An agenda-based framework for multi-issue negotiation

Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 152, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 1-45

  Fatima, Shaheen S ^a   Wooldridge, Michael ^a   Jennings, Nicholas R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Agendas; Game theory; Intelligent agents; Multi issue negotiation

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SOFTWARE; CONSTRAINT THEORY; GAME THEORY; OPTIMIZATION; PARETO PRINCIPLE; SERVERS;

MULTI-ISSUE NEGOTIATION;

INTELLIGENT AGENTS;

EID: 0242526826     PISSN: 00043702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0004-3702(03)00115-2     Document Type: Article

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