The influence of information on negotiation equilibrium

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2531, Issue , 2002, Pages 180-193

  Fatima, Shaheen S ^a   Wooldridge, Michael ^a   Jennings, Nicholas R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; SCATTERING PARAMETERS;

AMOUNT OF INFORMATION; DISTRIBUTION PROPERTY; EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTIONS; INFORMATION STATE; NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES; RELATIVE IMPACT;

INTELLIGENT AGENTS;

EID: 21144442914     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-36378-5_11     Document Type: Conference Paper

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