against Taiwan: Potential PRC Scenarios," in Parris H. Chang and Martin L. Lasater, eds., If China Crosses the Taiwan Straits: The International Response (New York: University Press of America, 1993), p. 17. If Taiwan has not capitulated by this point, the PRC would probably be forced to escalate or back down. It is also possible to imagine the PRC declaring victory after six months, claiming it had taught Taiwan a lesson, even if Taipei had not given in to Beijing's demands. However, this would still count as a coercive failure. Moreover, Taiwan's stated policy is to respond to a PRC use of force with a formal declaration of independence.
50. For a similar political scenario, see ibid. For an explanation of this formula, see "PRC: Qian Qichen Proposes '7-Point' Plan for '1 Country, 2 Systems' in Taiwan," Wen Wei Po, July 13, 2001, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) CPP20010713000050. Under this plan Taiwan would keep its military and its currency and maintain its existing government framework; in addition, the mainland would not send officials to Taiwan.
51. See John Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), p. 118; and "Military Publication Warns Taiwan," Zhongguo Guofang Bao, July 23, 1999, FBIS OW0608092499.
52. See John Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), p. 118; and "Military Publication Warns Taiwan," Zhongguo Guofang Bao, July 23, 1999, FBIS OW0608092499.
53. See "PRC Taiwan Expert Disparages Taiwan Military Capability," Ta Kung Pao, September 19, 2000, FBIS CPP20000919000039; "Jiefangjun Bao Views Developments, Problems in Taiwan Armed Forces," Jiefangjun Bao, May 30, 2001, FBIS CPP20010530000078; "Blockade Said First Option against Taiwan," Ta Kung Pao, September 10, 1999, FBIS OW1009084999; and "PRC, Taiwan Submarine, Antisubmarine Capabilities Compared," Kuang Chiao Ching, August 16, 2002, FBIS CPP20020816000067. Many of my mainland interlocutors, if not optimistic about success, at least pointed to some of the above-mentioned weaknesses that a blockade could exploit.
54. See "PRC Taiwan Expert Disparages Taiwan Military Capability," Ta Kung Pao, September 19, 2000, FBIS CPP20000919000039; "Jiefangjun Bao Views Developments, Problems in Taiwan Armed Forces," Jiefangjun Bao, May 30, 2001, FBIS CPP20010530000078; "Blockade Said First Option against Taiwan," Ta Kung Pao, September 10, 1999, FBIS OW1009084999; and "PRC, Taiwan Submarine, Antisubmarine Capabilities Compared," Kuang Chiao Ching, August 16, 2002, FBIS CPP20020816000067. Many of my mainland interlocutors, if not optimistic about success, at least pointed to some of the above-mentioned weaknesses that a blockade could exploit.
55. See "PRC Taiwan Expert Disparages Taiwan Military Capability," Ta Kung Pao, September 19, 2000, FBIS CPP20000919000039; "Jiefangjun Bao Views Developments, Problems in Taiwan Armed Forces," Jiefangjun Bao, May 30, 2001, FBIS CPP20010530000078; "Blockade Said First Option against Taiwan," Ta Kung Pao, September 10, 1999, FBIS OW1009084999; and "PRC, Taiwan Submarine, Antisubmarine Capabilities Compared," Kuang Chiao Ching, August 16, 2002, FBIS CPP20020816000067. Many of my mainland interlocutors, if not optimistic about success, at least pointed to some of the above-mentioned weaknesses that a blockade could exploit.
56. See "PRC Taiwan Expert Disparages Taiwan Military Capability," Ta Kung Pao, September 19, 2000, FBIS CPP20000919000039; "Jiefangjun Bao Views Developments, Problems in Taiwan Armed Forces," Jiefangjun Bao, May 30, 2001, FBIS CPP20010530000078; "Blockade Said First Option against Taiwan," Ta Kung Pao, September 10, 1999, FBIS OW1009084999; and "PRC, Taiwan Submarine, Antisubmarine Capabilities Compared," Kuang Chiao Ching, August 16, 2002, FBIS CPP20020816000067. Many of my mainland interlocutors, if not optimistic about success, at least pointed to some of the above-mentioned weaknesses that a blockade could exploit.
57. See Gary Klintworth, "China and Taiwan - From Flashpoint to Redefining One China," November 7, 2000, p. 16, http://www.aph.gov.au/ library/pubs/rp/2000-01/01rp15.htm.
58. See "Taiwan's CPC Raises Oil Security Reserves amid Escalating Middle East Tensions," Taipei Central News Agency, September 4, 2002, FBIS CPP20020904000099. My interlocutors in the Taiwanese navy estimated the oil reserves to be about three to four weeks in the summer of 2002.
59. For a description of Taiwan's geography, see http://www.fas.org/man/dod- 101/ops/taiwan-geo.htm.
60. Felix K. Chang also includes the eastern ports of Suao and Hualien in his analysis. See Chang, "Conventional War across the Taiwan Strait," Orbis, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Fall 1996), p. 600. Although including only the three main ports in his analysis, Godwin suggests that the Taiwanese might want to transfer some cargo to these smaller eastern ports. See Godwin, "The Use of Military Force against Taiwan," p. 22. My interlocutors at the Kaohsiung and Keelung harbor bureaus, however, suggested that the eastern ports were so crowded that they could not handle much more cargo and had little capacity to handle oil tankers. For a description of the cargo capacity of these ports, see Lloyd's Ports of the World: 2002 (Colchester, Essex, U.K.: Lloyd's of London Press, 2002).
61. Felix K. Chang also includes the eastern ports of Suao and Hualien in his analysis. See Chang, "Conventional War across the Taiwan Strait," Orbis, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Fall 1996), p. 600. Although including only the three main ports in his analysis, Godwin suggests that the Taiwanese might want to transfer some cargo to these smaller eastern ports. See Godwin, "The Use of Military Force against Taiwan," p. 22. My interlocutors at the Kaohsiung and Keelung harbor bureaus, however, suggested that the eastern ports were so crowded that they could not handle much more cargo and had little capacity to handle oil tankers. For a description of the cargo capacity of these ports, see Lloyd's Ports of the World: 2002 (Colchester, Essex, U.K.: Lloyd's of London Press, 2002).
62. Felix K. Chang also includes the eastern ports of Suao and Hualien in his analysis. See Chang, "Conventional War across the Taiwan Strait," Orbis, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Fall 1996), p. 600. Although including only the three main ports in his analysis, Godwin suggests that the Taiwanese might want to transfer some cargo to these smaller eastern ports. See Godwin, "The Use of Military Force against Taiwan," p. 22. My interlocutors at the Kaohsiung and Keelung harbor bureaus, however, suggested that the eastern ports were so crowded that they could not handle much more cargo and had little capacity to handle oil tankers. For a description of the cargo capacity of these ports, see Lloyd's Ports of the World: 2002 (Colchester, Essex, U.K.: Lloyd's of London Press, 2002).
63. For the specific statistics, see http://www.klhb.gov.tw; http://www.tchb.gov.tw; and http://www.khb.gov.tw.
64. By this I do not mean only ships in Taiwan's merchant marine, but all merchant ships that enter or depart from Taiwan's ports, regardless of the flag they carry.
65. See Joseph Morgan and Mark J. Valencia, eds., Atlas for Marine Policy in East Asian Seas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). To reach Kaohsiung and Taichung, merchant ships must enter the shallow water of the Taiwan Strait. To reach Keelung, merchant ships must enter the shallow water off Taiwan's east coast.
66. For more discussion of the difficulties of ASW in the shallow waters surrounding Taiwan, see Shlapak, Orletsky, and Wilson, Dire Strait? p. 22. For a brief introduction to ASW, see J.R. Hill, Anti-Submarine Warfare, 2d ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984). For an introduction to ocean acoustics, see Albert W. Cox, Sonar and Underwater Sound (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), especially p. 39. For discussions of the threat of diesel submarines in the acoustically challenging shallows, see Keith Edmunds, "ASW - Current and Future Trends," Defense Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 1 (April 2000), pp. 73-87; Norman Friedman, "Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare - Not as Easy as It Sounds," International Defense Review, June 1995, pp. 53-57; Brian Longworth, "Solutions to the Shallow-Water Challenge," Jane's Navy International, Vol. 101, No. 5 (June 1996), pp. 10-18; and Tim Sloth Joergensen, "U.S. Navy Operations in Littoral Waters: 2000 and Beyond," Naval War College Review, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 20-29.
67. For more discussion of the difficulties of ASW in the shallow waters surrounding Taiwan, see Shlapak, Orletsky, and Wilson, Dire Strait? p. 22. For a brief introduction to ASW, see J.R. Hill, Anti-Submarine Warfare, 2d ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984). For an introduction to ocean acoustics, see Albert W. Cox, Sonar and Underwater Sound (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), especially p. 39. For discussions of the threat of diesel submarines in the acoustically challenging shallows, see Keith Edmunds, "ASW - Current and Future Trends," Defense Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 1 (April 2000), pp. 73-87; Norman Friedman, "Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare - Not as Easy as It Sounds," International Defense Review, June 1995, pp. 53-57; Brian Longworth, "Solutions to the Shallow-Water Challenge," Jane's Navy International, Vol. 101, No. 5 (June 1996), pp. 10-18; and Tim Sloth Joergensen, "U.S. Navy Operations in Littoral Waters: 2000 and Beyond," Naval War College Review, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 20-29.
68. For more discussion of the difficulties of ASW in the shallow waters surrounding Taiwan, see Shlapak, Orletsky, and Wilson, Dire Strait? p. 22. For a brief introduction to ASW, see J.R. Hill, Anti-Submarine Warfare, 2d ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984). For an introduction to ocean acoustics, see Albert W. Cox, Sonar and Underwater Sound (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), especially p. 39. For discussions of the threat of diesel submarines in the acoustically challenging shallows, see Keith Edmunds, "ASW - Current and Future Trends," Defense Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 1 (April 2000), pp. 73-87; Norman Friedman, "Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare - Not as Easy as It Sounds," International Defense Review, June 1995, pp. 53-57; Brian Longworth, "Solutions to the Shallow-Water Challenge," Jane's Navy International, Vol. 101, No. 5 (June 1996), pp. 10-18; and Tim Sloth Joergensen, "U.S. Navy Operations in Littoral Waters: 2000 and Beyond," Naval War College Review, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 20-29.
