How do entrenchment and expropriation phenomena affect control mechanisms?

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 13, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 505-516

  De Miguel, Alberto ^a   Pindado, Julio ^a   De La Torre, Chabela ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SALAMANCA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Control mechanisms; Corporate governance; Entrenchment; Expropriation

Indexed keywords

EID: 22144471926     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00445.x     Document Type: Conference Paper

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