The political economy of social security: A survey

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 1-29

  Galasso, Vincenzo ^a,b,c   Profeta, Paola ^a  

^a BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

^c CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Multidimensional voting; Political pressure; Political sustainability; Redistribution; Social security reforms

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036188067     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(01)00066-0     Document Type: Article

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