69. For more discussion of the difficulties of ASW in the shallow waters surrounding Taiwan, see Shlapak, Orletsky, and Wilson, Dire Strait? p. 22. For a brief introduction to ASW, see J.R. Hill, Anti-Submarine Warfare, 2d ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984). For an introduction to ocean acoustics, see Albert W. Cox, Sonar and Underwater Sound (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), especially p. 39. For discussions of the threat of diesel submarines in the acoustically challenging shallows, see Keith Edmunds, "ASW - Current and Future Trends," Defense Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 1 (April 2000), pp. 73-87; Norman Friedman, "Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare - Not as Easy as It Sounds," International Defense Review, June 1995, pp. 53-57; Brian Longworth, "Solutions to the Shallow-Water Challenge," Jane's Navy International, Vol. 101, No. 5 (June 1996), pp. 10-18; and Tim Sloth Joergensen, "U.S. Navy Operations in Littoral Waters: 2000 and Beyond," Naval War College Review, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 20-29.
70. For more discussion of the difficulties of ASW in the shallow waters surrounding Taiwan, see Shlapak, Orletsky, and Wilson, Dire Strait? p. 22. For a brief introduction to ASW, see J.R. Hill, Anti-Submarine Warfare, 2d ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984). For an introduction to ocean acoustics, see Albert W. Cox, Sonar and Underwater Sound (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), especially p. 39. For discussions of the threat of diesel submarines in the acoustically challenging shallows, see Keith Edmunds, "ASW - Current and Future Trends," Defense Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 1 (April 2000), pp. 73-87; Norman Friedman, "Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare - Not as Easy as It Sounds," International Defense Review, June 1995, pp. 53-57; Brian Longworth, "Solutions to the Shallow-Water Challenge," Jane's Navy International, Vol. 101, No. 5 (June 1996), pp. 10-18; and Tim Sloth Joergensen, "U.S. Navy Operations in Littoral Waters: 2000 and Beyond," Naval War College Review, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 20-29.
71. For more discussion of the difficulties of ASW in the shallow waters surrounding Taiwan, see Shlapak, Orletsky, and Wilson, Dire Strait? p. 22. For a brief introduction to ASW, see J.R. Hill, Anti-Submarine Warfare, 2d ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984). For an introduction to ocean acoustics, see Albert W. Cox, Sonar and Underwater Sound (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), especially p. 39. For discussions of the threat of diesel submarines in the acoustically challenging shallows, see Keith Edmunds, "ASW - Current and Future Trends," Defense Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 1 (April 2000), pp. 73-87; Norman Friedman, "Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare - Not as Easy as It Sounds," International Defense Review, June 1995, pp. 53-57; Brian Longworth, "Solutions to the Shallow-Water Challenge," Jane's Navy International, Vol. 101, No. 5 (June 1996), pp. 10-18; and Tim Sloth Joergensen, "U.S. Navy Operations in Littoral Waters: 2000 and Beyond," Naval War College Review, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 20-29.
72. For more discussion of the difficulties of ASW in the shallow waters surrounding Taiwan, see Shlapak, Orletsky, and Wilson, Dire Strait? p. 22. For a brief introduction to ASW, see J.R. Hill, Anti-Submarine Warfare, 2d ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984). For an introduction to ocean acoustics, see Albert W. Cox, Sonar and Underwater Sound (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), especially p. 39. For discussions of the threat of diesel submarines in the acoustically challenging shallows, see Keith Edmunds, "ASW - Current and Future Trends," Defense Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 1 (April 2000), pp. 73-87; Norman Friedman, "Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare - Not as Easy as It Sounds," International Defense Review, June 1995, pp. 53-57; Brian Longworth, "Solutions to the Shallow-Water Challenge," Jane's Navy International, Vol. 101, No. 5 (June 1996), pp. 10-18; and Tim Sloth Joergensen, "U.S. Navy Operations in Littoral Waters: 2000 and Beyond," Naval War College Review, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 20-29.
73. See Sir Arthur Richard Hezlet, The Submarine and Seapower (London: P. Davies, 1967); S.W. Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, Vols. 1-3 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954-60); D.M. Sternhill and A.M. Thorndike, Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II, Report No. 51 (Washington, D.C.: Operations Evaluation Group, 1946); and Clay Blair, Hitler's U-Boat War, Vols. 1-2 (New York: Modern Library, 2000). The British also encountered similar difficulties in searching for Argentinean submarines in the 1982 Falklands War.
74. See Sir Arthur Richard Hezlet, The Submarine and Seapower (London: P. Davies, 1967); S.W. Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, Vols. 1-3 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954-60); D.M. Sternhill and A.M. Thorndike, Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II, Report No. 51 (Washington, D.C.: Operations Evaluation Group, 1946); and Clay Blair, Hitler's U-Boat War, Vols. 1-2 (New York: Modern Library, 2000). The British also encountered similar difficulties in searching for Argentinean submarines in the 1982 Falklands War.
75. See Sir Arthur Richard Hezlet, The Submarine and Seapower (London: P. Davies, 1967); S.W. Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, Vols. 1-3 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954-60); D.M. Sternhill and A.M. Thorndike, Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II, Report No. 51 (Washington, D.C.: Operations Evaluation Group, 1946); and Clay Blair, Hitler's U-Boat War, Vols. 1-2 (New York: Modern Library, 2000). The British also encountered similar difficulties in searching for Argentinean submarines in the 1982 Falklands War.
76. See Sir Arthur Richard Hezlet, The Submarine and Seapower (London: P. Davies, 1967); S.W. Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, Vols. 1-3 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954-60); D.M. Sternhill and A.M. Thorndike, Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II, Report No. 51 (Washington, D.C.: Operations Evaluation Group, 1946); and Clay Blair, Hitler's U-Boat War, Vols. 1-2 (New York: Modern Library, 2000). The British also encountered similar difficulties in searching for Argentinean submarines in the 1982 Falklands War.
77. Interviews, Taipei, summer 2001 and summer 2002; and Washington, D.C., fall 2002 and summer 2003.
78. The PLAN is divided into three fleets. The North Fleet is directed against Japan and Korea, the East Fleet is responsible for Taiwan, and the South Fleet is responsible for the South China Sea. See Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, chap. 4.
79. See Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, "Cause of Submarine Disaster Is Mystery," Boston Globe, May 4, 2003. This accident killed all seventy crew members.
80. Pomfret, "China to Buy 8 More Russian Submarines"; and Nikolai Novichkov, "China's Russian Kilo Buy May Put Song Submarine Future in Doubt," Jane's Defence Weekly, June 12, 2002.
81. Pomfret, "China to Buy 8 More Russian Submarines"; and Nikolai Novichkov, "China's Russian Kilo Buy May Put Song Submarine Future in Doubt," Jane's Defence Weekly, June 12, 2002.
82. For the troubles in 1998, see "Two of China's 'Kilos' Are No Longer in Operation," Jane's Defence Weekly, September 2, 1998; Robert Sae-Liu, "Second Song Submarine Vital to China's Huge Programme," Jane's Defence Weekly, August 18, 1999; and "New PLAN to Train, Purchase Vessel Mix," Jane's Defence Weekly, December 16, 1998. For the troubles in 2000, see Samuel Loring Morison, "Chinese Navy Orders Eight Kilo-Class Submarines," Navy News Week, June 24, 2002; and "Taiwan Report Says China Has 'Big Problems' with Russian-Made Submarines," Taipei Times, July 2, 2002, FBIS CPP20020702000150.
83. For the troubles in 1998, see "Two of China's 'Kilos' Are No Longer in Operation," Jane's Defence Weekly, September 2, 1998; Robert Sae-Liu, "Second Song Submarine Vital to China's Huge Programme," Jane's Defence Weekly, August 18, 1999; and "New PLAN to Train, Purchase Vessel Mix," Jane's Defence Weekly, December 16, 1998. For the troubles in 2000, see Samuel Loring Morison, "Chinese Navy Orders Eight Kilo-Class Submarines," Navy News Week, June 24, 2002; and "Taiwan Report Says China Has 'Big Problems' with Russian-Made Submarines," Taipei Times, July 2, 2002, FBIS CPP20020702000150.
84. For the troubles in 1998, see "Two of China's 'Kilos' Are No Longer in Operation," Jane's Defence Weekly, September 2, 1998; Robert Sae-Liu, "Second Song Submarine Vital to China's Huge Programme," Jane's Defence Weekly, August 18, 1999; and "New PLAN to Train, Purchase Vessel Mix," Jane's Defence Weekly, December 16, 1998. For the troubles in 2000, see Samuel Loring Morison, "Chinese Navy Orders Eight Kilo-Class Submarines," Navy News Week, June 24, 2002; and "Taiwan Report Says China Has 'Big Problems' with Russian-Made Submarines," Taipei Times, July 2, 2002, FBIS CPP20020702000150.
85. For the troubles in 1998, see "Two of China's 'Kilos' Are No Longer in Operation," Jane's Defence Weekly, September 2, 1998; Robert Sae-Liu, "Second Song Submarine Vital to China's Huge Programme," Jane's Defence Weekly, August 18, 1999; and "New PLAN to Train, Purchase Vessel Mix," Jane's Defence Weekly, December 16, 1998. For the troubles in 2000, see Samuel Loring Morison, "Chinese Navy Orders Eight Kilo-Class Submarines," Navy News Week, June 24, 2002; and "Taiwan Report Says China Has 'Big Problems' with Russian-Made Submarines," Taipei Times, July 2, 2002, FBIS CPP20020702000150.
86. For the troubles in 1998, see "Two of China's 'Kilos' Are No Longer in Operation," Jane's Defence Weekly, September 2, 1998; Robert Sae-Liu, "Second Song Submarine Vital to China's Huge Programme," Jane's Defence Weekly, August 18, 1999; and "New PLAN to Train, Purchase Vessel Mix," Jane's Defence Weekly, December 16, 1998. For the troubles in 2000, see Samuel Loring Morison, "Chinese Navy Orders Eight Kilo-Class Submarines," Navy News Week, June 24, 2002; and "Taiwan Report Says China Has 'Big Problems' with Russian-Made Submarines," Taipei Times, July 2, 2002, FBIS CPP20020702000150.
87. For an estimate of a 30 percent readiness rate, see Klintworth, "China and Taiwan - From Flashpoint to Redefining One China," p. 28. In a 2005 scenario, one study estimates that twenty-four submarines would be operational, including only three Romeos and four Mings. See Shlapak, Orletsky, and Wilson, Dire Strait? pp. 21-22. For the assumption that 80 percent of PRC submarines would be operational, see Chang, "Conventional War across the Taiwan Strait."
