A comparative study of game theoretic and evolutionary models of bargaining for software agents

Artificial Intelligence Review

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 185-203

  Fatima, Shaheen S ^a   Wooldridge, Michael ^a   Jennings, Nicholas R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bargaining; E commerce; Evolutionary algorithms; Game theory; Software agents

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; DATABASE SYSTEMS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHMS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; SOFTWARE AGENTS; WORLD WIDE WEB;

BARGAINING; CONSUMER-TO-CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS; EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY; RATIONAL DELIBERATION;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 17144386982     PISSN: 02692821     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10462-004-6391-1     Document Type: Article

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