Learning from the Americanists (again): Theory and method in the study of delegation

The Politics of Delegation

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 200-219

  Pollack, Mark A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 22544451481     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203005989     Document Type: Chapter

References (34)

1. Barry R. Weingast and Mark Moran, 'Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policy-making by the Federal Trade Commission', Journal of Political Economy 91/5 (1983), pp.765-800.
2. John A. Ferejohn and Charles R. Shipan, 'Congressional Influence on Administrative Agencies: A Case Study of Telecommunications Policy', in Larry Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer (eds.), Congress Reconsidered (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 4th edn. 1989), pp.393-110.
3. Randall Calvert, Mark Moran and Barry Weingast, 'Congressional Influence Over Policymaking: The Case of the FTC, in Mathew McCubbins and Terry Sullivan (eds.), Theories of Congress: The New Institutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1987). For an earlier and highly influential version of the same argument, see Weingast and Moran, 'Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?'.
4. Terry M. Moe, 'An Assessment of the Positive Theory of "Congressional Dominance'", Legislative Studies Quarterly MIA (Nov. 1987), pp.475-520.
5. B. Dan Wood, 'Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcement', American Political Science Review 82/1 (1988), pp.213-34.
6. John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan, 'The Costs of Control: Legislators, Agencies, and Transaction Costs', Legislative Studies Quarterly 25/1 (2000), pp.25-52; quote from p.35.
7. David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers (New York: Cambridge University Press 1999).
8. Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1991)
9. Kathleen Bawn, 'Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choice About Administrative Procedures', American Political Science Review 89/1 (1995), pp.62-73
10. Kathleen Bawn, 'Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 13/1 (1997), pp.101-26
11. David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, 'Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion', American Journal of Political Science 38/3 (1994), pp.697-722
12. John. D. Huber, 'How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance: Credible Commitment, Information, and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Politics', American Political Science Review 92/3 (1998), pp.577-92.
13. See, e.g., Konstantine Gatsios and Paul Seabright, 'Regulation in the European Community', Oxford Review of Economic Policy 5/1 (1989), pp.37-60
14. Giandomenico Majone, Regulating Europe (New York: Routledge 1996)
15. Giandomenico Majone, 'The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation', Journal of Common Market Studies 38/2 (June 2000), pp.273-302
16. Epstein and O'Halloran, Delegating Powers, pp. 1-4.
17. See for example Mathew McCubbins and Talbot Page, 'A Theory of Congressional Delegation', in Mathew McCubbins and Terry Sullivan (eds.), Congress: Structure and Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press 1987), pp.409-25.
18. John D. Huber, 'Delegation to Civil Servants in Parliamentary Democracies', European Journal of Political Research 37/3 (2000), pp.397-113.
19. See, e.g., Epstein and O'Halloran, 'Administrative Procedures'
20. Epstein and O'Halloran, Delegating Powers
21. Bawn, 'Political Control versus Expertise'
22. Bawn, 'Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy'.
23. See David Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1991).
24. Mark A. Pollack, 'Delegation, Agency and Agenda Setting in the European Community', International Organization 51/1 (Winter 1997), pp.99-134.
25. For recent summaries of the principal-agent approach, see Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union (New York: St. Martin's Press 1999), ch. 2; and Jonas Tallberg's excellent review in this volume.
26. See, e.g., Christian Joerges and Jürgen Neyer, 'Transforming Strategic Interaction into Deliberative Problem-Solving: European Comitology in the Foodstuffs Sector', Journal of European Public Policy 4/4 (1997), pp.609-25.
27. See, e.g., Bernard Steunenberg, Christian Koboldt and Dieter Schmidtchen, 'Policymaking, Comitology, and the Balance of Power in the European Union', International Review of Law and Economic 16/3 (1996), pp.329-44
28. Bernard Steunenberg, Christian Koboldt and Dieter Schmidtchen, 'Beyond Comitology: A Comparative Analysis of Implementation Procedures with Parliamentary Involvement', Aussenwirtschaft 52/1 (1997), pp.87-112; and Pollack, 'Delegation, Agency and Agenda Setting'.
29. Rhys Dogan, 'Comitology: Little Procedures with Big Implications', West European Politics 20/3 (1997), pp.31-60
30. Fabio Franchino, 'Control of the Commission's Executive Functions:Uncertainty, Conflict and Decision Rules', European Union Politics 1/1 (2000), pp.63-92.
31. John D. Huber, Charles R. Shipan and Madalaine Pfahler, 'Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy', American Journal of Political Science 45/2 (April 2001), pp.330-45.
32. John D. Huber and Arthur Lupia, 'Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies', American Journal of Political Science 45/1 (Jan. 2001), pp. 18-33.
33. Kaare Strøm, 'Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies', European Journal of Political Research 37/3 (May 2000), pp.261-89; quote from p.267.
34. See R.A.W. Rhodes, Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability (Philadelphia: Open University Press 1997).