88. For an estimate of a 30 percent readiness rate, see Klintworth, "China and Taiwan - From Flashpoint to Redefining One China," p. 28. In a 2005 scenario, one study estimates that twenty-four submarines would be operational, including only three Romeos and four Mings. See Shlapak, Orletsky, and Wilson, Dire Strait? pp. 21-22. For the assumption that 80 percent of PRC submarines would be operational, see Chang, "Conventional War across the Taiwan Strait."
89. For an estimate of a 30 percent readiness rate, see Klintworth, "China and Taiwan - From Flashpoint to Redefining One China," p. 28. In a 2005 scenario, one study estimates that twenty-four submarines would be operational, including only three Romeos and four Mings. See Shlapak, Orletsky, and Wilson, Dire Strait? pp. 21-22. For the assumption that 80 percent of PRC submarines would be operational, see Chang, "Conventional War across the Taiwan Strait."
90. Optimistic and pessimistic are relative to the United States and its potential defense commitment. An optimistic assessment, from the U.S. and Taiwanese perspective, is one in which the PLAN has fewer submarines; a pessimistic assessment would be one in which the PLAN had more submarines.
91. See U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1987, p. 96. For more on the poor maintenance procedures of the Chinese, see Cole, The Great Wall at Sea; "Two of China's 'Kilos' Are No Longer in Operation"; Sae-Liu, "Second Song Submarine Vital to China's Huge Programme"; "New PLAN to Train, Purchase Vessel Mix"; Morison, "Chinese Navy Orders Eight Kilo-Class Submarines"; and "Taiwan Report Says China Has 'Big Problems' with Russian-Made Submarines."
92. See U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1987, p. 96. For more on the poor maintenance procedures of the Chinese, see Cole, The Great Wall at Sea; "Two of China's 'Kilos' Are No Longer in Operation"; Sae-Liu, "Second Song Submarine Vital to China's Huge Programme"; "New PLAN to Train, Purchase Vessel Mix"; Morison, "Chinese Navy Orders Eight Kilo-Class Submarines"; and "Taiwan Report Says China Has 'Big Problems' with Russian-Made Submarines."
93. See U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1987, p. 96. For more on the poor maintenance procedures of the Chinese, see Cole, The Great Wall at Sea; "Two of China's 'Kilos' Are No Longer in Operation"; Sae-Liu, "Second Song Submarine Vital to China's Huge Programme"; "New PLAN to Train, Purchase Vessel Mix"; Morison, "Chinese Navy Orders Eight Kilo-Class Submarines"; and "Taiwan Report Says China Has 'Big Problems' with Russian-Made Submarines."
94. See U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1987, p. 96. For more on the poor maintenance procedures of the Chinese, see Cole, The Great Wall at Sea; "Two of China's 'Kilos' Are No Longer in Operation"; Sae-Liu, "Second Song Submarine Vital to China's Huge Programme"; "New PLAN to Train, Purchase Vessel Mix"; Morison, "Chinese Navy Orders Eight Kilo-Class Submarines"; and "Taiwan Report Says China Has 'Big Problems' with Russian-Made Submarines."
95. See U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1987, p. 96. For more on the poor maintenance procedures of the Chinese, see Cole, The Great Wall at Sea; "Two of China's 'Kilos' Are No Longer in Operation"; Sae-Liu, "Second Song Submarine Vital to China's Huge Programme"; "New PLAN to Train, Purchase Vessel Mix"; Morison, "Chinese Navy Orders Eight Kilo-Class Submarines"; and "Taiwan Report Says China Has 'Big Problems' with Russian-Made Submarines."
96. See U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1987, p. 96. For more on the poor maintenance procedures of the Chinese, see Cole, The Great Wall at Sea; "Two of China's 'Kilos' Are No Longer in Operation"; Sae-Liu, "Second Song Submarine Vital to China's Huge Programme"; "New PLAN to Train, Purchase Vessel Mix"; Morison, "Chinese Navy Orders Eight Kilo-Class Submarines"; and "Taiwan Report Says China Has 'Big Problems' with Russian-Made Submarines."
97. See U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1987, p. 96. For more on the poor maintenance procedures of the Chinese, see Cole, The Great Wall at Sea; "Two of China's 'Kilos' Are No Longer in Operation"; Sae-Liu, "Second Song Submarine Vital to China's Huge Programme"; "New PLAN to Train, Purchase Vessel Mix"; Morison, "Chinese Navy Orders Eight Kilo-Class Submarines"; and "Taiwan Report Says China Has 'Big Problems' with Russian-Made Submarines."
98. On average, each submarine has to travel approximately 700 kilometers to transit from fleet headquarters to the port. Traveling at 10 knots, each leg should take thirty-seven hours, with the round-trip transit requiring about three days. Rather than returning to its original base, each submarine should be able to return to the East Fleet headquarters for routine maintenance, refitting, and reprovisioning, further reducing the transit time.
99. In the Battle of the Atlantic, the cycle times for submarines patrolling the North Atlantic were usually one to two months, while those patrolling off the east coast of the United States were usually two to three months. See Blair, Hitler's U-Boat War, Vols. 1-2.
100. My interlocutors in the Taiwanese navy use two-, three-, and four-week cycle times for planning estimates.
101. For evidence of Chinese thinking on how to sustain submarine operations in wartime, see "PRC Submarine Unit Has First Success in Using Civilian Port to Load Torpedoes," Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, June 1, 2002, FBIS CPP20020603000058.
102. See Peter Kemp, Decision at Sea: The Convoy Escorts (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1978), p. 88.
103. See Clay Blair Jr., Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War against Japan, Vol. 2 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1975), pp. 863-968; and Blair, Hitler's U-Boat War, Vols. 1-2, especially appendixes. PLAN knowledge of the shipping lanes and ability to patrol near the ports should ease the search for merchant ships somewhat, but this is still a very favorable assumption.
104. See Clay Blair Jr., Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War against Japan, Vol. 2 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1975), pp. 863-968; and Blair, Hitler's U-Boat War, Vols. 1-2, especially appendixes. PLAN knowledge of the shipping lanes and ability to patrol near the ports should ease the search for merchant ships somewhat, but this is still a very favorable assumption.
105. See McDevitt, "Where Is China's Navy Headed?"; and Brad Kaplan, "China's Navy Today: Storm Clouds on the Horizon . . . or Paper Tiger?" Sea Power, December 1999, p. 31. Moreover, moving into attack position would also be difficult for submarines, especially if the merchant ships attempted to stay near the coastline as much as possible.
106. See McDevitt, "Where Is China's Navy Headed?"; and Brad Kaplan, "China's Navy Today: Storm Clouds on the Horizon . . . or Paper Tiger?" Sea Power, December 1999, p. 31. Moreover, moving into attack position would also be difficult for submarines, especially if the merchant ships attempted to stay near the coastline as much as possible.
107. The pk is defined as: "The statistical probability that the weapon will detonate close enough to the target with enough effectiveness to disable the target." See http://www.fas.org/news/reference/lexicon/dep.htm.
108. U.S. submarines in World War II required ten torpedoes for each kill (pk = 0.1). See Blair, Silent Victory, p. 793. In the Atlantic convoy battles of March 1943, out of eighty-five torpedoes fired against merchant ships, twenty-two merchant ships were destroyed (pk = 0.26). See Jurgen Rowher, The Critical Convoy Battles of March 1943 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977), pp. 197-200. In an analysis of a hypothetical Soviet blockade against NATO, one analyst uses a torpedo pk of 0.25, consistent with the most devastating German attacks. See Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Press, 1992), p. 182.
109. U.S. submarines in World War II required ten torpedoes for each kill (pk = 0.1). See Blair, Silent Victory, p. 793. In the Atlantic convoy battles of March 1943, out of eighty-five torpedoes fired against merchant ships, twenty-two merchant ships were destroyed (pk = 0.26). See Jurgen Rowher, The Critical Convoy Battles of March 1943 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977), pp. 197-200. In an analysis of a hypothetical Soviet blockade against NATO, one analyst uses a torpedo pk of 0.25, consistent with the most devastating German attacks. See Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Press, 1992), p. 182.
110. U.S. submarines in World War II required ten torpedoes for each kill (pk = 0.1). See Blair, Silent Victory, p. 793. In the Atlantic convoy battles of March 1943, out of eighty-five torpedoes fired against merchant ships, twenty-two merchant ships were destroyed (pk = 0.26). See Jurgen Rowher, The Critical Convoy Battles of March 1943 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977), pp. 197-200. In an analysis of a hypothetical Soviet blockade against NATO, one analyst uses a torpedo pk of 0.25, consistent with the most devastating German attacks. See Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Press, 1992), p. 182.
111. In a Soviet blockade scenario, although assigning a torpedo pk of 0.5, in recognition that this may be high, one analyst artificially limits the number of shots that a submarine can fire in each engagement. See Christopher C. Wright, "Developing Maritime Force Structure Options for the U.S. Defense Program," master's thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1976, chap. 3. For a range of barrier pks from 0.1 to 0.5 in a Soviet blockade scenario, with 0.25 as the base case, see Paul H. Nitze and Leonard Sullivan, Securing the Seas: The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance Options (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1979), chap. 13.
112. In a Soviet blockade scenario, although assigning a torpedo pk of 0.5, in recognition that this may be high, one analyst artificially limits the number of shots that a submarine can fire in each engagement. See Christopher C. Wright, "Developing Maritime Force Structure Options for the U.S. Defense Program," master's thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1976, chap. 3. For a range of barrier pks from 0.1 to 0.5 in a Soviet blockade scenario, with 0.25 as the base case, see Paul H. Nitze and Leonard Sullivan, Securing the Seas: The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance Options (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1979), chap. 13.
113. For examples of torpedo failures in the Falklands War, see David Miller and John Jordan, Modern Submarine Warfare (New York: Salamander, 1987), p. 75.
114. Some Chinese submarines carry fourteen torpedoes, while others carry eighteen or twenty. I therefore use an average of sixteen. Given the proximity, I also assume that the submarines do not keep any torpedoes for self-defense on the return transit.
115. I do not include a defensive minefield as another possible barrier because defensive mines might also destroy merchant shipping.
116. Barrier pk refers to the attrition that a submarine suffers with each traversal. Barry Posen uses a Department of Defense study to compute a barrier pk of 0.18 and suggests a pk of 0.10 as plausible. See Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, pp. 174, 260, For assumptions of pks of 0.05 and 0.10, see Wright, "Developing Maritime Force Structure Options for the U.S. Defense Program," p. 158. For an analysis with a base pk of 0.2, but which also doubles and halves the pk, see Nitze and Sullivan, Securing the Seas, pp. 350-375. For another analysis suggesting 0.2 as a plausible barrier pk, see Alain C. Enthoven and Wayne K. Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 225-234.
