Voting on pensions: A survey

Journal of Economic Surveys

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 181-209

  de Walque, Grégory ^a  

^a NATIONAL BANK OF BELGIUM   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Intertemporal consumer choice; Median voter; Public pension

Indexed keywords

CONSUMER-RESOURCE INTERACTION; CONSUMPTION BEHAVIOR; PENSION SYSTEM; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 15844403229     PISSN: 09500804     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0950-0804.2005.00244.x     Document Type: Article

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