Early or late conflict settlement in a variety of games - An experimental study

Journal of Economic Psychology

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 177-194

  Anderhub, Vital ^a   Güth, Werner ^b   Marchand, Nadège ^c  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN HISTORY   (Germany)

^c Groupe Analyse/de Theorie Economique   (France)

Author keywords

Negotiation; Nonmonotonic pie; Ultimatum power

Indexed keywords

EID: 1142303078     PISSN: 01674870     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-4870(02)00191-5     Document Type: Article

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