Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Volumn 3404, Issue , 2005, Pages 218-230

  Li, Xiang Yang ^a   Sun, Zheng ^b   Wang, Weizhao ^a  

^a ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b HONG KONG BAPTIST UNIVERSITY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SCIENCE; COSTS; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; SET THEORY;

COST ALLOCATION; COST SHARING; SET COVER GAMES; STRATEGYPROOF MECHANISMS;

COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS;

EID: 24144458883     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-31856-9_18     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (21)

1. Chvátal, V.: A greedy heuristic for the set-covering problem. Mathematics of Operation Research 4 (1979) 233-235
2. Feige, U.: A threshold of for approximating set cover. JACM 45 (1998) 634-652
3. Slavík, P.: Improved performance of the greedy algorithm for partial cover. Information Processing Letters 64 (1997) 251-254
4. Immorlica, N., Mahdian, M., Mirrokni, V.S.: Limitations of cross-monotonic cost-sharing schemes. In: ACM SODA 2005. To appear.
5. Marbach, P.: Priority service and max-min fairness. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 11 (2003) 733-746
6. Radunović, B., Boudec, J.Y.L.: A unified framework for max-min and min-max fairness with applications. In: Proceedings of 40th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing. (2002)
7. Osborne, M.J., Rubinstein, A.: A course in game theory. The MIT Press (1994)
8. Moulin, H., Shenker, S.: Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs:budget balance versus efficiency. Economic Theory 18 (2001) 511-533
9. Devanur, N., Mihail, M., Vazirani, V.: Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games. In: ACM EC (2003) 108-114
10. Pal, M., Tardos, E.: Group strategyproof mechanisms via primal-dual algorithms. In: IEEE FOCS (2003) 584-593
11. Feigenbaum, J., Papadimitriou, C.H., Shenker, S.: Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions. Journal of Computer and System Sciences 63 (2001) 21-41
12. Libman, L., Orda, A.: Atomic resource sharing in noncooperative networks. Telecommunication Systems 17 (2001) 385-409
13. Shenker, S., Clark, D., Estrin, D., Herzog, S.: Pricing in computer networks: Reshaping the research agenda. ACM Computer Comm. Review 26 (1996) 19-43
14. Feigenbaum, J., Krishnamurthy, A., Sami, R., Shenker, S.: Hardness results for multicast cost sharing. Theoretical Computer Science 304 (2003) 215-236
15. Archer, A., Feigenbaum, J., Krishnamurthy, A., Sami, R., Shenker, S.: Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing. Games and Economic Behavior 47 (2004) 36-71
16. Herzog, S., Shenker, S., Estrin, D.: Sharing the cost of multicast trees: An axiomatic analysis. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 5 (1997) 847-860
17. Li, X.Y., Sun, Z., Wang, W.: Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games (2004) at http://www.cs.iit.edu/~xli/publications-select. htm.
18. Vickrey, W.: Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance 16 (1961) 8-37
19. Clarke, E.H.: Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice 11 (1971) 17-33
20. Groves, T.: Incentives in teams. Econometrica 41 (1973) 617-631
21. Lehmann, D.J., Oćallaghan, L.I., Shoham, Y.: Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions. JACM 49 (2002) 577-602