An experiment on learning with limited information: Nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 47, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 325-352

  Friedman, Eric ^a   Shor, Mikhael ^b   Shenker, Scott ^c   Sopher, Barry ^d  

^a School of Operations Research and Industrial Engineering   (United States)

^b VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER SCIENCE INSTITUTE   (United States)

^d RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cournot; Experiments; Internet pricing; Learning; Limited information; Serial cost sharing

Indexed keywords

EID: 1942509654     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00183-0     Document Type: Article

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