Economic interdependence, bargaining power, and political influence

International Organization

Volumn 42, Issue 3, 1988, Pages 461-483

  Wagner, R Harrison ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84972168015     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300027703     Document Type: Article

References (14)

1. Klaus Knorr, “International Economic Leverage and Its Uses” in Klaus Knorr and Frank Trager, eds., Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1977), p. 102.
2. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).
3. Albert Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945).
4. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, pp. 45–46.
5. A. E. Roth, Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985
6. K. G. Binmore and p. Dasgupta, eds., The Economics of Bargaining (New York: Blackwell, 1987
7. K. G. Binmore, “Nash Bargaining Theory II” and “Perfect Equilibrium in Bargaining Models” in Binmore and Dasgupta, eds., The Economics of Bargaining, pp. 61–105
8. K. G. Binmore, A. Rubinstein, and A. Wolinsky, “The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling” ICERD Discussion Paper 85/112, London School of Economics, 1985. While it is important to note the potential effect of differences in discount rates, this feature of the solution will not play a role in the subsequent discussion.
9. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, pp. 26–29 48–52
10. J. C. Harsanyi, Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 186–89.
11. Knorr, “Economic Leverage and Its Uses” p. 103.
12. J. Hart, “Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations” International Organization 30 (Spring 1976), pp. 293–294.
13. A. Rubinstein, “A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences” Econometrica 53 (September 1985), pp. 1151–72.
14. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. 30.