Default and punishment in general equilibrium

Econometrica

Volumn 73, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 1-37

  Dubey, Pradeep ^a   Geanakoplos, John ^b   Shubik, Martin ^b  

^a STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Default; Endogenous assets; Equilibrium refinement; Incomplete markets; Moral hazard

Indexed keywords

EID: 24344500595     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00563.x     Document Type: Review

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