Accounting Recognition, Moral Hazard, and Communication

Contemporary Accounting Research

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 458-490

  Liang, Pierre Jinghong ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Accounting recognition; Agency theory; Communication; Moral hazard

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346985176     PISSN: 08239150     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1506/vk8r-aadh-ur0d-6qr6     Document Type: Article

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