Heterogeneous dynasties and the political economy of public debt

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 103, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 369-389

  De Walque, Grégory ^a   Gevers, Louis ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NAMUR   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Altruism; Median voter; Public debt; Ricardian equivalence

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040924366     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00251     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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3. Blanchard, O. (1985), Debt, Deficits and Finite Horizons, Journal of Political Economy 93, 223-247.
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5. de Crombrugghe, A. and Gevers, L. (2000), Conflicts within Economic Dynasties: Selfishness versus Descending Altruism, in L.-A. Gérard-Varet, S. Kolm and J. Mercier-Ythier (eds.), The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism, Macmillan, London.
6. Diamond, P. (1965), National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model, American Economic Review 55, 1126-1150.
7. Gevers, L. and Michel, P. (1998), Economic Dynasties with Intermissions, Games and Economic Behavior 25, 251-271.
8. Michel, P. and Pestieau, P.(1998), Fiscal Policy in a Growth Model with both Altruistic and non-Altruistic Agents, Southern Economic Journal 64, 682-697.
9. Vidal, J.-P. (1996), Altruisme et Hétérogénéité, Annales d'Economie et de Statistiques 43, 57-71.
10. Weil, P. (1989), Overlapping Families of Infinitely-lived Agents, Journal of Public Economics 38, 183-198.