Deadline effects in sequential bargaining - An experimental study

International Game Theory Review

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 117-135

  Güth, Werner ^a   Levati, M Vittoria ^a   Maciejovsky, Boris ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN HISTORY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Deadline effect; Decreasing pie; Ultimatum game

Indexed keywords

EID: 21644488600     PISSN: 02191989     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1142/S0219198905000442     Document Type: Article

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