117. Barrier pk refers to the attrition that a submarine suffers with each traversal. Barry Posen uses a Department of Defense study to compute a barrier pk of 0.18 and suggests a pk of 0.10 as plausible. See Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, pp. 174, 260, For assumptions of pks of 0.05 and 0.10, see Wright, "Developing Maritime Force Structure Options for the U.S. Defense Program," p. 158. For an analysis with a base pk of 0.2, but which also doubles and halves the pk, see Nitze and Sullivan, Securing the Seas, pp. 350-375. For another analysis suggesting 0.2 as a plausible barrier pk, see Alain C. Enthoven and Wayne K. Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 225-234.
118. Barrier pk refers to the attrition that a submarine suffers with each traversal. Barry Posen uses a Department of Defense study to compute a barrier pk of 0.18 and suggests a pk of 0.10 as plausible. See Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, pp. 174, 260, For assumptions of pks of 0.05 and 0.10, see Wright, "Developing Maritime Force Structure Options for the U.S. Defense Program," p. 158. For an analysis with a base pk of 0.2, but which also doubles and halves the pk, see Nitze and Sullivan, Securing the Seas, pp. 350-375. For another analysis suggesting 0.2 as a plausible barrier pk, see Alain C. Enthoven and Wayne K. Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 225-234.
119. Barrier pk refers to the attrition that a submarine suffers with each traversal. Barry Posen uses a Department of Defense study to compute a barrier pk of 0.18 and suggests a pk of 0.10 as plausible. See Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, pp. 174, 260, For assumptions of pks of 0.05 and 0.10, see Wright, "Developing Maritime Force Structure Options for the U.S. Defense Program," p. 158. For an analysis with a base pk of 0.2, but which also doubles and halves the pk, see Nitze and Sullivan, Securing the Seas, pp. 350-375. For another analysis suggesting 0.2 as a plausible barrier pk, see Alain C. Enthoven and Wayne K. Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 225-234.
120. S-2s can detect submarines through the use of sonobuoys, radar, magnetic anomaly detection, or line of sight. The use of S-2s also requires air dominance. For analyses suggesting that Taiwan would be able to control the air balance, especially near its coast, see Shlapak, Orletsky, and Wilson, Dire Strait?; O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan"; and John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, "China's Search for a Modern Air Force," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 64-94.
121. S-2s can detect submarines through the use of sonobuoys, radar, magnetic anomaly detection, or line of sight. The use of S-2s also requires air dominance. For analyses suggesting that Taiwan would be able to control the air balance, especially near its coast, see Shlapak, Orletsky, and Wilson, Dire Strait?; O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan"; and John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, "China's Search for a Modern Air Force," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 64-94.
122. S-2s can detect submarines through the use of sonobuoys, radar, magnetic anomaly detection, or line of sight. The use of S-2s also requires air dominance. For analyses suggesting that Taiwan would be able to control the air balance, especially near its coast, see Shlapak, Orletsky, and Wilson, Dire Strait?; O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan"; and John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, "China's Search for a Modern Air Force," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 64-94.
123. The detection assets of the surface ships include hull-mounted sonar and ASW helicopters with dipping sonar. Organizing a convoy operation would be very complicated. Although the Taiwanese navy considers this a likely tactic and trains for it on a limited scale, it needs to pay more attention to implementation on a larger scale. The convoy requirements would be lower than for the Battle of the Atlantic because the convoys would probably only need to escort the merchant ships to and from the shared sea-lanes, as discussed earlier. The number of merchant ships that would require escorting would be much higher, however, than any other historical example. From harbor bureau data, 1,250 ships usually enter and exit the three ports every week. In practice, such an operation would probably look more like a combination of convoys and ships sailing independently.
124. Operating near the convoys should at least ensure that the submarines approach the ASW barriers. For a discussion of the utility of nonacoustic assets for localization, but the difficulty in using these assets for detection, see Tom Stefanick, Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Naval Strategy (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 158, 181.
125. All Chinese submarines have electronic countermeasures, allowing them to detect radars before the radars can detect them. Some of my interlocutors suggest that the PLAN practices snorkeling in the midst of dense merchant traffic, hoping to frustrate detection attempts. For more on the difficulties of periscope detection, see Friedman, "Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare - Not as Easy as It Sounds."
126. See Lt. Wade H. Schmidt, U.S. Navy, "Top Torpedo," Proceedings, Vol. 119 (March 1993), p. 130. Given the number of possible false contacts, however, the submariner might prefer to verify that it is a target and engage at a closer range.
127. A bottomed submarine sits quietly on the ocean floor and is particularly difficult to distinguish from other objects. With an updated library of underwater objects, it is easier to distinguish a bottomed submarine from some other foreign object. There is evidence that the Taiwanese navy periodically maps the bottom topography of its surrounding waters. See "Naval Mine-Hunting Unit Featured," Lien-Ho Pao, April 20, 1997, FBIS 97C17034A.
128. With only four diesel submarines to train against, two from the World War II-era, there are also reasons to question the amount of ASW training the Taiwanese navy conducts.
129. To attain a more accurate estimate of the number of ships lost, I assume that half of the ships sunk in the initial simulations were on the way in. For most of the shipping, if a ship is sunk on the way in, it can neither off-load nor pick up new cargo. I double count half of the ships that are sunk to take account of the losses of imports and exports.
130. See Karl Lautenschläger, "The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Winter 1986/87), p. 96, n. 2.
131. For the estimate that each German U-boat sunk one ship per attack on an Allied convoy, see Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, p. 183. In comparison, the PLAN submarines achieve four kills per cycle. An exchange rate is the number of merchant ship kills per lost submarine. In World War II, U-boats had a mean overall exchange rate of 3.8:1, with a brief spike of 22:1. See Sternhill and Thorndike, Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II, p. 84. Exchange rates for U.S. submarines attacking Japanese shipping were 46:1 in 1942 and 42:1 in 1943. See Hezlet, The Submarine and Seapower, pp. 216, 220. For simulation 2, the mean exchange rate is 52.23:1, reaching a high of 116.92:1. These attacks on Taiwanese convoys would be far more deadly than U.S. submarine attacks against mostly unescorted Japanese merchant shipping.
132. For the estimate that each German U-boat sunk one ship per attack on an Allied convoy, see Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, p. 183. In comparison, the PLAN submarines achieve four kills per cycle. An exchange rate is the number of merchant ship kills per lost submarine. In World War II, U-boats had a mean overall exchange rate of 3.8:1, with a brief spike of 22:1. See Sternhill and Thorndike, Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II, p. 84. Exchange rates for U.S. submarines attacking Japanese shipping were 46:1 in 1942 and 42:1 in 1943. See Hezlet, The Submarine and Seapower, pp. 216, 220. For simulation 2, the mean exchange rate is 52.23:1, reaching a high of 116.92:1. These attacks on Taiwanese convoys would be far more deadly than U.S. submarine attacks against mostly unescorted Japanese merchant shipping.
133. For the estimate that each German U-boat sunk one ship per attack on an Allied convoy, see Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, p. 183. In comparison, the PLAN submarines achieve four kills per cycle. An exchange rate is the number of merchant ship kills per lost submarine. In World War II, U-boats had a mean overall exchange rate of 3.8:1, with a brief spike of 22:1. See Sternhill and Thorndike, Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II, p. 84. Exchange rates for U.S. submarines attacking Japanese shipping were 46:1 in 1942 and 42:1 in 1943. See Hezlet, The Submarine and Seapower, pp. 216, 220. For simulation 2, the mean exchange rate is 52.23:1, reaching a high of 116.92:1. These attacks on Taiwanese convoys would be far more deadly than U.S. submarine attacks against mostly unescorted Japanese merchant shipping.
134. See Comdr. E. Cameron Williams, U.S. Naval Reserve, "The Four 'Iron Laws' of Naval Protection of Merchant Shipping," Naval War College Review, Vol. 39 (May-June 1986), pp. 39-40.
135. See "Taiwan Intends to Buy U.S. Mine Sweeper for Fear of Mine Blockading Ports," People's Daily, April 10, 2002.
136. Mines are usually classified according to their position in the water (drifting, moored, or bottom) and according to their method of actuation (contact or influence). The methods of influence actuation are acoustic, magnetic, or pressure (the most difficult to simulate and counter). "Controlled" mines can be turned on and off. See Thomas R. Bernitt and Sam J. Tangredi, "Mine Warfare and Globalization: Low-Tech Warfare in a High-Tech World," in Tangredi, ed., Globalization and Maritime Power (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002), pp. 389-403; Gregory K. Hartmann with Scott C. Truver, Weapons That Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991); Tamara Moser Melia, "Damn the Torpedoes": A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures, 1777-1991 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1991); and Comdr. James A. Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns: An Historical Analysis of the Decisions of the Commanders," Naval War College Review, Vol. 19 (June 1967), pp. 75-129.
137. Mines are usually classified according to their position in the water (drifting, moored, or bottom) and according to their method of actuation (contact or influence). The methods of influence actuation are acoustic, magnetic, or pressure (the most difficult to simulate and counter). "Controlled" mines can be turned on and off. See Thomas R. Bernitt and Sam J. Tangredi, "Mine Warfare and Globalization: Low-Tech Warfare in a High-Tech World," in Tangredi, ed., Globalization and Maritime Power (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002), pp. 389-403; Gregory K. Hartmann with Scott C. Truver, Weapons That Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991); Tamara Moser Melia, "Damn the Torpedoes": A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures, 1777-1991 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1991); and Comdr. James A. Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns: An Historical Analysis of the Decisions of the Commanders," Naval War College Review, Vol. 19 (June 1967), pp. 75-129.
138. Mines are usually classified according to their position in the water (drifting, moored, or bottom) and according to their method of actuation (contact or influence). The methods of influence actuation are acoustic, magnetic, or pressure (the most difficult to simulate and counter). "Controlled" mines can be turned on and off. See Thomas R. Bernitt and Sam J. Tangredi, "Mine Warfare and Globalization: Low-Tech Warfare in a High-Tech World," in Tangredi, ed., Globalization and Maritime Power (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002), pp. 389-403; Gregory K. Hartmann with Scott C. Truver, Weapons That Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991); Tamara Moser Melia, "Damn the Torpedoes": A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures, 1777-1991 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1991); and Comdr. James A. Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns: An Historical Analysis of the Decisions of the Commanders," Naval War College Review, Vol. 19 (June 1967), pp. 75-129.
