Rational actors, tit-for-tat types, and the evolution of cooperation

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 27-56

  Guttman, Joel M ^a  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Evolutionary models; Prisoners' dilemma; Rationality; Repeated games; Voluntary cooperation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0029691669     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0167-2681(95)00050-X     Document Type: Article

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