The political economy of social security

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 102, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 503-522

  Casamatta, Georges ^a,b   Cremer, Helmuth ^a   Pestieau, Pierre ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LIÈGE   (Belgium)

^c UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Majority voting; Social security

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034376566     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00212     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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3. Casamatta, G. (1999), The Political Economy of Social Protection and Redistribution, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toulouse.
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11. Tabellini, G. (2000), A Positive Theory of Social Security, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 102(3), 523-545.
12. Veall, M. R. ( 1986), Public Pensions as Optimal Social Contracts, Journal of Public Economics 31, 237-251.