139. Mines are usually classified according to their position in the water (drifting, moored, or bottom) and according to their method of actuation (contact or influence). The methods of influence actuation are acoustic, magnetic, or pressure (the most difficult to simulate and counter). "Controlled" mines can be turned on and off. See Thomas R. Bernitt and Sam J. Tangredi, "Mine Warfare and Globalization: Low-Tech Warfare in a High-Tech World," in Tangredi, ed., Globalization and Maritime Power (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002), pp. 389-403; Gregory K. Hartmann with Scott C. Truver, Weapons That Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991); Tamara Moser Melia, "Damn the Torpedoes": A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures, 1777-1991 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1991); and Comdr. James A. Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns: An Historical Analysis of the Decisions of the Commanders," Naval War College Review, Vol. 19 (June 1967), pp. 75-129.
140. See Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 103; and "Naval Mine-Hunting Unit Featured," Lien-Ho Pao, April 20, 1997, FBIS 97C17034A.
141. See Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 103; and "Naval Mine-Hunting Unit Featured," Lien-Ho Pao, April 20, 1997, FBIS 97C17034A.
142. See Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 103. For a partial list of the mines in the PLAN inventory, see U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, June 2000. For more details, see A.D. Baker III, ed., Combat Fleets of the World, 2000-2001 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000), p. 105.
143. See Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 103. For a partial list of the mines in the PLAN inventory, see U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, June 2000. For more details, see A.D. Baker III, ed., Combat Fleets of the World, 2000-2001 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000), p. 105.
144. See Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 103. For a partial list of the mines in the PLAN inventory, see U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, June 2000. For more details, see A.D. Baker III, ed., Combat Fleets of the World, 2000-2001 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000), p. 105.
145. U.S. bombers in World War II, because they had air superiority, were able to lay mines off the coast of Japan and reseed the minefields quickly and easily from the air. For overall analysis of "Operation Starvation," see W.F. Craven and J.L. Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948); Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns"; and Hartmann, Weapons That Wait.
146. U.S. bombers in World War II, because they had air superiority, were able to lay mines off the coast of Japan and reseed the minefields quickly and easily from the air. For overall analysis of "Operation Starvation," see W.F. Craven and J.L. Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948); Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns"; and Hartmann, Weapons That Wait.
147. U.S. bombers in World War II, because they had air superiority, were able to lay mines off the coast of Japan and reseed the minefields quickly and easily from the air. For overall analysis of "Operation Starvation," see W.F. Craven and J.L. Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948); Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns"; and Hartmann, Weapons That Wait.
148. The ships would need to avoid mines that were already in the water, as well as communicate back to a central post where they positioned mines, which would become more complicated if many ships were involved. Reseeding with a merchant ship is also theoretically possible, but given the earlier caveats, it would be very dangerous.
149. Reseeding would require great confidence in knowing the location of the original mines and in the ability to navigate through a safe zone. A submarine would most likely need to use global positioning satellite technology to establish its position, and then use its inertial navigation unit to navigate through a safe zone to a safe spot to lay mines. The submarine would also need to be confident that the Taiwanese had not laid any defensive minefields in the area.
150. See Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns." After World War II, the British believed they could significantly increase this ratio through aggressive minesweeping and countermeasures on merchant ships. See Norman Friedman, The Postwar Naval Revolution (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986), pp. 184-185.
151. See Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns." After World War II, the British believed they could significantly increase this ratio through aggressive minesweeping and countermeasures on merchant ships. See Norman Friedman, The Postwar Naval Revolution (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986), pp. 184-185.
152. The size of merchant ships has increased substantially since World War II, suggesting that the baseline ratio should perhaps be higher. See also John G. Fox, "Sea Change in Shipping," Proceedings, Vol. 127, No. 5 (May 2001), pp. 62-65.
153. George Gilboy, "Naval Mine Warfare against an Island Nation: Japan's Modern Naval Mine Defenses," Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1990.
154. The Kilo can carry twenty-four mines, the Romeo, twenty-eight, and the Ming, twenty-four. Although the exact number of mines the Song can carry is not listed, twenty-four to twenty-eight seems reasonable.
155. For the mention of a database of Taiwan's surrounding waters, see "Naval Mine-Hunting Unit Featured."
156. At an average of 10 knots, a round-trip would take 80 hours (3.3 days). Therefore, each sortie, including laying mines would take approximately 4 days. I do not include five sorties because I assume that the submarines would require some routine maintenance.
157. As in simulation 2, a round-trip would take about four days. Given simulation 3's larger window of opportunity, it would seem reasonable to spend some time resting and refitting after each sortie. One week of rest and refit would make an 11-day cycle time.
158. A q-route is "a system of preplanned shipping lanes in mined or potentially mined waters used to minimize the area the mine countermeasures commander has to keep clear of mines to provide safe passage for friendly shipping." See www.fas.org/news/reference/lexicon/deq.htm. Q-routes, which are usually only about 1,000 yards wide, are only the first step in MCM, but usually are enough to allow merchant shipping to pass.
159. For discussions of the MCM operation at Wonsan, see Melia, "Damn the Torpedoes," especially chapter 3; Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, Sea War in Korea (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1957), especially chapter 4; Roy E. Appleman, United States Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961); and Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns."
160. For discussions of the MCM operation at Wonsan, see Melia, "Damn the Torpedoes," especially chapter 3; Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, Sea War in Korea (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1957), especially chapter 4; Roy E. Appleman, United States Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961); and Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns."
161. For discussions of the MCM operation at Wonsan, see Melia, "Damn the Torpedoes," especially chapter 3; Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, Sea War in Korea (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1957), especially chapter 4; Roy E. Appleman, United States Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961); and Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns."
162. For discussions of the MCM operation at Wonsan, see Melia, "Damn the Torpedoes," especially chapter 3; Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, Sea War in Korea (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1957), especially chapter 4; Roy E. Appleman, United States Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961); and Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns."
163. As in other parts of the article, I have been aggregating, but it is important to remember that the total number of mines would be split between the three routes, requiring a division of assets and three q-routes.
164. For the total of twenty-one minesweepers, see Appleman, United States Army in the Korean War, p. 633. The Japanese sent eight civilian sweepers, but they were not involved in the entire operation. The operations began on October 10 with only six minesweepers. See Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, p. 134, 136.
165. For the total of twenty-one minesweepers, see Appleman, United States Army in the Korean War, p. 633. The Japanese sent eight civilian sweepers, but they were not involved in the entire operation. The operations began on October 10 with only six minesweepers. See Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, p. 134, 136.
166. Applying this rate to a Taiwan scenario may be unfavorable for at least four reasons: (1) Taiwan would have more intelligence and familiarity with the area off its own coast, (2) it would not have to worry about shore fire complicating the clearing effort, (3) it would have more advanced sonars, and (4) Taiwan's MCM assets seem to have a higher readiness than the collection of U.S. reservists and Japanese civilians. For discussions of the difficulties of clearing mines off the enemy's coast, see E. Michael Golda, "The Dardanelles Campaign: A Historical Analogy for Littoral Mine Warfare," Naval War College Review, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 82-96; and Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns."
167. Applying this rate to a Taiwan scenario may be unfavorable for at least four reasons: (1) Taiwan would have more intelligence and familiarity with the area off its own coast, (2) it would not have to worry about shore fire complicating the clearing effort, (3) it would have more advanced sonars, and (4) Taiwan's MCM assets seem to have a higher readiness than the collection of U.S. reservists and Japanese civilians. For discussions of the difficulties of clearing mines off the enemy's coast, see E. Michael Golda, "The Dardanelles Campaign: A Historical Analogy for Littoral Mine Warfare," Naval War College Review, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 82-96; and Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns."
168. For simulation 3, the situation looks worse for Taiwan. It assumes, however, that the Taiwanese would not map the sea bottom and therefore not detect the presence of minelike objects for 250 days, a heroic assumption.
169. For example, in World War I Britain laid 114,000 mines; in World War II Britain laid 75,000 offensive mines, and the United States laid 25,000 mines against the Japanese. See Hartmann, Weapons That Wait, pp. 242-243.
170. For a brief review of the history of naval blockades, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), chapter four.
171. See Nicholas Tracy, Attack on Maritime Trade (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), chap. 2; Gerd Hardach, The First World War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); and C. Paul Vincent, The Politics of Hunger: The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1915-1919 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985).
172. See Nicholas Tracy, Attack on Maritime Trade (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), chap. 2; Gerd Hardach, The First World War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); and C. Paul Vincent, The Politics of Hunger: The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1915-1919 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985).
173. See Nicholas Tracy, Attack on Maritime Trade (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), chap. 2; Gerd Hardach, The First World War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); and C. Paul Vincent, The Politics of Hunger: The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1915-1919 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985).
174. See Blair, Hitler's U-Boat War, Vol. 1, p. 22. For World War II merchant ship loss rates of 12.5 percent, see George R. Lindsey, "Tactical Anti-Submarine Warfare: The Past and the Future," in Power at Sea, Adelphi Paper No. 122 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 30. For World War II loss rates ranging from 4 percent to 14 percent, see Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, Vol. 1, p. 458; and Blair, Hitler's U-Boat War, Vol. 2, app. 9.
175. See Blair, Hitler's U-Boat War, Vol. 1, p. 22. For World War II merchant ship loss rates of 12.5 percent, see George R. Lindsey, "Tactical Anti-Submarine Warfare: The Past and the Future," in Power at Sea, Adelphi Paper No. 122 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 30. For World War II loss rates ranging from 4 percent to 14 percent, see Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, Vol. 1, p. 458; and Blair, Hitler's U-Boat War, Vol. 2, app. 9.
176. See Blair, Hitler's U-Boat War, Vol. 1, p. 22. For World War II merchant ship loss rates of 12.5 percent, see George R. Lindsey, "Tactical Anti-Submarine Warfare: The Past and the Future," in Power at Sea, Adelphi Paper No. 122 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 30. For World War II loss rates ranging from 4 percent to 14 percent, see Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, Vol. 1, p. 458; and Blair, Hitler's U-Boat War, Vol. 2, app. 9.
177. See Blair, Hitler's U-Boat War, Vol. 1, p. 22. For World War II merchant ship loss rates of 12.5 percent, see George R. Lindsey, "Tactical Anti-Submarine Warfare: The Past and the Future," in Power at Sea, Adelphi Paper No. 122 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 30. For World War II loss rates ranging from 4 percent to 14 percent, see Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, Vol. 1, p. 458; and Blair, Hitler's U-Boat War, Vol. 2, app. 9.
178. See Bernitt and Tangredi, "Mine Warfare and Globalization," p. 392; Michel Thomas Poirier, "Results of the German and American Submarine Campaigns of World War II, October 20, 1999, p. 7; and Mark P. Parillo, The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993).
