Complexity and stochastic evolution of dyadic networks

Computers and Operations Research

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 312-327

  Baron, Richard ^a   Durieu, Jacques ^a   Haller, Hans ^b   Solal, Philippe ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ JEAN MONNET   (France)

^b VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Game theory; Network formation; NP hardness; Potential games; Stochastic stability

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COMPUTER SCIENCE; GAME THEORY; OPTIMIZATION; RELIABILITY; STOCHASTIC PROGRAMMING;

NASH NETWORK; NETWORK FORMATIONS; NP-HARDNESS; POTENTIAL GAMES; STOCHASTIC STABILITY;

COMPUTER NETWORKS;

EID: 23044466165     PISSN: 03050548     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.cor.2004.06.006     Document Type: Article

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