Dividend policy, corporate governance and the managerial entrenchment hypothesis: An empirical analysis

Journal of Business Finance and Accounting

Volumn 30, Issue 9-10, 2003, Pages 1173-1209

  Farinha, Jorge ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PORTO   (Portugal)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 22144497316     PISSN: 0306686X     EISSN: 14685957     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0306-686X.2003.05624.x     Document Type: Article

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