179. See Bernitt and Tangredi, "Mine Warfare and Globalization," p. 392; Michel Thomas Poirier, "Results of the German and American Submarine Campaigns of World War II, October 20, 1999, p. 7; and Mark P. Parillo, The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993).
180. See Bernitt and Tangredi, "Mine Warfare and Globalization," p. 392; Michel Thomas Poirier, "Results of the German and American Submarine Campaigns of World War II, October 20, 1999, p. 7; and Mark P. Parillo, The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993).
181. See Michael O'Hanlon, "Taiwan's Real Bind," New York Times, April 20, 2000; Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time," p. 121; and "China's Missile Tests Spark Worries for Taiwan Trade," Asian Wall Street Journal, March 6, 1996.
182. See Michael O'Hanlon, "Taiwan's Real Bind," New York Times, April 20, 2000; Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time," p. 121; and "China's Missile Tests Spark Worries for Taiwan Trade," Asian Wall Street Journal, March 6, 1996.
183. See Michael O'Hanlon, "Taiwan's Real Bind," New York Times, April 20, 2000; Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time," p. 121; and "China's Missile Tests Spark Worries for Taiwan Trade," Asian Wall Street Journal, March 6, 1996.
184. One of my interlocutors in Taiwan suggested that this happened in 1995-96, although on a relatively small scale.
185. For analysis of profits made by shippers in World War I, see Martin Doughty, Merchant Shipping and War: A Study in Defence Planning in Twentieth-Century Britain (London: Royal Historical Society, 1982), especially p. 19. For interviews with merchant shippers about wartime shipping, see "For Shipowners, War Is a Golden Opportunity," Record (Associated Press), August 16, 1984.
186. For analysis of profits made by shippers in World War I, see Martin Doughty, Merchant Shipping and War: A Study in Defence Planning in Twentieth-Century Britain (London: Royal Historical Society, 1982), especially p. 19. For interviews with merchant shippers about wartime shipping, see "For Shipowners, War Is a Golden Opportunity," Record (Associated Press), August 16, 1984.
187. See Richard Harwood, "Saudis Build Seaborne Emergency Oil Stockpile," Washington Post, January 1, 1984; "Analyst Says Oil Flow from Gulf Uncurbed," Boston Globe, September 10, 1987; and "Shipping Undeterred by Attacks in the Persian Gulf," Los Angeles Times, April 23, 1988. For more details, see Nadia El-Sayed, The Gulf Tanker War: Iran and Iraq's Maritime Swordplay (New York: St. Martin's, 1999); and Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press, "The Effects of Wars on Neutral Countries: Why It Doesn't Pay to Preserve the Peace," Security Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Summer 2001), especially pp. 43-46.
188. See Richard Harwood, "Saudis Build Seaborne Emergency Oil Stockpile," Washington Post, January 1, 1984; "Analyst Says Oil Flow from Gulf Uncurbed," Boston Globe, September 10, 1987; and "Shipping Undeterred by Attacks in the Persian Gulf," Los Angeles Times, April 23, 1988. For more details, see Nadia El-Sayed, The Gulf Tanker War: Iran and Iraq's Maritime Swordplay (New York: St. Martin's, 1999); and Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press, "The Effects of Wars on Neutral Countries: Why It Doesn't Pay to Preserve the Peace," Security Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Summer 2001), especially pp. 43-46.
189. See Richard Harwood, "Saudis Build Seaborne Emergency Oil Stockpile," Washington Post, January 1, 1984; "Analyst Says Oil Flow from Gulf Uncurbed," Boston Globe, September 10, 1987; and "Shipping Undeterred by Attacks in the Persian Gulf," Los Angeles Times, April 23, 1988. For more details, see Nadia El-Sayed, The Gulf Tanker War: Iran and Iraq's Maritime Swordplay (New York: St. Martin's, 1999); and Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press, "The Effects of Wars on Neutral Countries: Why It Doesn't Pay to Preserve the Peace," Security Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Summer 2001), especially pp. 43-46.
190. See Richard Harwood, "Saudis Build Seaborne Emergency Oil Stockpile," Washington Post, January 1, 1984; "Analyst Says Oil Flow from Gulf Uncurbed," Boston Globe, September 10, 1987; and "Shipping Undeterred by Attacks in the Persian Gulf," Los Angeles Times, April 23, 1988. For more details, see Nadia El-Sayed, The Gulf Tanker War: Iran and Iraq's Maritime Swordplay (New York: St. Martin's, 1999); and Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press, "The Effects of Wars on Neutral Countries: Why It Doesn't Pay to Preserve the Peace," Security Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Summer 2001), especially pp. 43-46.
191. On Syria's 1989 blockade of the Lebanon coast, see Jim Muir, "Lebanon's Embattled Christians," Christian Science Monitor, July 28, 1989, p. 6. On the 1991 Yugoslav blockade of Croatian ports, see Janet Porter, "Croatian Ports Maintain Operations, Insurance Rates Soar," Journal of Commerce, October 4, 1991, p. 12B.
192. See Graham Hutchings, "Anger as China Fires Missiles near Taiwan: Poll to Go Ahead Despite Threats," Daily Telegraph, March 9, 1996.
193. For a description of Iran's attempt to self-insure, see Youssef Ibrahim, "Nervous Gulf: Iran Boosts Ship-Insurance Program as Saudi Warns of Surge in Oil Prices," Wall Street Journal, March 9, 1984.
194. According to the central bank, Taiwan had $708 billion in foreign reserves at the end of June 2000 and $157 billion in foreign exchange reserves in October 2002. See "CNA: Taiwan's Foreign Exchange Reserves Hit New High," Central News Agency, October 5, 2002, FBIS CPP20021005000051.
195. For discussions of the impact of these crises on the Taiwanese stock market and the resultant capital flight, see Carver, Face Off, especially pp. 94, 125. Stock prices fell after President Lee Tenghui's July 1999 declaration of "special state-to-state relations," the PRC's threatening February 2000 White Paper, and Premier Zhu Rongji's threats before Taiwan's March 2000 presidential election.
196. See "Taiwan: Finance Minister Urges Investors to Not Overreact to Market Plunge," Central News Agency, August 5, 2002, FBIS CPP20020805000. This remark was very controversial because it challenged the idea that both Taiwan and the mainland belong to "one China," and was interpreted by the mainland as a move toward independence.
197. See Peter Montagnon and Laura Tyson, "Chinese Cloud over Taiwan Stocks," Financial Times, March 11, 1996, p. 28; and "Taiwan: Stock Market Intervention Incurs 'Huge' Paper Losses for Government," Taipei Times, October 17, 2002, FBIS CPP20021017000039.
198. See Peter Montagnon and Laura Tyson, "Chinese Cloud over Taiwan Stocks," Financial Times, March 11, 1996, p. 28; and "Taiwan: Stock Market Intervention Incurs 'Huge' Paper Losses for Government," Taipei Times, October 17, 2002, FBIS CPP20021017000039.
199. See Chia-lung Lin, "The Political Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism," in Stephane Corcuff, ed., Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), p. 236.
200. "CNA: Alleged Military Intelligence Leak Caused No Major Harm: Taiwan Navy," Central News Agency, June 12, 2002, FBIS CPP20020612000069.
201. See "Taiwan's Retired Generals, Lawmakers Said Leaking Information to Mainland Authorities," Tzu-Yu Shih-Pao, March 16, 2002, FBIS CPP20020318000022; "AFP: Taiwan Journalist Charged with Reporting Military Secrets," AFP, October 14, 2002, FBIS CPP20021014000065; "Taiwan Report on Naval Officer's Father Spying for PRC," Tzu-Yu Shih-Pao, June 13, 2002, FBIS CPP20020613000028; and "Taiwan Army Officer in 'Top-Secret' Unit May Have Defected to China," Taipei Times, October 16, 2002, FBIS CPP20021016000040.
202. See "Taiwan's Retired Generals, Lawmakers Said Leaking Information to Mainland Authorities," Tzu-Yu Shih-Pao, March 16, 2002, FBIS CPP20020318000022; "AFP: Taiwan Journalist Charged with Reporting Military Secrets," AFP, October 14, 2002, FBIS CPP20021014000065; "Taiwan Report on Naval Officer's Father Spying for PRC," Tzu-Yu Shih-Pao, June 13, 2002, FBIS CPP20020613000028; and "Taiwan Army Officer in 'Top-Secret' Unit May Have Defected to China," Taipei Times, October 16, 2002, FBIS CPP20021016000040.
203. See "Taiwan's Retired Generals, Lawmakers Said Leaking Information to Mainland Authorities," Tzu-Yu Shih-Pao, March 16, 2002, FBIS CPP20020318000022; "AFP: Taiwan Journalist Charged with Reporting Military Secrets," AFP, October 14, 2002, FBIS CPP20021014000065; "Taiwan Report on Naval Officer's Father Spying for PRC," Tzu-Yu Shih-Pao, June 13, 2002, FBIS CPP20020613000028; and "Taiwan Army Officer in 'Top-Secret' Unit May Have Defected to China," Taipei Times, October 16, 2002, FBIS CPP20021016000040.
204. See "Taiwan's Retired Generals, Lawmakers Said Leaking Information to Mainland Authorities," Tzu-Yu Shih-Pao, March 16, 2002, FBIS CPP20020318000022; "AFP: Taiwan Journalist Charged with Reporting Military Secrets," AFP, October 14, 2002, FBIS CPP20021014000065; "Taiwan Report on Naval Officer's Father Spying for PRC," Tzu-Yu Shih-Pao, June 13, 2002, FBIS CPP20020613000028; and "Taiwan Army Officer in 'Top-Secret' Unit May Have Defected to China," Taipei Times, October 16, 2002, FBIS CPP20021016000040.
205. See "Taipei Times Examines Low Morale within Armed Forces," Taipei Times, July 14, 2001, FBIS CPP20010716000182. Many of my interlocutors in the Taiwanese military expressed annoyance at President Chen's changing rhetoric depending on his audience, which is only increasing the confusion.
206. The defense budget for 2002 was set at NT$259.9 billion. See "Taiwan Defense Budget Hits Eight-Year Low," Taipei Times, September 4, 2002, FBIS CPP20020904000138.
207. For more on these two laws, see "Report on Taiwan's Evolving Military," Taiwan Review, October 1, 2003, FBIS CPP20030926000173.
