Deposit insurance: A reconsideration

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 49, Issue 6, 2002, Pages 1235-1260

  Boyd, John H ^a   Chang, Chun ^a   Smith, Bruce D ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^c FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036742662     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(02)00143-5     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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