208. See "Taiwan Military to Educate Soldiers 'Why We Fight,'" Taipei Times, October 1, 2001, FBIS CPP20011001000094; and "CNA: President Chen Urges Military to Defend Taiwan against Threat' of China," Central News Agency, September 16, 2003, FBIS CPP20030916000123.
209. See "Taiwan Military to Educate Soldiers 'Why We Fight,'" Taipei Times, October 1, 2001, FBIS CPP20011001000094; and "CNA: President Chen Urges Military to Defend Taiwan against Threat' of China," Central News Agency, September 16, 2003, FBIS CPP20030916000123.
210. See "Taiwan: President Chen Urges Military to Fight for Survival in Armed Forces Day Speech," Office of the President, September 2, 2002, FBIS CPP20020903000250.
211. See M. Taylor Fravel, "Towards Supremacy: Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan's Democratization," Armed forces and Society, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Fall 2002), pp. 57-84.
212. See Xiaobing Li, "PLA Attacks and Amphibious Operations during the Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954-55 and 1958," in Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949 (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 143-172.
213. See Garver, Face Off: and John F. Copper, "Taiwan's 1995 Legislative
214. See Garver, Face Off: and John F. Copper, "Taiwan's 1995 Legislative Yuan Election," Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, No. 1 (College Park: University of Maryland School of Law, 1996).
215. See "Li Says Democracy Stronger than PRC 'Threats,'" Hong Kong AFP, March 22, 1996, FBIS FTS19960322000077.
216. Lee Teng-hui won 54 percent of the popular vote. For the estimates of backlash, see John F. Copper, As Taiwan Approaches the New Millennium: Essays on Politics and Foreign Affairs (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1999), pp. 90-91.
217. See "Ta Kung Pao Cites Zhu Rongji on Taiwan Issue," Ta Kung Pao, March 16, 2000, FBIS CPP20000316000009.
218. Most reports suggest that the threats increased the vote for Chen by 2-3 percent. See "Gap between PRC, Taiwan Said 'Widened' after Elections," South China Morning Post, March 22, 2000.
219. For a discussion of the ethnic divide between Hakka, Fulao, mainlanders, and aborigines, see Liu I-Chou and Ho Szu-yin, "The Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the Taiwan People," Issues and Studies (May/June 1999), pp. 1-34. Virtually every chapter in Corcuff's book discusses difficulties and divisions over self-identification. See Corcuff, Memories of the Future. According to Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), 42.5 percent identified themselves as Taiwanese, 38.5 percent as both, and 13.6 percent as Chinese. See MAC, "Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China," June 2000, http://www.mac.gov.tw. According to MAC data, 35.8 percent of people support status quo now/decision later, 13.7 percent status quo now/unification later, 15.9 percent status quo now/independence later, 16.8 percent independence indefinitely, 5.7 percent independence as soon as possible, and 0.9 percent unification ASAP. See MAC, "Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China," May 2003, http://www.mac.gov.tw.
220. For a discussion of the ethnic divide between Hakka, Fulao, mainlanders, and aborigines, see Liu I-Chou and Ho Szu-yin, "The Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the Taiwan People," Issues and Studies (May/June 1999), pp. 1-34. Virtually every chapter in Corcuff's book discusses difficulties and divisions over self-identification. See Corcuff, Memories of the Future. According to Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), 42.5 percent identified themselves as Taiwanese, 38.5 percent as both, and 13.6 percent as Chinese. See MAC, "Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China," June 2000, http://www.mac.gov.tw. According to MAC data, 35.8 percent of people support status quo now/decision later, 13.7 percent status quo now/unification later, 15.9 percent status quo now/independence later, 16.8 percent independence indefinitely, 5.7 percent independence as soon as possible, and 0.9 percent unification ASAP. See MAC, "Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China," May 2003, http://www.mac.gov.tw.
221. For a discussion of the ethnic divide between Hakka, Fulao, mainlanders, and aborigines, see Liu I-Chou and Ho Szu-yin, "The Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the Taiwan People," Issues and Studies (May/June 1999), pp. 1-34. Virtually every chapter in Corcuff's book discusses difficulties and divisions over self-identification. See Corcuff, Memories of the Future. According to Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), 42.5 percent identified themselves as Taiwanese, 38.5 percent as both, and 13.6 percent as Chinese. See MAC, "Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China," June 2000, http://www.mac.gov.tw. According to MAC data, 35.8 percent of people support status quo now/decision later, 13.7 percent status quo now/unification later, 15.9 percent status quo now/independence later, 16.8 percent independence indefinitely, 5.7 percent independence as soon as possible, and 0.9 percent unification ASAP. See MAC, "Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China," May 2003, http://www.mac.gov.tw.
222. For a discussion of the ethnic divide between Hakka, Fulao, mainlanders, and aborigines, see Liu I-Chou and Ho Szu-yin, "The Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the Taiwan People," Issues and Studies (May/June 1999), pp. 1-34. Virtually every chapter in Corcuff's book discusses difficulties and divisions over self-identification. See Corcuff, Memories of the Future. According to Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), 42.5 percent identified themselves as Taiwanese, 38.5 percent as both, and 13.6 percent as Chinese. See MAC, "Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China," June 2000, http://www.mac.gov.tw. According to MAC data, 35.8 percent of people support status quo now/decision later, 13.7 percent status quo now/unification later, 15.9 percent status quo now/independence later, 16.8 percent independence indefinitely, 5.7 percent independence as soon as possible, and 0.9 percent unification ASAP. See MAC, "Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China," May 2003, http://www.mac.gov.tw.
223. See "Taiwan Business Leaders 'Express Dismay' over President's Remarks," China Post, August 6, 2002, CPP20020806000188; "Taipei Times: Opposition Criticizes Chen's Call for Referendum," Taipei Times, August 4, 2002, FBIS CPP20020804000019; and "Taiwan: KMT Chair Urges President to Abandon Push toward Independence," Taiwan News, December 8, 2003, FBIS CPP20031208000190.
224. See "Taiwan Business Leaders 'Express Dismay' over President's Remarks," China Post, August 6, 2002, CPP20020806000188; "Taipei Times: Opposition Criticizes Chen's Call for Referendum," Taipei Times, August 4, 2002, FBIS CPP20020804000019; and "Taiwan: KMT Chair Urges President to Abandon Push toward Independence," Taiwan News, December 8, 2003, FBIS CPP20031208000190.
225. See "Taiwan Business Leaders 'Express Dismay' over President's Remarks," China Post, August 6, 2002, CPP20020806000188; "Taipei Times: Opposition Criticizes Chen's Call for Referendum," Taipei Times, August 4, 2002, FBIS CPP20020804000019; and "Taiwan: KMT Chair Urges President to Abandon Push toward Independence," Taiwan News, December 8, 2003, FBIS CPP20031208000190.
226. For interviews with Taiwanese suggesting that the lack of unity about the future would prevent Taiwan from being unified if China attacked, see William Foreman, "Does Taiwan Have the Stomach for War?" Athens Daily News (Associated Press), April 26, 2001.
227. In the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, China lost control of Taiwan to Japan; Taiwan would remain a Japanese colony until the end of World War II. After fleeing to Taiwan in 1949, the KMT would rule the island nation, while the PRC would rule the mainland. The experiences of Taiwanese and mainlanders have been very different for more than a century, and the PRC has never exercised sovereignty over Taiwan.
228. According to an October 2003 United Daily News poll, 62 percent of respondents identified themselves as Taiwanese, whereas only 16 percent identified themselves as Taiwanese in 1989. Only 19 percent identified themselves as Chinese, down from 52 percent in 1989. See Philip P. Pan, "New National Identity Emerges in Taiwan: Culture Shifting Away from the Mainland," Washington Post, January 2, 2004. According to MAC data, between January 1993 and July 2001, those identifying themselves as Chinese fell from 48.5 percent to 13.6 percent, those identifying themselves as both rose from 32.7 percent to 38.5 percent; and strikingly, those identifying themselves as Taiwanese rose from 16.7 percent to 42.5 percent. See Corcuff, Memories of the Future; A-chin Hsiau, "Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism (London: Routledge, 2000); Angelina Chun-chu Yee, "Constructing a Native Consciousness: Taiwan Literature in the 20th Century," China Quarterly, Vol. 165 (March 2001), pp. 83-101; Yun-han Chu and Jih-wen Lin, "Political Development in 20th-century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation, and the Construction of National Identity," ibid., pp. 102-129; and Lee Teng-hui, "Understanding Taiwan: Bridging the Perception Gap," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 6 (November/December 1999), pp. 9-14.
229. According to an October 2003 United Daily News poll, 62 percent of respondents identified themselves as Taiwanese, whereas only 16 percent identified themselves as Taiwanese in 1989. Only 19 percent identified themselves as Chinese, down from 52 percent in 1989. See Philip P. Pan, "New National Identity Emerges in Taiwan: Culture Shifting Away from the Mainland," Washington Post, January 2, 2004. According to MAC data, between January 1993 and July 2001, those identifying themselves as Chinese fell from 48.5 percent to 13.6 percent, those identifying themselves as both rose from 32.7 percent to 38.5 percent; and strikingly, those identifying themselves as Taiwanese rose from 16.7 percent to 42.5 percent. See Corcuff, Memories of the Future; A-chin Hsiau, "Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism (London: Routledge, 2000); Angelina Chun-chu Yee, "Constructing a Native Consciousness: Taiwan Literature in the 20th Century," China Quarterly, Vol. 165 (March 2001), pp. 83-101; Yun-han Chu and Jih-wen Lin, "Political Development in 20th-century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation, and the Construction of National Identity," ibid., pp. 102-129; and Lee Teng-hui, "Understanding Taiwan: Bridging the Perception Gap," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 6 (November/December 1999), pp. 9-14.
230. According to an October 2003 United Daily News poll, 62 percent of respondents identified themselves as Taiwanese, whereas only 16 percent identified themselves as Taiwanese in 1989. Only 19 percent identified themselves as Chinese, down from 52 percent in 1989. See Philip P. Pan, "New National Identity Emerges in Taiwan: Culture Shifting Away from the Mainland," Washington Post, January 2, 2004. According to MAC data, between January 1993 and July 2001, those identifying themselves as Chinese fell from 48.5 percent to 13.6 percent, those identifying themselves as both rose from 32.7 percent to 38.5 percent; and strikingly, those identifying themselves as Taiwanese rose from 16.7 percent to 42.5 percent. See Corcuff, Memories of the Future; A-chin Hsiau, "Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism (London: Routledge, 2000); Angelina Chun-chu Yee, "Constructing a Native Consciousness: Taiwan Literature in the 20th Century," China Quarterly, Vol. 165 (March 2001), pp. 83-101; Yun-han Chu and Jih-wen Lin, "Political Development in 20th-century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation, and the Construction of National Identity," ibid., pp. 102-129; and Lee Teng-hui, "Understanding Taiwan: Bridging the Perception Gap," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 6 (November/December 1999), pp. 9-14.
231. According to an October 2003 United Daily News poll, 62 percent of respondents identified themselves as Taiwanese, whereas only 16 percent identified themselves as Taiwanese in 1989. Only 19 percent identified themselves as Chinese, down from 52 percent in 1989. See Philip P. Pan, "New National Identity Emerges in Taiwan: Culture Shifting Away from the Mainland," Washington Post, January 2, 2004. According to MAC data, between January 1993 and July 2001, those identifying themselves as Chinese fell from 48.5 percent to 13.6 percent, those identifying themselves as both rose from 32.7 percent to 38.5 percent; and strikingly, those identifying themselves as Taiwanese rose from 16.7 percent to 42.5 percent. See Corcuff, Memories of the Future; A-chin Hsiau, "Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism (London: Routledge, 2000); Angelina Chun-chu Yee, "Constructing a Native Consciousness: Taiwan Literature in the 20th Century," China Quarterly, Vol. 165 (March 2001), pp. 83-101; Yun-han Chu and Jih-wen Lin, "Political Development in 20th-century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation, and the Construction of National Identity," ibid., pp. 102-129; and Lee Teng-hui, "Understanding Taiwan: Bridging the Perception Gap," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 6 (November/December 1999), pp. 9-14.
232. According to an October 2003 United Daily News poll, 62 percent of respondents identified themselves as Taiwanese, whereas only 16 percent identified themselves as Taiwanese in 1989. Only 19 percent identified themselves as Chinese, down from 52 percent in 1989. See Philip P. Pan, "New National Identity Emerges in Taiwan: Culture Shifting Away from the Mainland," Washington Post, January 2, 2004. According to MAC data, between January 1993 and July 2001, those identifying themselves as Chinese fell from 48.5 percent to 13.6 percent, those identifying themselves as both rose from 32.7 percent to 38.5 percent; and strikingly, those identifying themselves as Taiwanese rose from 16.7 percent to 42.5 percent. See Corcuff, Memories of the Future; A-chin Hsiau, "Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism (London: Routledge, 2000); Angelina Chun-chu Yee, "Constructing a Native Consciousness: Taiwan Literature in the 20th Century," China Quarterly, Vol. 165 (March 2001), pp. 83-101; Yun-han Chu and Jih-wen Lin, "Political Development in 20th-century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation, and the Construction of National Identity," ibid., pp. 102-129; and Lee Teng-hui, "Understanding Taiwan: Bridging the Perception Gap," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 6 (November/December 1999), pp. 9-14.
233. According to an October 2003 United Daily News poll, 62 percent of respondents identified themselves as Taiwanese, whereas only 16 percent identified themselves as Taiwanese in 1989. Only 19 percent identified themselves as Chinese, down from 52 percent in 1989. See Philip P. Pan, "New National Identity Emerges in Taiwan: Culture Shifting Away from the Mainland," Washington Post, January 2, 2004. According to MAC data, between January 1993 and July 2001, those identifying themselves as Chinese fell from 48.5 percent to 13.6 percent, those identifying themselves as both rose from 32.7 percent to 38.5 percent; and strikingly, those identifying themselves as Taiwanese rose from 16.7 percent to 42.5 percent. See Corcuff, Memories of the Future; A-chin Hsiau, "Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism (London: Routledge, 2000); Angelina Chun-chu Yee, "Constructing a Native Consciousness: Taiwan Literature in the 20th Century," China Quarterly, Vol. 165 (March 2001), pp. 83-101; Yun-han Chu and Jih-wen Lin, "Political Development in 20th-century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation, and the Construction of National Identity," ibid., pp. 102-129; and Lee Teng-hui, "Understanding Taiwan: Bridging the Perception Gap," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 6 (November/December 1999), pp. 9-14.
234. For good reviews of these developments, see Pan, "New National Identity Emerges in Taiwan"; and David Lague, "Goodbye to the Mainland," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 7, 2002.
235. For good reviews of these developments, see Pan, "New National Identity Emerges in Taiwan"; and David Lague, "Goodbye to the Mainland," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 7, 2002.
236. For recent discussions of the political developments on Taiwan in the 1990s/ see Bernice Lee, The Security Implications of the New Taiwan, Adelphi Papers No. 331 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Sheng Lijun, China's Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001).
237. For recent discussions of the political developments on Taiwan in the 1990s/ see Bernice Lee, The Security Implications of the New Taiwan, Adelphi Papers No. 331 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Sheng Lijun, China's Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001).
238. See "Taiwan: Former President Says Don't 'Panic' Over Chen's Remarks," China Post, August 6, 2002, FBIS CPP20020806000190; and "Taiwan President Says Remarks 'Oversimplified,'" Taiwan News, August 7, 2002, FBIS CPP20020807000173.
239. See "Taiwan: Former President Says Don't 'Panic' Over Chen's Remarks," China Post, August 6, 2002, FBIS CPP20020806000190; and "Taiwan President Says Remarks 'Oversimplified,'" Taiwan News, August 7, 2002, FBIS CPP20020807000173.
240. See "SCMP: Chen Shui-bian Asserts Taiwan 'Undeniably' Sovereign Nation," South China Morning Post, December 8, 2003, FBIS CPP20031208000139; "CNA: President Reaffirms 'No Compromise' on Taiwan Sovereignty," Central News Agency, June 28, 2001, FBIS CPP20010628000120; and "Taiwan: Lien Chan Urges Return to 'One China, Separate Interpretations' Basis," Central News Agency, October 18, 2000, CPP20001018000067.
241. See "SCMP: Chen Shui-bian Asserts Taiwan 'Undeniably' Sovereign Nation," South China Morning Post, December 8, 2003, FBIS CPP20031208000139; "CNA: President Reaffirms 'No Compromise' on Taiwan Sovereignty," Central News Agency, June 28, 2001, FBIS CPP20010628000120; and "Taiwan: Lien Chan Urges Return to 'One China, Separate Interpretations' Basis," Central News Agency, October 18, 2000, CPP20001018000067.
242. See "SCMP: Chen Shui-bian Asserts Taiwan 'Undeniably' Sovereign Nation," South China Morning Post, December 8, 2003, FBIS CPP20031208000139; "CNA: President Reaffirms 'No Compromise' on Taiwan Sovereignty," Central News Agency, June 28, 2001, FBIS CPP20010628000120; and "Taiwan: Lien Chan Urges Return to 'One China, Separate Interpretations' Basis," Central News Agency, October 18, 2000, CPP20001018000067.
243. See Shelley Rigger, "Social Science and National Identity: A Critique," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4 (Winter 1999-2000), p. 549.
244. See "Taiwan Referendum Law Passed, Largely Pan-Blue Creation," Tzu-Yu Shih-Pao, November 28, 2003, FBIS CPP20031128000106.
245. See Rigger, "Social Science and National Identity"; and Tsong-jyi Lin, "The Evolution of National Identity Issues in Democratizing Taiwan: An Investigation of the Elite-Mass Linkage," in Corcuff, Memories of the Future, pp. 123-143.
246. See Rigger, "Social Science and National Identity"; and Tsong-jyi Lin, "The Evolution of National Identity Issues in Democratizing Taiwan: An Investigation of the Elite-Mass Linkage," in Corcuff, Memories of the Future, pp. 123-143.
247. "CNA: Majority of Taiwan Residents Willing to Bear Arms: Poll," Central News Agency, July 14, 2002, FBIS CPP20020714000016. Although the results of this poll show a 13 percent drop over four years, this still a very high percentage. There is not enough information available from the poll to explain this change.
248. See "VP Lien Chan Interviewed by Time Magazine," Chung-Yang Jih-Pao, July 26, 1999.
249. See Pape, Bombing to Win, pp. 21-27. He cites such coercive failures as Germany versus Britain (World War I and World War II), France in the Rhineland (1923-24), Italy versus Ethiopia (1936), United States versus Japan (1941), Allied bombing of Germany (World War II), U.S. bombing of North Vietnam (1965-68), and Soviet operations in Afghanistan (1979-88). See ibid., p. 2. For other discussions of why coercion fails, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chap. 4.
250. See Pape, Bombing to Win, pp. 21-27. He cites such coercive failures as Germany versus Britain (World War I and World War II), France in the Rhineland (1923-24), Italy versus Ethiopia (1936), United States versus Japan (1941), Allied bombing of Germany (World War II), U.S. bombing of North Vietnam (1965-68), and Soviet operations in Afghanistan (1979-88). See ibid., p. 2. For other discussions of why coercion fails, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chap. 4.
251. See Pape, Bombing to Win, pp. 21-27. He cites such coercive failures as Germany versus Britain (World War I and World War II), France in the Rhineland (1923-24), Italy versus Ethiopia (1936), United States versus Japan (1941), Allied bombing of Germany (World War II), U.S. bombing of North Vietnam (1965-68), and Soviet operations in Afghanistan (1979-88). See ibid., p. 2. For other discussions of why coercion fails, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chap. 4.
252. See "TN Editorial Sees 'One Country, Two Systems' as Failed Policy," Taiwan News, July 1, 2002, FBIS CPP20020701000167; and "CNA: Taiwan President Decries Beijing's 'One Country, Two Systems' Model," Central News Agency, July 13, 2001, FBIS CPP20010713000149.
253. See "TN Editorial Sees 'One Country, Two Systems' as Failed Policy," Taiwan News, July 1, 2002, FBIS CPP20020701000167; and "CNA: Taiwan President Decries Beijing's 'One Country, Two Systems' Model," Central News Agency, July 13, 2001, FBIS CPP20010713000149.
254. See MAC, "Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China," May 2003, http: //www.mac.gov.tw.
255. See Robert Marquand, "Hong Kong's Rallies Test China's 'Two Systems' Policy," Christian Science Monitor, July 10, 2003.
256. The costs to the PRC of a failed use of force could be the subject of another article. At the very least, these costs would include threatening the survival of the regime, setting back the economic modernization project, risking the destruction of China's military and damage to the homeland if war broke out with the United States, losing diplomatic face in the international community, and forcing Taiwan to declare independence.
257. See Cole, The Great Wall at Sea. Although the PLAN is developing advanced antishipping cruise missiles (ASCMs), using these to attack merchant ships would be very expensive. ASCMs are more likely to be used against surface combatants or aircraft carriers.